


A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM AND AL-SHABAAB REFERENCES IN
SOCIAL MEDIA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA


by

Richard Michael Rodriguez Jr.
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science
Geoinformatics and Geospatial Intelligence

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
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Date: 

Summer Semester 2014
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

A Spatial Analysis of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab References in Social Media in Sub-Saharan Africa

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University

by

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Bachelor of Science
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Summer Semester 2014
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA



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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my loving wife Kristen, and my dog Blake.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the many friends, relatives, and supporters who have made this happen. My loving Wife, Kristen, assisted me in my research. Dr. Anthony Stefanidis, and the other members of my committee were of invaluable help. Finally, thanks go out to the Fenwick Library for providing a clean, quiet, and well-equipped repository in which to work.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Volunteered Geographic Information VGI
Sub-Saharan Africa SSA
Ambient Geographic Information AGI
Social Media IntelligenceSOCMINT
Geospatial Intelligence.....GEOINT

ABSTRACT

A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM AND AL-SHABAAB REFERENCES IN SOCIAL MEDIA IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Richard Michael Rodriguez Jr., M.S.

George Mason University, 2014

Thesis Director: Dr. Anthony Stefanidis

This thesis describes the role that social media can play in showing how terrorist organization can impact people's conversation via Twitter. The two groups that this thesis focusses on are Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. We present a new approach of how we can look into how terrorist organization can be analyzed and see what kind of impacts they may have over different cultures. The process used in researching and writing this thesis, is we conducted literature search of the social media phenomenon and what social media can provide. We look to build on research by using the social media phenomenon to find what types of impacts terrorist organizations may have over cultures along with seeing how a terrorist event can have impact over people on social media. This thesis hopes to expand on previous research on the academic uses for social media, as well as add to the expanding role that social media can be used for intelligence purposes.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Introduction

While social media may be a mainstay in the western world, too much of the earth's population, this phenomenon is still a fairly new medium of self-expression (Wyche, et al., 2013) that has given the developing world a new way of connecting and informing beyond traditional borders. Current mapping possibilities have become more prevalent since the turn of the century and the appearance of the first geospatially equipped websites (Sui and Goodchild, 2011). Geospatially equipped social media has opened up a new pool of data for the geospatial analyst. Geographic data harvested from social media could also be referred to as Ambient Geographic Information (AGI), which is a subcategory of volunteered geographic information (VGI) because it is more crowd harvesting versus VGI, which is more crowdsourcing (Crooks, et al., 2013).

Information from Social media is a form of communication for people to put news, propaganda, culture, and indeed any information they feel worth sharing with the family, friends or the larger public can be analyzed for its geographic information. VGI can be very useful to a broad spectrum of intelligence analysis with uses in both the civilian and commercial world and for the military (Goodchild, 2007). The growing work of GIS and Geography will continue to use VGI to show social and cultural contexts, which lie within VGI (Lin, 2013).

This allows for virtual polycentric communities to be formed giving a new perspective on geopolitical boundaries (Stefanidis, et al., 2014). Social media has now allowed for information to be disseminated at a much larger scale and at a faster rate. This can be shown through many different works and defining moments in time that can be correlated to the use of social media to get the message out through non-traditional channels (Crooks, et al., 2013). Capturing defining moments over different times and spaces will allow us to see the see geospatial trends through the analysis of geolocated tweets.

When a tweet is posted, it has geolocation information that is either populated by the publisher (Twitter) or by the client through which the tweet was submitted (Croitoru, et. al, 2013). Empowered with the location data allows the analyst to have a geographic context of where the information is originating from and makes geospatial analysis of different topics to be correlated to geographic locations. With the ability to correlate the information in a large number of tweets much deeper types of analysis are now possible. Geospatial analysis has allowed for the construction of maps based on a sort of cyber-space representation on how any particular part of the world “feels” about a specific subject (Zook, et al., 2011). With maps and data driven by a representation of tweets, it is now possible to observe how different parts of the world may perceive different events. Viewing the web and flow of social media information through geographic location, in effect, allows geospatial analyst to analyze how different parts of the earth express themselves in an unfiltered and unedited way, which would otherwise be limited by the reach of traditional news outlets.

With social media essentially a way of free speech and a way for user to make themselves heard we see many different types of user joining social media sites. We are now seeing many terrorist organization joining different types of social media to further promote their agendas (Naidu, 2013). This is no different with Sub-Saharan African terrorist organizations. They are utilizing this new type of resource available. With Al-shabaab and Boko Haram both conducting operations in the last year and utilizing social media we have chosen to focus our attentions on these two organizations within Sub-Saharan Africa.

The main focus of this paper will be to contribute a geospatial representation of the impacts that Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have on twitter. This will be expressed through a number of geographic processes to help give a clear picture on what kind geospatial impact these two groups have on the world.

The Remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 addresses previous studies in this research area and how they relate to this study followed by chapter 3 that will discuss what and how our study can contribute a geospatial analysis approach to study area. Chapter 4 is the methodologies used to appropriate the data to which will be used for our test study. In Chapter 5 is where we perform the analysis on the dataset. We conclude with the outlook in chapter 6.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Social Media Phenomenon

Webster's dictionary defines social media as forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos). The social media phenomenon has been felt across the globe. When people are online they are actively engaged in some form of social media platforms ranging from social networking sites, blogs, to video and music sharing sites. If people have an Internet connection they will be engaging in social media (Smith, 2010). Social media has little to do with traditional types of informational media but rather creates a venue for an audience to connect, interact and communicate with one another through different types of social media sites (Correa, et al., 2010). Interaction of people at this large of scale will allow researchers to discover different types applications with the data that they are creating inadvertently by participating in the social media phenomenon.

2.2 What Social Media Provides

Social media is made up by a variety of Internet platforms that include social networking sites, sharing sites, blogs, and wikis (Kietzmann, et al., 2011). These different types of sites allow for users to have interaction between each other. This

allows for a direct engagement of people and companies at low cost and timely manor, which is more efficient than other forms of traditional interaction such as sending a letter, advertising, and social engagements (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). Social media also allows for users to participate at their convenience. Social media has been transformed by Social networking sites (SNS), which have allowed for greater interaction of individuals (Edosomwan et al., 2011). SNS revolve around people and not just an interest, where many Internet sites are still based on interests. This allows for the individuals on SNS to be the center of their networks. SNS create a world of centric networks oppose to a social group (Boyd and Ellison, 2007). By allowing these individuals to create their networks they are able to form common interest thus they are able to dictate the content that is warranted by their network. Many of these networks create a common interest and have many like-minded people within their networks. These networks are not restricted to local areas since they are created on virtual domains, which allows for a diverse group of like-minded people in these networks. This allows analyst to view how a network may think and possible operate. The large participation of people on SNS and social media, allows for virtual communities to be formed. Identifying these communities and mapping them by exploiting the geospatial content of the social media feeds allows for geographical analysis of these communities that would otherwise not be present (Stefanidis, et al., 2014). Being able to analyze social media for its geographical information allows for analysis of different types of online communities that would not be possible with other forms of media. Omand, et al., (2012) propose the introduction of a new form of intelligence; social media intelligence (SOCMINT) and

using SOCMINT for intelligence purposes and for law enforcement. By incorporating SOCMINT into geospatial analysis we will be able to further analyze communities and possible use this for geospatial intelligence purposes. The explosion of social media has opened up many opportunities for analysis. The addition of geospatial-enabled site has further opened the door for geospatial analysis of these online communities and the tracking of how these communities and groups interact with one another.

This thesis will focus on one form of SNS, which is Twitter. Jack Dorsey developed twitter in 2006. He originally developed it as a form of short messaging service (SMS)-based communication platform so that friends could keep up with each other. This is why twitter is only limited to 145 characters because mobile carriers at the time of development only allowed 145 characters. Twitter has continued to grow and develop into more of a mainstream social media that allows users to interact with each other. According to twitters webpage they have 255 million monthly active users and 500 million tweets per day (Twitter, 2014). Twitter also allows for researchers to download one percent of tweets through their application-programming interface (API).

Twitter was chosen for this thesis because of the rapid and easy communication it allows it users to have. This is not the only reason, as when you have 255 million curious users and large part of the actively engaging in their curiosity on a daily basis (Russell, et al., 2013). Twitter also focuses less on the information about the person giving the users some anonymity and focusing more on what a person has to say rather than focusing on the that person (Hughes, et al., 2012). These curious users will create networks by their interactions with each other thus allowing us to analyze them. Twitter has already played

a role in raising global consciousness about terrorist attacks in India (Hanson, ed al., 2010).

2.3 Use of Social Media by Terrorist

Social media has also allowed terrorist organization to have access to creating social networks and communicating their agendas and spreading their propaganda to a large audience. The attacks in Kenya by African Militants Al-Shabaab primarily used twitter to communicate their goals and claim responsibility for the attacks (Naidu, 2013). Many terrorist and Jihadist have been using twitter on a regular basis to upload pictures and videos of them to further promote their agenda and show what they are contributing to the cause (Prucha and Fisher, 2013). Not only are terrorist using twitter to further spread their views but regularly monitor twitter so they can have situational awareness. The Mumbai terrorist regularly monitored the official twitter page thus indirectly aiding them with situational awareness (Oh, et al., 2011).

2.4 Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab

In this thesis we will focus on primarily on two terrorist organizations (Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab) to see how they have impact over twitter networks. Both of these groups operate in Sub-Saharan Africa. Boko Haram operates in most populous country of Nigeria with intentions of promoting an extreme version of Islam which forbids them to take part in any kind of western society (Chothia, 2011). Al-Shabaab operates out of the Somalia but carries out many operations in Kenya (BBC, 2014). Al-shabaab agenda is to create Somali Caliphate of the Wahhabi Islamic sect in the Somali

inhabited regions; they plan to achieve their goals by committing violent operations (Ali, 2008). These organizations have been in the active over the last year for attacks they have conducted. With Bin Laden deceased the global war on terror is shifting and could possibly be shifting in the near future to groups to groups in Africa (Bertram and Ellison, 2014). Our focus will be on these organization and the possible networks they create on social media.

Boko Haram is active on SNS with Facebook and twitter. There twitter account seems to be closer to the militants but this is not always true. They show graphic photograph and videos of operations but also would show them performing community engagements to help gather support (Bertram and Ellison, 2014). With Boko Haram having a presence on SNS we will be able to further investigate what kind of networks they may impact.

Al-Shabaab opened its first official twitter account in 2011 and fully embraced the use that this SNS tool to its fullest by bragging about the accomplishment that they have achieved (Gettleman, 2011). During the 2013 Westgate mall attack Al-Shabaab released a tweet laying claim to the attack and describing why they were conducting the attack. They basically said that they were taking the fight to the Kenyans on their land (Agbiboa, 2014). This is an example of how Al-Shabaab can have an impact though SNS by reaching people all the way in the western world with only posting a tweet (Allen, 2014). By Al-Shabaab using twitter to claim this attack we will be able to analyze these date to see what kind of networks are possibly created and we can further analyze what kind of impact they may have with different countries.

2.5 Analyzing Social Media Geospatially

Social media has become a viable way for citizens to express their self in a very intimate and immediate way. In the past ten years, cell phone access in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased greatly. Access to cell phones in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased dramatically over the past decade with 30 mobile phones per 100 people in Sub-Saharan Africa (Owiny, et al., 2014). The opportunities of a mobile Internet connection open to the public in Sub-Saharan Africa contrast greatly with struggles traditional media faced in the late 20th century. Where black journalists were beaten down, arrested or went missing for reporting on the Soweto protests of 1976 in South Africa, more recently Kenyans turned heavily to social media during the elections of 2007 (Olorunnisola and Martin, 2012). While the effect of social media was mixed with radio driven hate speech and spam text messages contributing to violence, bloggers exposing sham voting processes did play an important part in advancing citizen journalism through social media (Odinga 2013). The effect of this new communication tool isn't limited to times of crisis. Kassam (2012) looks into how incorporating social media into the schools in Kenya can play a role in the world and how kids can use this to get a better understanding of how the world works.

As Africa has leap-frogged its need for a fixed line Internet (Casey and Davies, 2012) and the availability of mobile phones grows, the actual accessibility of a connected population in Sub-Saharan Africa faces limits. While many in the western world take the social media juggernaut Facebook for granted as a free service, the costs of obtaining an Internet connection in Kenya alone, by phone or PC are very real. Poor electrical utility

infrastructure leading to frequent blackouts, bandwidth costs or internet cafe charges has made social media unrealized potential (Wyche, et al., 2013). This form of the digital divide is ever present in Sub-Saharan Africa because it has been shown that the least developed African countries have very low Internet access and usage rates (Fuchs and Horak, 2008).

While social media is a new tool for communication and can bring powerful advantages for a populace, so too come unintended consequences. The US State department lists both Boko Haram from Nigeria and Al-Shabaab from Somalia as terrorist organizations. And much like similar groups around the globe, they quickly embraced social media. For established journalism outlets, embracing social media has very real caveats. In the case of the Syrian civil war, verification and authentication of sources and content has become a real problem (Lynch, et al., 2014).

Social media has become an avenue for citizens to express one's self and reach a large audience. The use of micro blogs can be analyzed to connect virtual communities though their connections to other user (Stefanidis, et al., 2013). Analyzing this type of data can give a better perception of the atmosphere of communities. With increased use of social media along with the ever-evolving new computer technologies that allow us to stay connected virtually anytime these types of virtual communities will continue to grow as more users get added.

Terrorist organizations are using these types of communities to further their agenda in a way that has not really been done in the past. Boko Haram, which operates out of Nigeria, and Al-shabaab, which operates out of Somalia, have both used social

media to further their agendas. Evans, 2014 has done network analysis on the micro blogging of this organization to show the use of social media in strategic communication and engagement. Social media has opened doors for us to study these communities online and see what type of impact they have. Another aspect of studying this type of data is to see how countries and local communities take interest in these different types of terrorist organizations. In this study we look more into the human factors of how these organizations impact different communities through social media. By performing traditional analysis of the twitter data that has been collected we will be able to get and better understanding of how the world responds to a time of crises. We create a participation index for each country based of the number of tweets and then normalize it by the country's population. These participation indices will allow us to get a better picture of how each country feels about these terrorist organizations.

Taking this analysis to a global scale to display how countries participate in expressing themselves about these organizations would allow to better understanding of how a particular population feels. By not limiting ourselves to any one region we can get a better global understanding of how different nations react and participate in the flow of social information circulating from these organizations.

This type of analysis is of interest to a wide variety of countries in addition to businesses. Social analysis can be of interest to countries looking to find allies for help in combating a terrorist organization and finding hotspots of support or opposition to issues. This thesis can contribute to the information used by policy makers in researching the sentiment of their own population on issues. Analysis of social media can be helpful in a

decision if combating or avoiding a conflict will better suit their citizens. Just as a volatile message may draw a great deal of social attention, a policy maker may find the general population could have no material support or sustained interest in the these divisive groups or the countries where they operate.

CHAPTER THREE

Objective and Hypothesis

The objective of this thesis is to use geospatial analysis techniques and apply them to geospatially located tweets. In applying these techniques we want to investigate how social media can be analyzed for its geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) purposes. GEOINT means the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information that describes, assesses, and visually depicts physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth (NGA, 2005). As mentioned earlier the introduction of SOCMINT could possibly help further using social media for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. We plan to take this idea of SOCMINT one step further by applying GEOINT techniques to it. This will allow us to fuse these two types of intelligence to have a broader more accurate intelligence picture that would otherwise be hard to get.

We are looking to find how Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab can impact different countries through twitter. This thesis will investigate tweets over a three month period referencing either Boko Haram or Al-Shabaab. We are looking to find what kind of geospatial relationships these countries may have about these two groups. This is an important area of research in social media to help provide information on how different countries may feel about certain terrorist organizations. Another aspect that we hope to uncover is how a terrorist event can change the impact of how countries respond though

twitter. We want to see if more countries will take an interest in these organization by having a higher participation during the month of the event or the month after it occurred.

We plan on doing this by performing different types of geospatial analysis to the dataset. First we will show the where these tweets from the dataset are located and show where the highest tweeting countries are by performing a density analysis. Next we plan to analyze the participation of each country and compare them to see what kinds of impacts these two terrorist organizations have.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS

4. Harvesting of Data

4.1 Process in which data is collected

George Mason University Center for Geospatial Intelligence has come up with a dynamic process for “Harvesting ambient geospatial information from social media feeds” (Stefanidis, et al., 2013). This system transforms social media data into geosocial data. The process has multi-steps that generally require data collection from a set of social media data providers through their Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), processing its geolocation content, and storing the data in a dedicated database for further analysis (Croitoru, et al., 2013). Having a system like this allows for the discovery of valuable information from social media.

The way the system works for Twitter is there are two different API's that can be accessed. The first is a streaming style API that is just a continuous flow which is subject to the parameters collector sets. The second is a REST API (Twitter, 2014) which allows for queries to the twitter servers which will return results given the query parameters.

Once the API's are accessed the data is queried form a JSON stream it is transferred with all the information into a database system (Croitoru, et al., 2013). This data can then be sent to analyst in different formats. Collecting data using twitters API has allowed for a mass collection of different time periods. This system allows for many different key words and time periods to be collected.

Figure 1 shows the process that was used to convert the data in to a usable dataset for Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) ArcGIS. People create tweets and then this information stored by twitter an then it is processed by the system that has been established by the George Mason University Center for Geospatial Intelligence. This data is then sent to analysts in the form the tab-separated values (.tsv) file. This file will be converted to a text file that can be opened and saved Microsoft Access database (.mdb). Once in a Microsoft Database file the database can be accessed using ESRI ArcCatalog by Object Linking and Embedding, Database (OLE-DB) connection. With this connection we can convert this to a table within a file geodatabase. When we have this table in the file geodatabase we can convert the data it to a usable feature classes in ArcGIS.




Figure 1. A system how we harvest social media feeds that is driven by Twitter and convert it two usable geospatial information.

The data that was available to use for this thesis was collect from April 2013 to March 2014, the .tsv files were just over six gigabytes of data. For the analysis of this thesis we will analyze the months of July, September, and October 2013. We choose these months because in the month of September the terrorist organization Al-shabaab attacked the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The three month study had a total of 9,332,201 tweets; 5,563,007 of those tweets were geolocated, of those geolocated tweets 5,194,001 tweets had locations that were located within land which are highlighted in figure 2. This shows that not all geolocated tweets have an accurate geolocation. This shows there are a number of Null values that are of no use to performing geospatial analysis. They can be used for network analysis between users or used for analysis of hash tags and other references in the text portion of the data.




Figure 2. The location of geolocated tweets referring to Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya in our dataset (period 01 August – 31 October 2013). The locations are marked by green dots.

4.2 Key words that were used for harvesting data

The data used for the analysis in this thesis was collected using the key words of “Kenya”, “Nigeria”, and “Ghana” along with a bounding box around SSA. Kenya and Nigeria were chosen because these two countries have a higher presence on social media along with having a high presence of terrorist activities. Ghana was primarily chose because it has a good presence on social media but also because it’s close proximity to Nigeria. The restriction we have for pulling these tweets that reference these key words is the language barrier. This could possibly affect the data as we are only pulling tweets that are in the English language. Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana all have a primary language of English but also have other languages that are spoken within their borders. Ghana

could have the biggest impact by the language barrier since English accounts for only a small portion of languages being spoken despite being the official language.

4.3 Creating the Feature Class with Our Parameters

We have our data from the above process that was selected using the key words. We now want to extract tweets in the feature class that only reference Boko Haram or Al-Shabaab. Figure 3 shows the process of how we get the tweets referencing these two groups into a feature class.




Figure 3. Process of getting a feature class with parameters.

A query was performed on the feature class that we got from the process above to extract tweets referencing the two terrorist groups either Boko Haram or Al-Shabaab. This is performed as a SQL query on the text portion of the tweet. We query for different spellings of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. Next we perform a SQL query on the feature class with tweets referencing the groups to query entities that have a centroid located within our land boundaries feature class. This allows us to have all the geolocated tweets

located within a country boundaries. Unfortunately not all geolocated tweets are have an accurate geolocation. Once all the data is selected we perform an export to new feature class of the queried entities. This will become our new feature class that has entities that only reference Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in tweets and that have a land based geolocation. The will leaves us with 20,023 tweets from our original dataset.

4.4 Dataset for Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab

As highlighted by the above the process we were able to get our dataset to tweets that only referenced Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. These 20,023 tweets will be the dataset analyzed in this thesis. Figure 4 visualizes these tweets that only reference Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. This visual representation of the points shows that many of the countries that had a high numbers of tweets in the original dataset of 5,194,001 tweets continue to have a high number tweets in dataset that will be used in this thesis. The countries that the two groups operate in (Nigeria and Kenya) have the high number of tweets located within their borders. This reveals that these countries are interested in the terrorist groups operating within their borders.




Figure 4. The location of geolocated tweets referring to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in our dataset (period 01 August – 31 October 2013). The locations are marked by green dots.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS

Geospatial Analysis of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab

5.1 Boko Haram

Tweets referencing Boko Haram account for 10,444 out of the 20,023 tweets that were collected for this study. Of those 10,444 tweets we generated a word cloud using the text portion of all the tweets. Figure 5. shows the words from the text portion that were ingested into a word cloud generator to get the key words that are most used to reveal what people are tweeting about. The word cloud generator used is wordle.net which displays the 150 most frequently used word in the text portion. The size of the word is proportional to the use of the word (Viegas, et al., 2009). This allows us to get a better understanding of what is being tweeted about. The word cloud reveals that the main things tweeted about in the dataset for Boko Haram are words that can be closely associated with terrorism. There are words like strike, bomb and killing. The revealing of these words that are associated with terrorist activities shows that people genuinely have a concern about what this group is doing or acts that they are committing.




Figure 6. A density analysis revealing hotspots in geolocated tweet, generated using ArcGIS 10.1 Spatial Analysis.

In order for us to better utilize the data that we have and get a true picture of the data we must create an index that allows us to normalize our data. The reason we normalize this data is it allows for us to compare relations between countries. To normalize our dataset we will take our total number of tweets and divide that by the countries total population. Doing this gives us our participation index. Table 1 shows our dataset with the countries and the participation index for the top 15 countries that tweeted about Boko Haram. As you can see this table give us a better understanding of

how countries are participating in tweeting about Boko Haram. You can see in that India has the fifth most tweets but has a rather low participation index do to the amount of people in the country.

Table 1. Top Tweeting generating countries referring to Boko Haram

Country	Population	Twitter traffic	Participation index
Nigeria	168833776	5310	3.145
United States	313914040	2696	0.858
Kenya	43178141	348	0.805
United Kingdom	63612729	284	0.446
India	1236686732	152	0.012
Ghana	25366462	128	0.504
France	65696689	107	0.162
Canada	34754312	93	0.267
Italy	59539717	83	0.139
Burkina Faso	16460141	79	0.479
Spain	46761264	74	0.158
Congo, DRC	65705093	72	0.109
Belgium	11128246	69	0.620
Brazil	198656019	65	0.032
Germany	80425823	65	0.080

We can take the information table 1 and visualize it in a map to see how each country is participating in comparison to each other as shown in figure 7. We can see in figure 8 that Nigeria, Kenya, and the United states have high participation rates. What is also worth noting in this map is the countries with a relative close proximity to Nigeria also had a high participation index. If you take note of figure 6 there is a high level of tweets coming from that region. The highest density of tweets for Boko haram came

from that area. Comparing figures 6 and 7 allows us to see that countries who have a high participation index also have higher densities.




Figure 7. The top 15 countries of Table 2 plotted with their normalized participation index metrics

Analysis of figure 8 allows us to analyze a pie chart that showing us a comparison of participation of each country. Nigeria had the highest participation of tweets referring to Boko Haram. The United States and Kenya were the other two countries that have a vested interest in which there citizens take interest in tweeting about Boko Haram. We can take note that many European countries tweet about Boko Haram.




Figure 8. A representation of Boko Haram's impact using twitter feeds for the time period of 01 August 2013 - 31 October 2013 using population-normalized participation indices.

We can further break down the data on Boko haram by the participation indices by Month. In doing this we look to see the impacts that Boko Haram has over a certain region each month. What we expect to see in doing this is to see if certain months create a higher participation index for different countries. We can also see the impact that Boko Haram has on different nations. This gives us a better understanding on what kind of impacts this group can have on a month-to-month time frame. Having this breakdown we will be able to explore what kind of events can possibly impact a culture to take interest in this group; or possibly see if certain events can create a decline interests of this group. This will allow us to have a time comparison for the three month study. Figures 9 – 11 have the breakdown of the participation indices broken down by month for the dataset.




Figure 9. A representation of Boko Haram's impact using twitter feeds for the month of August 2013 using population-normalized participation indices.




Figure 10. A representation of Boko Haram's impact using twitter feeds for the month of September 2013 using population-normalized participation indices.




Figure 11. . A participation of Boko Haram's influence using twitter feeds for the month of October 2013 using population-Normalized participation indices.

Analysis of the monthly breakdowns reveals a persisting trend that Kenya and Nigeria both have the greatest interest in what goes on with Boko Haram. They have the highest participation index for each month and only Kenya slips down in the month of October. This can possibly be attributed to the Westgate Mall Attack in Nairobi, Kenya.

Analysis of the top five participating countries can be revealing how different events can impact a country. In figure 12 we analyze the top five participating countries that reference to Boko Haram. Figure 12 reveals that all the top participating countries have an increase in participation between the months of August and September, then we see a decrease from September to October.




Figure 12. Top 5 Participating counties displayed over the study period for Boko Haram.

In doing this analysis we can see that Boko Haram has large global footprint especially within Europe, the United States, and Canada. Outside of a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa they do not have a big regional foot print. There is more interest for this group at a global level.

5.2 Al-Shabaab

Tweets referencing Al-Shabaab account for 9,579 out of the 20,023 tweets that were collected for this study. Of those 9,579 tweets we generated a word cloud from the text portion of the tweets. This word cloud reveals that the main things tweeted about in this dataset are Nairobi, Westgate, attack and Islamist. There are other words that are related to terrorist activities especially within the word cloud that are related to terrorist activities. The revealing of these words that are associated with the attacks shows that people genuinely have a concern about what this group is doing or acts that they are committing.




Figure 14. A density analysis revealing hotspots in geolocated tweet, generated using ArcGIS 10.1 Spatial Analysis.

We will normalize the data for Al-Shabaab as we did with the Boko Haram data, this is done this for the same reason as stated above. This gives us our participation index which can be seen in table 2. In table 2 we can see that some of the countries that had a high participation index for Boko Haram also have a high participation index for Al-Shabaab. We also see some different countries on the top fifteen participation index for Al-Shabaab. This shows that not countries interested in Boko Haram may not be interested in Al-Shabaab and vice versa.

Table 2. Top Tweeting generating countries referring to Al-Shabaab

Country	Population	Twitter traffic	Participation index
Kenya	43178141	3271	7.575
United States	313914040	1300	0.414
France	65696689	1138	1.732
United Kingdom	63612729	517	0.812
Somalia	10195134	402	3.943
Nigeria	168833776	237	0.140
Uganda	36345860	228	0.627
Tanzania	47783107	213	0.445
South Africa	52274945	212	0.405
Canada	34754312	182	0.523
Netherlands	16754962	151	0.901
Congo, DRC	65705093	112	0.170
Mexico	120847477	108	0.089
Ghana	25366462	95	0.374
India	1236686732	84	0.006

We will take this information table 2 and visualize this in a map as we did with the Boko Haram dataset. Just like with the previous dataset we will be able to visualize the participation indices to their geographic representation. What is also worth noting in figure 15 is that many SSA countries had a high participation index, which indicates that many of these countries given their smaller populations and technology deficiency they still have an interest in what this group is doing. This is a difference from the Boko Haram dataset. If you take note of figure 14 there is a high level of tweets coming from SSA. The highest density of tweets for Al-Shabaab came from Somalia and Kenya. This shows that the countries Al-Shabaab operate in also have an interest in them as well. We also see that the countries with the largest participation indices also had the highest densities.




Figure 15. The top 15 countries of Table 2 plotted with their normalized participation index metrics.

In figure 16 we will analyze a pie chart to shows participation indices for countries that referenced Al-Shabaab in tweets during the study period. This will allow us to compare participation of countries side by side. Kenya accounts for the largest participation for the overall study. Somalia accounted for the second largest participation followed by France. This shows us that their citizens take interest in tweeting about Al-Shabaab. We can take note that many SSA countries tweet about Al-Shabaab.




Figure 16. A representation of Al-Shabaab's impact using twitter feeds for the time period of 01 August 2013 - 31 October 2013 using population-normalized participation indices.

Like we did the Boko Haram data we will break the participation indices down by month. In doing this we can see the impacts that Al-Shabaab has over different countries. This will allow us to see what countries emerge and dissipate over the study period. This gives us a better understanding on what kind of impacts this group can have on a month-to-month time frame. Figures 17 – 19 have the breakdown of the participation indices broken down by month for the dataset.




Figure 17. A representation of Al-Shabaab's impact using twitter feeds for the month of August 2013 using population-normalized participation indices.




Figure 18. A representation of Al-Shabaab's impact using twitter feeds for the month of September 2013 using population-normalized indices.




Figure 19. A representation of Al-Shabaab’s impact using twitter feeds for the month of October 2013 using population-normalized participation indices.

Looking further into the dataset we can see that Kenya and Somalia have a much higher participation rate of the overall tweets for the months of October and August. We see a rise in more countries tweeting about Al-Shabaab during the Westgate mall attack which lowers the participation rate Kenya and Nigeria that month. This shows a large drop showing that more countries began to have an interest during a time of crises but once the crises is over interest in this group falls.

In showing the break down by months we can see that many countries within Sub-Saharan Africa have an interest in Al-Shabaab. Meaning that they have a greater regional footprint than they have globally. During the crises of the mall attack there an increase in participation by all the other countries participation index especially France which jumps to the second highest participating country. This shows that the more Al-Shabaab attacks and creates anarchy the more recognition they will get on a global scale.




Figure 20. Top 5 Participating counties displayed over the study period for Al-Shabaab.

Analysis of the top five participating countries can be revealing how different events can impact a country. In figure 20 we analyze the five top participating countries that refer to Al-Shabaab. We can see that there is a spike in participation from all the countries except Somalia from August to September. It is interesting that the month of the Westgate mall attack Somalia has a decrease in participation. The participation from September to October for the Kenya and the Netherlands continues to rise. Somalia has an increase and almost returns to what its participation was in August. Then United Kingdom has a slight decrease but France has a rather large decrease which brings it back to its normal participation index. Plotting out the participation give us an insight on to how these countries react to a crises situation involving one of these terrorist organizations. The two most interesting countries are Somalia and France. These two countries have the sharpest increases and decreases. This could be that that France has an interest when a crises happens in Sub-Saharan Africa. Where in Somalia people could be afraid to tweet and express themselves or Al-Shabaab members could be practicing some sort of operational security by not wanting to have any part of their plans to be leaked on social media.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

6.1 Conclusion

Social media has become a staple in everyday life and the use of social media continues to increase. With this social media becoming a more viable data source and continuing to grow it will aid in the development for this new type of intelligence analysis. The more volunteered geographic information that is available the more data there will be for futures studies to analyze. In this paper we were able to show how just a small sample of this data can be analyzed and be put into a format that can be utilized by policy makers to make decision on events that are unfolding.

In this thesis we are able to show which countries have a concerned interest in these two terrorist groups based off of how their citizens react via social media. We were able to display this visually and see if neighboring countries have an interest or if they do not have an interest of these groups. In our study we were able to show that both Kenya and Somalia have an interest in Al-Shabaab by having the largest participation over the entire study period. The study also showed that given a time period during a terrorist attack new interest may form creating a different picture than may be different from what may be normal picture. We were also able to show that many European countries had an interest in Al-Shabaab. This was most evident during the month of September in which the Westgate mall attack took place. We see many Europeans participation index

increase. This was especially true with the country of France as they had the second highest participation during that month. They had a large spike in participation during that month and then returned in October to around the same participation as they had for August. Many Sub-Saharan African countries also having an interest in what Al-Shabaab is doing. This was especially true for many of these countries that are located near or around Kenya and Somalia.

We were also able to show that Nigeria had the most interest in Boko Haram. Nigeria is where Boko Haram conducts its operation. The greatest participation for Boko Haram was in Nigeria but we also see many other countries with interests about this group. It was worth noting that more European countries had the same or a higher participation index than many Sub-Saharan African countries. By many European countries and the United States having high participation rates in this group this shows that Boko Haram not only has an impact in SSA but has a global impact as well.

We were also able to see how an event can impact how different countries can switch their participation in a certain group. This was most evident in the Month of October for the country of Kenya in the Boko Haram dataset. We see their participation taper way down for Boko Haram. We know that the Westgate mall attack by Al-Shabaab took place at the end of September so many Kenyans may be more focused on what they are doing opposed to what other groups in SSA would be doing.

We have addressed a few aspects of how social media can be used to show how terrorist organizations can have a spatial impact over different countries. First we were able to show how terrorist organizations can impact different countries based from tweets

referring to either Boko Haram or Al-Shabaab. Next we able to show how an event can impact different countries by either taking more of an interest in these groups or have less participation in a groups because of some other impact that maybe closer to their region.

6.2 Outlook

In this thesis we address some of the ways social media can be utilized in geospatial analysis. This type of analysis could be looked at as a fusion of the new field to SOCMINT and GEOINT. These are both new types of intelligence that can utilize social media that has a growing use around the world. With the continued use of social media these types of intelligence will continue to be important for future studies.

This type of study can be improved for future studies by focusing keyword searches on the exact terrorist organizations for an improved dataset. Having this kind of dataset will give an improvement in the number of tweets that refer to these organization. This will allow to have a better representation of how these groups can have an impact over different cultures.

Further analysis into the networks of these organizations will allow us to not only see what official twitter accounts these organization have but see what kind of conversations they can impact over social media. Comparing networks to the impacts they have over countries or even cities would be valuable information to policy makers as well as researchers. This would be a valuable approach for future work in this study area.

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Notes

Twitter, 2014. <https://about.twitter.com/company>

BIOGRAPHY

Richard Michael Rodriguez Jr. graduated from Cobre High School, Bayard, New Mexico, in 2002. He received her Bachelor of Science from Western New Mexico University in 2006. He served in the United States Army for three years as a human intelligence collector. Upon leaving the Army he worked as a geospatial engineer for the Army Geospatial Center. Upon completion of his master he will be employed by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.