Online Library

This article examines the consensus points, evidence base and blind spots of radicalization discourse: namely, the approved ways of talking about radicalization/deradicalization that claim a special scientific or scholarly authority and that have become entrenched as a kind of socially sanctioned common sense embedded in academia, the media and government bureaucracy. Drawing on an analysis of the current 50 most cited journal articles on radicalization and deradicalization, it finds that much of what counts as scholarly knowledge of radicalization and deradicalization lacks a proper empirical foundation and utility for policy makers. It also laments what can be described as “the missing agent” problem in radicalization research, where the dominant focus on putative “risk factors” or “pushes and pulls” of radicalization serves, in effect, to disappear the human agent at the heart of the radicalization process. The article concludes by calling for an empirically-driven approach to radicalization that foregrounds the subjective experiences that animate the process by which people become terrorists or the active supporters of terrorist methods.

While the radical right is relatively successful on social media, only a fraction of its supporters become activists offline. Why do some individuals become offline activists in radical right organizations, while others prefer to limit their support to online spaces? Following an inductive analysis of interviews with activists and supporters of a radical right organization, this study points to the importance of going beyond classical explanations for activism by focusing on the impact of, and relationship between, group identification and stigma for mobilization. It shows that activists who identify with the organization and consider it stigmatized are motivated to participate in protest actions to speak out in front of this perceived injustice. By contrast, supporters who question the organization’s legitimacy in the face of stigma engage with the organization on social media and are motivated by a desire to keep a low profile and to avoid being openly associated with stigmatized actors.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Regulation on Terrorist Content Online (TCO) are both legislative measures enacted by the European Union (EU) which are aimed at regulating digital
services and combating the spread of harmful content online. While both measures are concerned with reducing online harm in the EU, they differ in the nature and extent of: the harm they purport to mitigate; the burden of compliance imposed on platforms undertaking relevant activities; and on the activities which bring platforms in scope. In its concern with a more specific and egregious form of online harm, the TCO generally imposes more stringent requirements on tech platforms and is expressed in more mandatory terms. However, this is not uniformly the case across all the areas which are common to both the DSA and the TCO. In the matter of crisis response in particular, the DSA’s requirements are more exacting and potentially more onerous than those provided by the TCO.

To accentuate which platform characteristics particularly foster radicalization and extremist dynamics, this contribution investigates the affordances of social media as delineated in contemporary literature, conducting a platform comparison encompassing Telegram, WhatsApp, and X (formerly Twitter). Based on a scoping review, 17 affordances identified from studies researching radicalization dynamics on social media were extracted and categorized. The most frequently mentioned affordances—anonymity, visibility, and collectivity—were then further analyzed concerning their contribution to radicalization and the radicalization potential of these specific platforms. The platform-comparative affordance discussion shows that, although, in principle each of the three compared platforms can foster an environment conducive to radicalization depending on user intention and usage context, the specific characteristics of each platform necessitate a nuanced consideration. On one hand, it is imperative to discern affordances differentially along various dimensions when assessing their implications (e.g., internal vs. external visibility). On the other hand, it is beneficial to consider which affordances emerge from the actualization of other affordances. For instance, collectivity can result from the interplay of several affordances, such as interactivity and anonymity, and can be referred to as a meta-affordance. Furthermore, the analysis shows that platform branding and self-presentation not only affect platform architecture and affordances but also shape users’ perceptions of the platform, thereby influencing the actualization of affordances. This was particularly noted in the literature for Telegram and increasingly for X. Specific assertions, nevertheless, are hindered by the conceptual diffusion of the affordance approach and a lack of empirical analyses directly and systematically examining platform affordances in conjunction with radicalization dynamics.

Digital integration and the emergence of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) are providing new tools for insurgents to use in spreading their propaganda through violent extremism. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has come to represent a conduit for insurgents in planning and carrying out their extreme agendas. This article provides a deeper understanding of the double-edged sword effect of AI in relation to violent extremism in the ASEAN context. It reveals that, even though AI has been very important in countering violent extremism, it has simultaneously facilitated terrorists in spreading their propaganda in more innovative and covert ways. The legal framework governing AI is still in its infancy and challenges such as the doubleedged sword effect in the use of the technology require specific guidelines or legislation for use in effective governance.

This study tracked, recorded and coded the content recommended to 10 experimental or ‘sockpuppet’ accounts on 10 blank smartphones, 5 on YouTube Shorts and 5 on TikTok. On each platform, we set up 5 types of accounts: one 16-year old boy and one 18-year old boy who sought out content typically associated with gender-normative young men (e.g. gym content, sports, video games), one 16-year old boy and one 18-year old boy who actively sought out content associated with the manosphere (e.g. Andrew Tate, anti-feminist), and one blank control account that did not deliberately seek out or engage with any particular content. The purpose of this research was to simulate and explore the digital reality of boys and young men using TikTok and YouTube Shorts, who are most likely to be targeted by the manosphere.