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This article explores the extent to which ‘transnationalism’ offers analysts a meaningful prism through which to analyze racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (REMVE) terrorism or whether the term obscures more than it illuminates. The ‘transnational’ dimension of REMVE terrorism is often ill-defined and misunderstood, leading to misconceptions about the nature of such networks that in turn exaggerate their ‘global’ reach and distort our understanding of how they operate in practice. The digital revolution has internationalized far-right extremist networks, but many of these remain regional rather than truly transnational. Nevertheless, understanding the transnational dimension of social media and its role in the radicalization of lone-actor REMVE terrorists is increasingly important. Online REMVE communities rather than physical organizations per se serve as the medium through which violent ideologies are spread; where lessons from previous attacks are learned and internalized; where the perpetrators of violence are revered; and where further acts of violence are encouraged and incited—which, as this article demonstrates, has real-world effects. What this suggests is that, insofar as REMVE terrorism is concerned, ‘domestic’ terrorism is increasingly inseparable from tackling ‘transnational’ terrorism and that digital platforms have increasingly blurred the boundaries between the two.

Involuntary celibates, or incels, have been of heightened interest to scholars and practitioners due to their ongoing engagement in misogynistic and violent discourse. The incel subculture is complex, requiring unique strategies to develop effective interventions. The present study investigates patterns in incels’ online posting behaviors and whether acceptance of subcultural beliefs is reflected in variations of user engagement and posting behaviors over time. A sample of postings are drawn from a well-known incel-moderated forum and analyzed using group-based trajectory modeling. The results demonstrate that three distinct posting trajectory groups are present. The findings demonstrate heterogeneity among users’ posting behaviors in the forum over time and suggest that variation may be a reflection of users’ subcultural beliefs.

It has been established by leaders of the Australian national security community, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, that young people are being increasingly recruited into extremism. To date, few Australian studies have examined this issue using primary source data. This article seeks to understand the conditions which may make vulnerable young Australians more susceptible to recruitment, recruitment pathways, and forms of recruitment. To address this, primary sources were consulted, and frontline countering violent extremism (CVE) practitioners were interviewed. It was found that there is no typical pathway for young Australians to be recruited to extremism and that recruitment can be both foreign (informed by transnational networks and organisations) and/or familiar (within the immediate domestic environment of the young person). We identified the continued significance of online vectors, but further established the ongoing relevance and power of offline engagement for the recruitment of young people. Finally, we suggest that multiple intersecting vulnerabilities render young people more susceptible to recruitment, with data that suggests they may be naïve to their being recruited in the first place.

The proliferation of images and videos online commemorating the death of martyrs is becoming more and more widespread within the neofascist movement. Ceremonies honouring fallen comrades today go viral on the Internet in a manner that information technologies could not facilitate in the past. Neofascist organisations share these ritualistic practices on the Internet, producing hypermedia environments: specific media content that creates a dialogue between the digital and the physical realm. Analysing these hypermedia environments enables a better understanding of neofascist representations and tactics today. Noting that supremacist terrorism is widely excluded from the far-right hypermedia fabric, while the martyrs of neofascism are at the centre of these actions, this article illustrates the shifts that the movement is experiencing, from a clandestine offensive to a self-defence mass strategy.

This article presents an ethnographic analysis of the online training practices IS sympathisers adopt to recruit, indoctrinate, train, and vet new affiliates. The study highlights the carefully crafted virtual ecosystem established by IS unofficial media operatives, which seeks to identify and select converts with specialised digital skills and unwavering commitment to the group’s vision of Islam. Prioritising quality over quantity, the selection process subjects new recruits to rigorous pre-and post-selection trials to ensure their authenticity, devotion, and obedience. Oaths of allegiance are central to membership within this virtual ecosystem, engendering a master-apprentice dynamic that may secure new recruits’ adherence to assigned duties within the network. The instructional scaffolding within this ecosystem comprises two main constituents: theological indoctrination and digital training. The former places emphasis on IS’s allegedly authentic religious sources in teaching Islamic jurisprudence, while the latter includes training on online security and media campaigns. As sympathisers progress through the ranks within the virtual ecosystem, they are empowered by their newly achieved “veteran” status to take on leadership roles within the digital sphere or engage in combat operations. The meticulously engineered architecture of social hierarchies within the network is designed to foster loyalty and obedience, perpetuate a hierarchical fraternity, thereby enhancing the organisation’s resilience and longevity.

Hash Sharing Working Group:  As technologies, content, and types of violent extremist and terrorist groups change, GIFCT continuously reviews its definitions and parameters to evolve in line with trends and member needs. This group reviewed GIFCT’s Hash-Sharing Database inclusion criteria and proposed enhancements to improve its transparency and accuracy. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) worked with GIFCT to produce a set of concrete recommendations for Enhancing Transparency and Accuracy in GIFCT’s Hash-Sharing Database. GIFCT will be implementing recommendations throughout 2025 to ensure the database remains effective and impactful in cross-platform counterterrorism efforts.