Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The virtual "Caliphate" strikes back? Mapping the Islamic State's information ecosystem on the surface web

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Security Journal Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This study maps the surface web information ecosystem exploited by the Islamic State (IS) and its followers between December 2020 and June 2021. Open-source intelligence investigation allowed a massive online presence of Daesh, manifested by hundreds of communication channels, to be detected. Its propaganda dissemination was founded mainly on one “central” Arabic domain, linked to a constellation of auxiliary standalone websites, blogs, encrypted messaging apps, as well as file-sharing and streaming services. Aside from it, the Islamic State utilised other surface web environments, including numerous Internet Archive profiles and a network of communication channels established by Afaaq Electronic Foundation. This study also shows that URLs banned by law enforcement in 2020 and 2021 were usually quickly restored by the IS’s media offices.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. It should be stressed, however, that online campaign was only a part of the Islamic State’s larger media enterprise that comprised a variety of offline propaganda activities, including radio broadcasts or handbills (Winter 2017b).

  2. The surface web is usually defined as any Internet content that is indexed by ordinary search engines (Villalva et al. 2018).

  3. This means that this study mapped official, semi-official and unofficial propaganda dissemination channels that supported the Islamic State’s agenda.

  4. This study follows the definition of the open-source intelligence coined by Evangelista et al. (2021, p. 3). They argue that this is “a concept that addresses the search, collection, processing, analysis, and use of information from open sources that can be legally accessed by any individual or organization.”

  5. It was utilised to verify whether the IS’s visual propaganda was published elsewhere.

  6. The “Reverse IP Lookup” option was exploited. It allows detecting websites co-hosted on the same server.

  7. It was primarily utilised to verify the content of inaccessible URLs.

  8. The identified pro-IS domains frequently contained multiple external links redirecting users to different propaganda releases, all located on a single file-sharing platform. In such a case, they were collectively treated as one record in the database. An exception was made only to those file-sharing and streaming services that either served as “beacons” that redirected users to other communication channels (e.g., pastethis.to) or constituted a separate propaganda dissemination environment, which was the case of the Internet Archive. See Online Appendix 1.

  9. It should be stressed that the database from the first period served as a reference point for the second part of the investigation that initially aimed to verify which websites and accounts active at the turn of 2020/2021 were still accessible. However, due to length and technical limitations, this paper provides only the final version of the map, from June 2021, in form of a table (Online Appendix 1).

  10. Because of the adopted approach to coding file-sharing domains, their accessibility was not registered in the database, with the exception of the Internet Archive (see Footnote 9). The same applies to the alternative means of communication. No effort was made to verify their availability. This decision was caused by the legal doubts related to the European Union’s legislation—where this project was carried out—that forbids to directly communicate with terrorist organizations (recitals 6 and 11 of the Directive 2017/541).

  11. Its title is probably a reference to the battle of Sanita-al-Uqab fought in 634 between the forces of the Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire. It should be also stressed that the website used a popular, national-level Top-Level Domain (TLD).

  12. Alokab #2 was the only exception. At first glance, it seemed to be inaccessible as well. However, more careful analysis proved that it contained visual propaganda in its subdomains that were exploited (shared) by Elokab #1.

  13. It was the only IS-affiliated communication channel identified that used Persian as its main language.

  14. Its previous incarnation, under a different TLD, was linked with Elokab #1 at the turn of 2020/2021. It was, however, inactive at the time.

  15. Shineofislam #3 simply redirected visitors towards the #2.

  16. Many item collections were published on the Internet Archive in 2020, but were not identified in the first OSINT investigation carried out at the turn of 2020/2021. This was mostly due to the fact that analyzed websites of the IS at the time did not share links leading to these environments. It changed in the mid-2021.

References

  • Abu Rumman, Muhammad. 2020. The Future of ISIS: Strengths and Weaknesses Dynamics of the “Virtual Caliphate” and the Gap in Counterterrorism Strategies. Amman: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2020.

  • Al-Rawi, Ahmed. 2019. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s standardised media and jihadist nation-state building efforts. Communication and the Public 4: 3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amarasingam, Amarnath. 2020. Telegram Deplatforming ISIS Has Given Them Something to Fight For. VoxPol. https://www.voxpol.eu/telegram-deplatforming-isis-has-given-them-something-to-fight-for/. Accessed 18 June 2021.

  • Ayad, Moustafa, Amarasingam, Amarnath, and Alexander, Audrey. 2021. The Cloud Caliphate: Archiving the Islamic State in Real-Time. West Point: United States Military Academy.

  • Ayad, Moustafa. 2020. The Propaganda Pipeline: The ISIS Fuouaris Upload Network on Facebook. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, Richard. 2017. Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees. New York: The Soufan Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bazzell, M. 2016. Open source intelligence techniques: Resources for searching and analysing online information.

  • Berger, J.M., and Morgan, Jonathon. 2015. The ISIS Twitter Census. Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Analysis Paper 20.

  • Berger, J.M. 2016. Making CVE Work. A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption. ICCT Research Paper May.

  • Berger, J.M., and Perez, Heather. 2016. The Islamic State’s Diminishing Returns on Twitter: How suspensions are limiting the social networks of English-speaking ISIS supporters. GW Program on Extremism Occasional Paper February.

  • Bloom, Mia, Hicham Tiflati, and John Horgan. 2019. Navigating ISIS’s Preferred Platform: Telegram. Terrorism and Political Violence 31: 6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clifford, Bennett, and Powell, Helen. 2019. Encrypted Extremism. Inside the English-Speaking Islamic State Ecosystem on Telegram. Washington D.C.: The George Washington University.

  • Combating violent extremism. 2016. Twitter. https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/combating-violent-extremism.html. Accessed 15 June 2021.

  • Conway, Maura, Moign Khawaja, Suraj Lakhani, Jeremy Reffin, Andrew Robertson, and David Weir. 2019. Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and Its Impacts. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42: 1–2.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cook, David, and David B. Cook. 2005. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. 2019. From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Corera, Gordon. 2020. ISIS’ still evading detection on Facebook’, report says. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53389657. Accessed 8 July 2021.

  • Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and the Council of March 15th 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. 2017. Official Journal of the European Union, L 88/6, 31.3.2017.

  • Europol and Telegram take on terrorist propaganda online. 2019a. Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-and-telegram-take-terrorist-propaganda-online. Accessed 16 June 2021.

  • Europol and Telegram take on terrorist propaganda online. 2019b. Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-and-telegram-take-terrorist-propaganda-online. Accessed 9 July 2021.

  • Evangelista, Joao Rafel, Sassi Goncalves, Renato Jose, Marcio Romero, and Domingos Napolitano. 2021. Systematic Literature Review to Investigate the Application of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) with Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Applied Security Research 16: 3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fisher, Ali, Prucha, Nico, and Winterbotham, Emily. 2019. Mapping the Jihadist Information Ecosystem. Towards the Next Generation of Disruption Capability. Global Research Network on Terrorism and Technology Paper 6.

  • Fishman, Brian. 2019. Crossroads: Counter-terrorism and the Internet. Texas National Security Review 2: 2.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ganesh, Bharath, and Jonathan Bright. 2020. Countering Extremists on Social Media: Challenges for Strategic Communication and Content Moderation. Policy & Internet 12: 1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • How to complete your ethics self-assessment. 2021. Ec.europa.eu. https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/docs/2021-2027/common/guidance/how-to-complete-your-ethics-self-assessment_en.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2021.

  • Ingram, Haroro J. 2018. Islamic State’s English-language Magazines, 2014–2017: Trends & Implications for CT-CVE Strategic Communications. ICCT Research Paper March.

  • Ingram, Haroro J., Charlie Winter, and Craig Whiteside. 2020. The ISIS Reader. Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kadivar, Jamileh. 2020. Daesh and The Power of Media and Message. Arab Media & Society 30.

  • Kelion, Leo. 2018. IS propaganda ‘hidden on Internet Archive’. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44112431. Accessed 7 July 2021.

  • Khawaja, Moign. 2020. Is ISIS Dead or Alive? Vox-Pol. https://www.voxpol.eu/is-isis-dead-or-alive/. Accessed 23 June 2021.

  • Krona, M. (2020). Mediating Islamic State. Collaborative Media Practices and Interconnected Digital Strategies of Islamic State (IS) and pro-IS Supporter Networks on Telegram. International Journal of Communication 14.

  • Kundnani, Arun, and Ben Hayes. 2018. The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies. Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakomy, Miron. 2017. Cracks in the Online “Caliphate”: How the Islamic State is Losing Ground in the Battle for Cyberspace. Perspectives on Terrorism 11: 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakomy, Miron. 2018. Picturing the Islamic State’s online propaganda: vanishing or resurfacing from the World Wide Web? RSCAS EUI Working Papers 70.

  • Lakomy, Miron. 2021a. Islamic State’s Online Propaganda. A Comparative Analysis. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lakomy, Miron. 2021b. Mapping the online presence and activities of the Islamic State’s unofficial propaganda cell: Ahlut-Tawhid Publications. Security Journal 34.

  • Lakomy, Miron. 2022. Why Do Countering Violent Extremism Strategies Not Work? The Case of Digital Jihad. Terrorism and Political Violence.

  • Lorenzo-Dus, Nuria, and Stuart Macdonald. 2021. Visual Jihad: Constructing the ‘Good Muslim’ in Online Jihadist Magazines. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44: 5.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald, Stuart, Daniel Grinnell, Anina Kinzel, and Nuria Lorenzo-Dus. 2019. Daesh, Twitter and the Social Media Ecosystem. The RUSI Journal 164: 4.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald, Stuart, Rees, Connor, Joost S. 2022. Remove, Impede, Disrupt, Redirect: Understanding & Combating Pro-Islamic State Use of File-Sharing Platforms. Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network.

  • Marone, Francesco. 2019. Violent Extremism and the Internet, Between Foreign Fighters and Terrorist Financing. In Digital Jihad. Online Communication and Violent Extremism, ed. Francesco Marone. Milano: Ledizioni LediPublishing.

  • Milton, Daniel. 2018. Down, But Not Out: An Updated Examination of the Islamic State's Visual Propaganda. West Point: United States Military Academy.

  • Munoz, Michael. 2018. Selling the Long War: Islamic State Propaganda after the Caliphate. CTC Sentinel 11: 10.

    Google Scholar 

  • Online Jihadist Propaganda. 2021 in review. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

  • Pennington, R., and M. Krona, eds. 2019. The Media World of ISIS. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prucha, Nico. 2016. IS and the Jihadist Information Highway—Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via Telegram. Perspectives on Terrorism 10: 6.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ranstorp, M., L. Ahlerup, and F. Ahlin, eds. 2022. Salafi-jihadism and Digital Media. The Nordic and International Context. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 27th 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 2016. Official Journal of the European Union, 119/1.

  • Roy, Olivier. 2017. Jihad and Death. The Global Appeal of Islamic State. London: Hurst & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad. Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Shehabat, Ahmad, Teodor Mitew, and Yahia Alzoubi. 2017. Encrypted Jihad: Investigating the Role of Telegram App in Lone Wolf Attacks in the West. Journal of Strategic Security 10: 3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Silva, Shiroma. 2020. Islamic State: Giant library of group’s online propaganda discovered. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54011034. Accessed 16 June 2021.

  • Springer, Devin R., James L. Regens, and David N. Edger. 2009. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites. The First Half of August 2016. 2016. Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

  • Summary of Information on Jihadist Websites. The First Half of July 2015. Bimonthly Report. 2015. Herzliya: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

  • Tennessee Man Accused Of Helping Islamic State Group. 2021. News 18. https://www.news18.com/news/world/tennessee-man-accused-of-helping-islamic-state-group-3610358.html. Accessed 22 June 2021.

  • Top 5 Proven Social Media Platforms to Earn Cryptocurrency. 2018. Steemit. https://steemit.com/steemit/@crypto.hype/top-5-proven-social-media-platforms-to-earn-cryptocurrency. Accessed 23 June 2021.

  • Torres Soriano, Manuel R. 2019. Seven Premises of Jihadist Activism on the Internet. In Digital Jihad. Online Communication and Violent Extremism, ed. Francesco Marone. Milano: Ledizioni LediPublishing.

  • Villalva, Dario Adriano Bermundez, Onaolapo, Jeremiah, Stringhini, Gianluca, and Musolesi, Mirco. 2018. Under and over the surface: a comparison of the use of leaked account credentials in the Dark and Surface Web. Crime Science 7.

  • Weimann, Gabriel. 2016. Terrorist Migration to the Dark Web. Perspectives on Terrorism 10: 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, Gunnar J. 2019. Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013–2014. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42: 1–2.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Welch, Tyler. 2018. Theology, heroism, justice, and fear: An analysis of ISIS propaganda magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 11: 3.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whiteside, Craig. 2016. Lightning the Path: The Evolution of the Islamic State Media Enterprise (2003–2016). ICCT Research Paper November.

  • Whittaker, Zack. 2019. Hackers are spreading Islamic State propaganda by hijacking dormant Twitter accounts. https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/02/hackers-islamic-state-propaganda-twitter/. Accessed 8 July 2021.

  • Winkler, Carol, Kareem El-Damanhoury, Zainab Saleh, John Hendry, and Nagham El-Karhili. 2019. Intersections of ISIS media leader loss and media campaign strategy: A visual framing analysis. Media, War & Conflict 14: 4.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, C. 2019. Researching Jihadist Propaganda Access, Interpretation & Trauma. Washington, DC: RESOLVE Network.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Winter, C., and A. Almohammad. 2019. From Battlefront to Cyberspace. Demystifying the Islamic State’s Propaganda Machine. West Point: United States Military Academy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, Charlie. 2015. Documenting the virtual ‘Caliphate.’ London: Quilliam Foundation.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, Charlie. 2017a. Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winter, Charlie. 2017b. Totalitarian Insurgency: Evaluating the Islamic State’s In-Theater Propaganda Operations. CIWAG Case Studies 15.

Download references

Acknowledgements

Research activities were co-financed by the funds granted under the Research Excellence Initiative of the University of Silesia in Katowice

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Political Science, University of Silesia, Bankowa 11, 40-007, Katowice, Poland

    Miron Lakomy

Authors
  1. Miron Lakomy
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Miron Lakomy.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Supplementary Information

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary file1 (DOCX 150 kb)

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lakomy, M. The virtual "Caliphate" strikes back? Mapping the Islamic State's information ecosystem on the surface web. Secur J 36, 791–811 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-022-00364-z

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-022-00364-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation