This thesis examines how extremist far-right recruiters communicate online to support Australia’s countering violent extremism (CVE) early detection efforts. It argues that current strategies—while sometimes effective—overlook online spaces as primary recruitment sites, focus too heavily on detecting already-radicalised individuals, and rely on oversimplified root-cause models. Further, it contends that detection is hindered by representational biases portraying the far right as non-terrorist and unified, leaving many groups free to operate. Using an interdisciplinary approach combining media logic with Critical Terrorism and Security Studies, the research develops an original “Extremism Typology,” blending Social Identity Theory and Identity Theory to analyse how social, cultural, and collective identities shape recruitment discourse. Applying multimodal discourse analysis to far-right websites, it conceptualises recruiters as “lighthouses” guiding audiences through a “digital fog” of misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories. It concludes that far-right groups are not unified and that effective early detection must treat them as distinct entities while recognising online environments as central to recruitment.