By Shaswati Das
On 10 May, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire, after finding themselves at the precipice of yet another all-out war. Had the war unfolded, it would have been the fifth war between both nuclear-armed nations, in the last eight decades. Underpinning India’s retaliatory action is the act of one group – The Resistance Front (TRF) – that killed 26 male tourists in Pahalgam, in Jammu and Kashmir’s Anantnag district, on 22 April.
Symbolically, India’s military strike against Pakistan was named “Operation Sindoor.” Sindoor is vermillion that Hindu women wear after they are married. The name now embodies India’s attempt at avenging the deaths of 26 husbands at the hands of TRF, and by extension – Pakistan, which has long since used jihad and militancy to remain engaged in territorial contestation over Kashmir.
What it has led to thus far is a low-grade warfare, followed by a tense ceasefire. India has reportedly razed nine terrorist camps and launch pads in Pakistan and decimated air defence systems in Lahore, with civilian casualties reported on both sides. This fragile ceasefire, however, is conditional to Pakistan’s compliance with eradicating terror networks on its soil. Much like any war against terrorism, this one too stands the risk of feeding into existing narratives of radicalisation and recruitment. As the war narrative plays out on social media sites, not only has the ongoing skirmish further polarised both nations, which have historically been split on communal lines, but this is likely to legitimise recruitment narratives for militant groups in the region.
In September 2020, TRF posted a message to its followers across channels on Telegram saying, “As already warned that such menace will not be allowed on the pious land of Martyrs. Anybody involved directly or indirectly in such menace and acts as a stooge of Occupier Regime will be met with the same fate. Don’t become the scapegoats of Fascist Occupier Regime. Be it KP’s Non-Locals or the collaborators think before you act as puppets of the Occupier Regime. #KashmirFight.”[1]
Pre-emptively, this message justified TRF’s actions that would eventually ensue in the Pahalgam attack, three years later. The group itself is an offshoot, or a front for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure), which has been operating under the aegis of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence since the late 1980s.
Following Operation Sindoor and Pakistan’s retaliatory strikes, mujahideen killed in the crossfire have been widely depicted as martyrs on social media platforms operated by affiliated groups. Videos and images from funerals, glorifying their sacrifice, are now being shared widely. Simultaneously, militant groups – predominantly the Lashkar-e-Taiba – have begun filming and sharing passionate speeches debunking India’s claims of Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam attack. While its emir Hafiz Muhammad Saeed has begun to handover the group’s reins to his son, Talha Saeed, the latter’s videos calling for justice have been widely shared by the group on microblogging site, X.
Propaganda surrounding wartime experiences and societal grievances is pivotal in informing radicalisation narratives of terrorist groups. Conflicts – especially those framed through the lens of identity, socio-political injustice and victimisation (as has been the case following India’s strikes against Pakistan) provide fertile ground for extremism to take root. Groups’ rhetoric weaves together socio-economic and political discontent with overarching themes of warfare and victimhood. These narratives, distributed via popular messaging applications, are then used to influence public opinion, cement existing grievances, and instil among potential recruits a sense of vengeance. While this fosters a sense of solidarity among sympathisers, particularly in settings marked by violence and instability, groups ensure that this shared sense of outrage is disseminated transnationally.
On the other side of the coin, is a narrative that is almost jubilant. Certain pro-India nationalist accounts have framed the country’s response as a definitive assertion of sovereignty, and a firm assertion of India’s ownership of Kashmir, therein celebrating what they see as the vindication of majoritarian control. On platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp, users have framed the violence as India’s defeat of a state that has been known to harbour terrorists, backed by clips and tweets by world leaders justifying India’s retaliation against an alleged sponsor of terrorism.
Audience outreach for groups is fairly simple. Under the circumstances, groups exploit these narratives of war, victory and defeat to tap into the average Kashmiri youth’s existing sense of resentment against India. Radicalisation and recruitment in Kashmir is crucially reliant on the socio-political conditions in the region, and prevailing psychosocial narratives. Groups such as TRF and People’s Anti-Fascist Front (PAFF) which is an offshoot of Pakistan’s Bahawalpur-based Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) rely extensively on reframing narratives of violence by India, to propel youth towards violent action. From 2021 to 2023, PAFF used various Telegram channels with videos of the Indian military’s operations in Kashmir to underscore the importance of homegrown retaliatory violence by Kashmiri youth against “prevailing injustices.”[2]
How the war and the ceasefire pan out, remains to be seen. In the interim though, militant groups are more likely to use videos of India’s attacks and Pakistan’s response as symbolic imagery. These evoke strong psychological reactions, provoking individuals – especially the youth – to eventually consider taking up violence against the perceived aggressor. Existing research into online recruitment states that in 2024, India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology blocked 4772 social media accounts attempting to radicalise and recruit youth. In the same year, security forces in Kashmir killed 69 active militants in the region, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal.
As military operations develop and nationalistic fervour gains momentum on both sides, the deeper, long-term battle will be fought not on the Indo-Pakistan borders, but across digital platforms. Whether framed through martyrdom or majoritarian triumph, these competing narratives serve the strategic interests of extremist actors by fuelling polarisation, validating grievance-based recruitment, and discrediting moderate discourse that calls for peace and diplomatic mediation. In an ongoing conflict where there is little distinction between information warfare and physical conflict, of import will be online avenues of radicalisation – marking a shift from overt forms of recruitment. In the absence of robust counter-narratives or the side-lining of voices of reason, this war will continue to produce not just ideological divisions, but the next generation of extremists.
[1] The author had conducted research on Telegram from 2022-2023, tracking jihadist groups’ radicalisation and recruitment narratives across Pakistan and India Administered Kashmir.
[2] PAFF, Telegram, 17 November 2022
Dr Shaswati Das is a lecturer for the Bath Spa University-Elizabeth School of London partnership. Her research focuses on terrorist recruitment and counterterrorism narratives.
IMAGE CREDIT: PEXELS
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