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This paper focuses on the attempts by Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) to use Twitter to disseminate its online magazine, Rumiyah. It examines a data set of 11,520 tweets mentioning Rumiyah that contained an out link, to evaluate the success of Daesh’s attempts to use Twitter as a gateway to issues of its magazine.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The Internet is a transformative technology that terrorists are exploiting for the spread of propaganda and radicalizing new recruits. While al-Qaeda has a longer history, Islamic State is conducting a modern and sophisticated media campaign centered around online social networking. This article introduces and contextualizes the contributions to this Special Issue by examining some of the ways in which terrorists make use of the Internet as part of their broader media strategies.

‘Islamic State’s Online Activity and Responses’ provides a unique examination of Islamic State’s online activity at the peak of its “golden age” between 2014 and 2017 and evaluates some of the principal responses to this phenomenon. Featuring contributions from experts across a range of disciplines, the volume examines a variety of aspects of IS’s online activity, including their strategic objectives, the content and nature of their magazines and videos, and their online targeting of females and depiction of children. It also details and analyses responses to IS’s online activity – from content moderation and account suspensions to informal counter-messaging and disrupting terrorist financing – and explores the possible impact of technological developments, such as decentralised and peer-to-peer networks, going forward. Platforms discussed include dedicated jihadi forums, major social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and newer services, including Twister.

‘Islamic State’s Online Activity and Responses’ is essential reading for researchers, students, policymakers, and all those interested in the contemporary challenges posed by online terrorist propaganda and radicalisation. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.

As efforts to identify and remove online terrorist and violent extremist content have intensified, concern has also grown about so‐called lawful but awful content. Various options have been touted for reducing the visibility of this borderline content, including removing it from search and recommendation algorithms, downranking it and redirecting those who search for it. This article contributes to this discussion by considering the moderation of such content, in terms of three sets of values. First, definitional clarity. This is necessary to provide users with fair warning of what content is liable to moderation and to place limits on the discretion of content moderators. Yet, at present, definitions of borderline content are vague and imprecise. Second, necessity and proportionality. While downranking and removal from search and recommender algorithms should be distinguished from deplatforming, tech companies’ efforts to deamplify borderline content give rise to many of the same concerns as content removal and account shutdowns. Third, transparency. While a number of platforms now publish their content moderation policies and transparency data reports, these largely focus on violative, not borderline content. Moreover, there remain questions around access to data for independent researchers and transparency at the level of the individual user.

It is well established that jihadist groups and their supporters post URLs on online platforms to outlink to items of propaganda stored on other platforms. Industry initiatives – such as Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s inclusion of URLs in its hash-sharing database, and Tech Against Terrorism’s Terrorist Content Analytics Platform – have sought to counter this practice. These measures, together with new regulatory regimes (e.g. the EU’s Terrorist Content Online Regulation) and the growing use of decentralised services, raise the question whether jihadist groups’ propaganda dissemination strategies are perhaps being forced to evolve. This report considers whether there is evidence of such an evolution, by examining the means that three jihadist groups (Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Al-Shabaab) used to disseminate their propaganda during a two-month period in early 2023.