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Policymakers, researchers, and responders alike focus on the evolution of terrorist and other groups associated with political violence. This study offers a comparative analysis of the images of ISIS and U.S. far-right groups’ use of flag images, as such emblems contribute to community building, heighten emotional responses, and have political import. It adds to previous work by comparing groups across the ideological spectrum, by recognizing differences in media operations present as groups evolve, and by focusing on visual messaging that is vital for influence in the online environment. Using chi-square analyses, it compares almost 5000 images that include flags from ISIS publications between 2014 and 2020 with 600 images focused on the far-right events at the Unite the Right Rally and the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol. Specifically, it looks at the compositional elements of the flags appearing in the images, the immediate media context within the photographic frame, and the broader regulatory, political, religious, and economic situational contexts. The findings indicate that while the far right and ISIS both heavily rely on flags in their visual images, eight key differences emerge as related to the groups, their contexts, and the evolution of the media systems.

In response to calls for more empirical studies in organizational communication to further develop the Four Flows Model of CCO, this analysis examines Daesh’s use of visual messaging strategies as a means of institutional positioning in the global communications environment. To do so, the study analyzes over 2000 religious and state images displayed in the group’s English/Arabic publications. The findings highlight the critical role of both the quantity and nature of visual output in the Four Flows Model. The study also expands current understandings of institutional positioning over time, through organizational expansion/constraint, and in relation to various targeted online communities.

Recognizing that militant, non-state groups utilize social media and online platforms to reach members, sympathizers, and potential recruits, state agencies and social media corporations now increasingly regulate access to accounts affiliated with such groups. Scholars examining deplatforming efforts have, to date, focused on the extent of audience loss after account restrictions and the identification of strategies for regrouping online followers on the same or different platforms over time. Left unexplored is if and how militant non-state groups adapt their official messaging strategies in response to platform restrictions despite continuing online access to them. To begin to fill that gap, this study compares ISIS’s 550 images displayed in the group’s official newsletter al-Naba 6 months before and after Europol’s November 2019 take-down of terrorist affiliated accounts, groups, channels, and bots on Telegram. It conducts a content analysis of images related to militaries and their outcomes, non-military activities and their outcomes, and presentational forms. The findings demonstrate that ISIS visually emphasizes its standard priming approach but shifts its agenda-setting strategy. While retaining some of its standard visual framing practices, the group also alters frames, particularly those related to images showing opposing militaries and military outcome.

Extreme militant groups use their media campaigns to share information, recruit and radicalize followers, share worldviews, and seek public diplomacy ends. While previous research documents that various on-the-ground events correspond to changes in the groups’ messaging strategies, studies of how competing militant groups influence one another’s media campaigns are nascent. This study helps fill that gap by examining how successful attacks by one militant group correspond to changes in both the perpetrating and competing groups’ visual media messaging strategies. It examines attack success through the lens of violent acts that result in direct impact (measured through death counts) and indirect impact (measured through traditional media coverage levels). The study utilizes a content analysis of 1882 authority-related images in AQAP’s al-Masra newsletter and ISIS’s al-Naba’ newsletter appearing three issues before and after each attack, and a chi-square analysis comparing four ISIS attack conditions (high death/high media, high death/low media, low death/high media, and low death/low media). The findings show that a high number of resulting deaths, rather than a high level of media coverage, correspond to changes in the media campaigns of both the perpetrators and the competing groups, with key differences in visual content based on group identity.

The decision to target leaders of groups like ISIS to hamper their effectiveness has served as a longstanding principle of counterterrorism efforts. Yet, previous research suggests that any results may simply be temporary. Using insights from confiscated ISIS documents from Afghanistan to define the media leader roles that qualified for each level of the cascade, CTC (Combating Terrorism Center) records to identify media leaders who died, and a content analysis of all ISIS images displayed in the group’s Arabic weekly newsletter to identify the group’s visual framing strategies, this study assesses whether and how leader loss helps explain changes in the level and nature of the group’s visual output over time. ISIS’s quantity of output and visual framing strategies displayed significant changes before, during, and after media leader losses. The level of the killed leader within the group’s organizational hierarchy also corresponded to different changes in ISIS’s media framing.

VOX-Pol Blog post.