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As the global political barometer increasingly shifts towards insularity, protectionism and propaganda-driven populism across countries, the CVE community is faced with a varied set of challenges. Whether it is on the question of dealing with returning ISIS FTFs, and preventing their move to different geographical theatres; or combatting majoritarian groups that rally around grievances, race or religion and fuel extreme violence—we need to ask ourselves how much more vulnerable we are today, and identify where the fault lines lie. While addressing these challenges, it is equally necessary to ensure that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms are balanced as governments address security priorities. It is with the desire to see more global conversation on the manifold ideologies that drive violence and the responsibility of governments, platforms and civil society engaged in CVE initiatives that the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) organised the second iteration of Tackling Insurgent Ideologies, with the theme “Implementing the Christchurch Call: Towards a Global CVE Agenda.” We brought together a diverse group of policymakers, researchers and practitioners involved in the process of developing strategies that deal with the proliferation of radicalism and violence to debate and discuss best practices, learnings and a way forward.

Today, the Commission presents guidelines and principles to increase the proactive prevention, detection and removal of illegal content inciting hatred, violence and terrorism online. The increasing availability and spreading of terrorist material and content that incites violence and hatred online is a serious threat to the security and safety of EU citizens.

Jonathan Russell, Head of Policy at Quilliam, talks to Sky News #digitalview about how everyone, not just governments, can help challenge extremist propaganda.

#digitalview, Sky News (23/01/16)

Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world. Quilliam stands for religious freedom, equality, human rights and democracy.

The Digital Services Act (DSA) requires designated Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOPs and VLOSEs) conduct assessments of the systemic risk of the dissemination of illegal content through their services- and to mitigate such risk where it arises. With regulators, researchers, civil society, and the general public finally due to see the public versions of the first systemic risk assessments conducted by VLOP and VLOSE providers, robust evaluation of the DSA’s systemic risk management approach to the dissemination of illegal content is crucial.  

CERRE’s Benchmarks for Evaluating Management of Risk of Terrorist Content Dissemination issue paper contributes to this evaluation by examining the systemic risk management approach to the dissemination terrorist content. Terrorist content is a specific subset of illegal content under the DSA that is also the subject of a complex nexus of other EU legislation, including the TERREG and several transnational initiatives. The determination of terrorist content poses a significant challenge, as authorities and platforms grapple with the use of sophisticated evasive techniques by terrorist actors, including the use of coded content or “beacons”, while also seeking to respect the fundamental rights of platform users.  

In this issue paper, author  Sally Broughton Micova explores the key definitional issues surrounding terrorist content and maps the ecosystem of actors involved in its risk assessment, mitigation, enforcement, and dissemination. Based on detailed analysis, the paper develops a series of benchmarks and concomitant metrics for the systemic risk evaluation of terrorist content. 

The article describes a systematic approach used by the Swiss Intelligence Service (SAP). The procedure described is illustrated by the authentic case of messages among extremists going on the Website www.islamic-minbar.com, a case that was prosecuted and brought to verdict by the Attorney General of the Swiss Confederation.

Over the last four years as the Syrian uprising has grown into a full-blown civil war, a sinister parallel conflict has been fought out in cyberspace, with combatants wielding bytes and software rather than guns as they have battled for supremacy on Syria’s internet frontline.

But the consequences of this secret cyber war have been real and deadly – particularly for opponents of the Assad regime who have been targeted for arrest and torture as a consequence of personal information gleaned from their email traffic.

In some cases even the military plans of crucial rebel offensives had been hacked. But the opposition has been busy too, leaking President Bashar al-Assad’s embarrassing personal correspondence and eavesdropping on government troop deployments amid much else.

As a consequence Syria’s civil war has become fertile ground for ‘hacktivists’ from both sides – egged on and in some cases assisted by governments and agencies from outside the region.

In this special investigation for People & Power , Juliana Ruhfus has been finding out why some experts believe Syria’s electronic armies have been drawing up the blueprints for all wars of the future, conflicts that transcend traditional physical boundaries but which can be just as significant as those fought with tanks and missiles.