Online Library

This book explores the online strategies and presence of Salafi-Jihadi actors in the Nordic as well as the international context.

Global Salafi-jihadism has been at the epicentre of international focus during the past decade. This book explores how the Swedish and other Nordic Salafi-jihadist sympathisers have used social digital media to radicalise, recruit, and propagate followers in relation to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and online communities. The chapters in this volume unpack different perspectives of Salafi-jihadi communications strategies, as well as how the international Salafi-jihadi community has constantly reconfigured and adapted to changing security conditions. The case studies of the Nordics constitute a microcosm of wider Salafi-jihadi narratives in relation to the rise and fall of the Islamic State’s so-called ‘digital caliphate’.

This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism studies, counter-extremism and counter-terrorism, social media and security studies.

Currently the UK does not have a specific anti-cyberterrorism law, instead relying on existing anti-terrorism laws to deal with cyberterrorism. This approach raises a number of problems insofar as it can lead to legislative uncertainty and unpredictability, as well as impacting on carrying risks of over-criminalisation, a lack of counterbalance, violation of principles of proportionality and arbitrariness. In light of these problems, this article aims to offer a critical evaluation of the UK’s existing legal responses to cyberterrorism with reference to the rule of law and basic human rights principles, mainly focusing on the vague and overly broad definition of terrorism, a tendency towards criminalising a wide range of terrorism precursor offences online, pre-emptive strategies and aggravated punishment of cyberterrorism. Based on this analysis, the article argues that applying the extension of existing anti-terrorism laws to combat low-risk cyberterrorism activities runs the risk of exacerbating harms to the values of the rule of law.

Between 2014 and 2017, the Islamic State maintained vibrant communities on a range of social media platforms. Due to aggressive account and content takedown policies by the major platforms, these visible communities are now almost non-existent. Following the March 2019 Christchurch attack, the question as to why major platforms cannot rout the extreme right in the same way has repeatedly arisen. In this article, Maura Conway explores why this is not as straightforward as it may seem.

This article uses the context of the widespread circulation of accounts about “CoronaJihad” in India during the COVID-19 pandemic to examine how public WhatsApp groups that participate in disseminating such accounts function within the ecosystem of hate around Hindutva majoritarianism in the country. The manner in which the WhatsApp platform operates within this ecosystem is mapped through a granular study of three public Hindutva WhatsApp groups; the messages within these groups during the first phase of the COVID-19 lock-down in India were examined during the course of this study. The pattern of messaging within the three groups that contribute to the narrative of “CoronaJihad,” which blames the minority Muslim community for the spread of the virus in India, were analyzed. The article focuses on factors including company policies and the specific sociopolitical situation in the country to understand the circumstances that make WhatsApp’s deep entanglement with the divisive politics of Hindutva majoritarianism in India possible.

In this paper we argue that understanding terrorism within the new cyber environment of the twenty-first century is paramount for the intelligence services in the dawn of the 21st century. We believe that the intelligence services will have to confront this new trend in terrorism tactics in years to come whether they are fully prepared or not. This new type of threat will be one of the principal questions for intelligence services in the 21st Century.