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This article is concerned with the boundaries of freedom of expression on the Internet and, more specifically, with manifestations of terrorism on YouTube. The article opens with two definitions of terrorism. Section II discusses various responsibilities that businesses have: economic, legal, moral, social and discretionary. Section III addresses the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Unfortunately, not all companies adhere to the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility. Therefore, ethical standards should be anchored in appropriate laws and enforced by responsible governments. Section IV clarifies that incitement to violence is in the focus of attention. The philosophy of John Stuart Mill is instrumental in explaining the difference between advocacy (or preaching) and incitement (or instigation). Sections V and VI examine the influences of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-Muslim jihadi preacher, and of Anjem Choudary, the British-Muslim jihadi preacher, on their followers. The words of al-Awlaki and of Choudary instigated many of the terrorist activities that the West had seen in recent years. There are direct links between their incitement and extreme violent incidents. Both of them were able to spread their instigation to terror on platforms provided by Google and specifically its subsidiary YouTube. Finally, Section VII probes YouTube and CSR. It is argued that the Internet is international in character, but it cannot be abused to override law. There is not one law for people and another for the Internet. It is further argued that power without responsibility is dangerous and corrosive.

The main purpose of this policy brief is to highlight the risks of radicalization by utilizing statistical analysis. The main question interrogated here is to determine the relation between the level of social reaction and ISIS’s attacks. These reactions are measured through Google Trends of news, web searches, and video ratings. Methodologically, Turkey, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany are picked as the sample countries. In order to derive consistent data from Google’s database, the keywords “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” and its some acronyms such as ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State, and DAESH are utilized.

This analysis revealed that Internet media might function as a recognition tool for terrorist organizations considering the fact that following ISIS’s attacks, people of both the target country and other countries progressively search ISIS on Google. Thus, one way or another, ISIS gains reputation and takes the opportunity for radicalization. Furthermore, the level of these searches differs among the aforementioned countries due to specific reasons, which are elaborated in this policy brief.

This article is concerned with identifying the ideological and techno-material parameters that inform Facebook’s approach to racism and racist contents. The analysis aims to contribute to studies of digital racism by showing Facebook’s ideological position on racism and identifying its implications. To understand Facebook’s approach to racism, the article deconstructs its governance structures, locating racism as a sub-category of hate speech. The key findings show that Facebook adopts a post-racial, race-blind approach that does not consider history and material differences, while its main focus is on enforcement, data, and efficiency. In making sense of these findings, we argue that Facebook’s content governance turns hate speech from a question of ethics, politics, and justice into a technical and logistical problem. Secondly, it socializes users into developing behaviors/contents that adapt to race-blindness, leading to the circulation of a kind of flexible racism. Finally, it spreads this approach from Silicon Valley to the rest of the world.

There is an increasing threat posed by terrorism in modern day, and with the internet enabling new ways of disseminating online terrorist propaganda, audiences and support for terrorist groups are growing. The complex linkage between society and technology is become ever more critical as the world continues to shift more day-to-day life online, and this notion has increased greatly during the coronavirus global pandemic where online platforms have become an essential aspect for communicating. The spread of online terrorist propaganda has sparked concerns about the governance of Internet. However, Internet governance is multifaceted, complex and can be examined through various lenses. This paper argues that there is a need for a socio-technical perspective, exploring the inextricable linkages between societies and technology, on Internet governance. Focusing on the UK’s approach to governing terrorist propaganda, the paper highlights the strengths and limitations of the model of national law and regulation.

Since 2016, at least 43 countries around the globe have proposed or implemented regulations specifically designed to tackle different aspects of influence campaigns, including both real and perceived threats of fake news, social media abuse, and election interference. Some governments are in the early stages of designing regulatory measures specifically for digital contexts so they can tackle issues related to the malicious use of social media. For others, existing legal mechanisms regulating speech and information are already well established, and the digital aspect merely adds an additional dimension to law enforcement. Our research team conducted an analysis of proposed or implemented regulations and identified a number of interventions. Some measures target social media platforms, requiring them to take down content, improve transparency, or tighten data protection mechanisms. Other measures focus on civil actors and media organisations, on supporting literacy and advocacy efforts, and on improving standards for journalistic content production and dissemination. A third group of interventions target governments themselves, obligating them to invest in security and defence programs that combat election interference, or to initiate formal inquiries into such matters. Finally, a fourth group of interventions take aim at the criminalisation of automated message generation and disinformation.

This article offers a method for systematically grading the quality of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) videos based on technical production criteria. Using this method revealed moments when ISIS production capacity was severely debilitated (Fall 2015) and when they began to rebuild (Spring 2016), which the article details. Uses for
this method include evaluating propaganda video output across time and across groups, and the ability to assess kinetic actions against propaganda organizations. This capacity will be critical as Islamic State media production teams will be pushed out of its territory as the State collapses.