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This thesis examines why approximately 700 German foreign fighters traveled to Syria and Iraq between early 2012 and late 2015. It presents the author’s original research on 99 German foreign fighter profiles, examining their preexisting network connections in Germany as well as their biographical availability and integration into German society. The study finds that German foreign fighters are primarily mobilized through traditional social network connections and that the mobilizing network in Germany consists of a nationwide, interconnected, and politically active “Salafist scene.” The project also finds that while Western governments often worry about the looming threat of online radicalization, verifiable examples of purely Internet-based radicalization remain rare.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, or NetzDG law represents a key test for combatting hate speech on the internet. Under the law, which came into effect on January 1, 2018, online platforms face fines of up to €50 million for systemic failure to delete illegal content. Supporters see the legislation as a necessary and efficient response to the threat of online hatred and extremism. Critics view it as an attempt to privatise a new ‘draconian’ censorship regime, forcing social media platforms to respond to this new painful liability with unnecessary takedowns. This study shows that the reality is in between these extremes. NetzDG has not provoked mass requests for takedowns. Nor has it forced internet platforms to adopt a ‘take down, ask later’ approach. At the same time, it remains uncertain whether NetzDG has achieved significant results in reaching its stated goal of preventing hate speech. This paper begins by explaining the background that led to the development and passage of NetzDG. It examines the reaction to the law by civil society, platforms and the government. It concludes with suggestions, for platforms, civil society and the authorities, on ways to improve the law to be effective in the fight against online hate while keeping the internet open and free.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) Crisis Response Working Group (CRWG) was established in April 2020 as part of the GIFCT substantive Working Group structure. The CRWG’s objective is to drive effective collaboration among industry, government, and law enforcement to minimize the spread of terrorist or violent extremist content online stemming from an offline event.

Incident Response Working Group: GIFCT conducted a robust multistakeholder review of its Incident Response Framework (IRF) to better reflect the needs and feedback of key stakeholders and draw on lessons learned from prior activations. Widespread concerns about the potential rise in AI generated content around terrorist attacks, and the increasing prevalence of violence associated with accelerationist movements or self-mobilized radicalization informed discussions aimed at updating the IRF. Working with the Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism (CTEC) GIFCT undertook a comprehensive review and expert dialogue series which resulted in the report Future-Proofing GIFCT’s Incident Response: Addressing Societal Harms, and will inform GIFCT work in updating the IRF in 2025.