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This paper contributes to platform-comparative research through a case study of Twitter/X, Telegram, and Gettr in the context of German far-right social movements. It introduces the conceptual framework of platform opportunity structures to examine how platforms enable or constrain far-right mobilization. Using community analysis of sharing networks among the same pool of far-right social movement actors, the study explores how technological affordances, governance models, ownership and branding, and user bases and cultures shape platform-specific networking patterns. The findings reveal Telegram as a central platform for the most radical and active communities; Twitter as a site where anti-elite journalists and politicians are salient; and Gettr as a platform to connect to the U.S. far right. While anti-elite and COVID-related conspiracist figures exert influence on all platforms-particularly on Telegram, the prevalence of AfD politicians, pseudonymous amplifiers, and transnational ties to the U.S. far right – especially after Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter – are emergent factors. As Twitter shifts toward ‘alternative’ platforms like Telegram and Gettr, offering minimal moderation and security and even ideological branding, this article adds to understanding how dynamic platform opportunity structures shape far-right mobilization online.

This article examines how far-right groups advance political agendas through digital platforms, specifically by embedding reactionary ideology within health and wellness discourse. Our investigation concerns the “Barbarian Right” subculture on X (formerly Twitter), where reactionary content is often intertwined with wellness messaging. Using social network analysis of 42 accounts identified through digital ethnography, we mapped the structure of this community and identified key influencers. Subsequent semiotic discourse analysis revealed ideological practices and their relationship to platform affordances. Our findings reveal a small number of prominent accounts, supported by alternative media outlets that dominate this space. These accounts primarily deliver health advice strategically interspersed with white nationalist messaging. This research offers empirical insights into the growing alignment between far-right and wellness communities, shedding light on potential radicalization pathways and recruitment strategies of the dissident right.

This is the protocol for a Campbell Systematic Review. This review will address two aims: (1) A qualitative synthesis of literature on the composition of online far right propaganda, and (2) A quantitative synthesis of literature examining the impact of exposure to online far‐right propaganda on audiences. These syntheses will be guided by the following specific objectives: (i) What is the content (i.e. themes) of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (ii) What is the structure of online far‐right propaganda, and how does this differ across ideological subgroups? (iii) What is the context of these messages (i.e., where, when and by whom were they posted?) (iv) What impact does exposure to online far‐right propaganda have on audiences with reference to the radicalisation of opinion and/or action?

This study focuses on the role played by search engines in accessing Salafi-jihadi terrorist content on the surface web and beyond. It argues that due to the very nature of the World Wide Web, search engines may be exploited as primary gateways to harmful content, allowing followers of Salafi-jihadi violent extremist groups to find and law enforcement to detect crucial communication channels maintained by terrorist organisations easily. While ‘findability’ has become a key concept in other fields that research how users locate material online, we point out that the obvious functionality of search engines has remained under the radar in the counterterrorism discourse for years, and this gap must now be addressed. In order to decrease the accessibility of terrorist-operated websites (TOWs) serving as the primary nodes that reroute traffic deeper into the ecosystems maintained by violent extremist organisations (VEOs), there is a role to be played by search engines. They dispose of a number of potential tools that can be exploited to limit the visibility of terrorist content on the surface web.

TikTok is a pivotal platform for political communication, especially among younger users. This study examines how the German rightwing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD) used TikTok to disseminate populist messages and engage users during the 2024 European elections. By analyzing videos posted by AfD politicians in the three months leading up to the elections, we identified the main populist messages and assessed their impact on user engagement compared to other parties. Applying LLM-enhanced topic modeling of video transcriptions, we identified twelve themes, grouped into three types of populist discursive strategies: (1) Protectionism against Horizontal Threats, with imagined enemies on the ‘eye level’ (e.g., migrants and ‘wokeists’), (2) Protectionism against Vertical Threats, with imagined enemies being in positions of structural power (e.g., anti-elitism), and (3) Concerns of the People, with diffuse and abstract roots of the problem (e.g., fears of inflation, security, or loss of individual rights). While horizontal out-group attacks and vertical anti-elitism garnered higher average engagement, most content focused solely on anti-elite and concern-related themes. Thus, going beyond theories of right-wing populism that emphasize identity-based exclusionary rhetoric, we show that the AfD also focused on users’ concerns. This suggests a strategy aimed at resonating with voters by combining divisive messaging with relatable issues, or even prioritizing such concerns. By mainly promoting anti-elitism alongside real-world concerns – thus obscuring the extremism of its agenda and key figures – the AfD generates significantly more engagement, outperforming all other German parties combined. Our findings raise questions about right-wing populist rhetoric in online campaigning amid growing voter insecurity.

This study investigates how a far-right extremist group, The Base, enacts communicative resilience (CR) strategies across digital platforms despite deplatforming efforts. In our empirical analysis, we conducted a content analysis of 69 conversations about bans that occurred in The Base’s encrypted chatrooms on Matrix and Wire between 2018 and 2020. We examined if and how the CR processes outlined in the communication theory of resilience (CTR) applied to far-right extremists groups operating online. Our analysis shows that deplatforming, while disruptive, triggers CR processes that activate collaborative discovery of new methods to remain resilient. Additionally, we discovered an additional, online performative process of persistent presence in response to a perceived constant, existential threat. That strategy demonstrates operational capacity, reinforces group-based identities, accrues social capital, and performs a proven capacity to challenge detractors. By assessing The Base’s online dynamics, this study contributes to broader conversations on mediated CTR, deplatforming, extremism, and the role of CR in political legitimation.