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New communication technologies are often invested with users’ hopes for change in the social order. Thus the Internet is said to be inherently democratic, levelling traditional distinctions of social status, and creating opportunities for less powerful individuals and groups to participate on a par with members of more powerful groups. Specifically, the Internet has been claimed to lead to greater gender equality, with women, as the socially, politically, and economically less powerful gender, especially likely to reap its benefits.

The association between 4chan and online extremist subcultures has seen increasing academic scrutiny—particularly following the 2019 Christchurch attack by a right-wing terrorist who frequented the anonymous forums. Gender-based extremism features as one (of many) critical subcultures that commands our academic attention, though few studies to date have sought to capture and assess the entire landscape of this phenomenon on 4chan’s most notorious board: /pol/. Drawing on a pre-Christchurch attack dataset extracted from Papasavva et al. (2020), this study investigates how Australians and New Zealanders (ANZ) broadly conceptualize—and debate—women, gender, and sexual violence on 4chan’s /pol/ board. We apply a mixed-methods approach, combining automated machine learning tools alongside expert qualitative analysis. Across nearly 300,000 posts and comments, we show how gender is constructed within this community, and the conjugal order they demand as a result. This order racially and sexually defines gender identities and norms, which are perceived as mechanisms to restore power and dominance to an ethnically and ideologically conforming in-group. Those that violate or disrupt the conjugal order are legitimized as targets of sexual, and gender-based violence. This normalizes far/extreme right gendered constructs across ANZ contexts in support of exclusivist far/extreme right ideological positions.

Far-right extremism is rapidly becoming a primary security threat in both the UK and Australia. By adopting a comparative case-study approach, this article examines how misogyny and gendered narratives espoused through online channels can serve as motivators towards violent extremism through transnational networks. We argue that gendered narratives specifically play a key role in influencing motivations for joining and participating in extremist groups and can frame the parameters of involvement for both women and men. We further found that misogyny is a shared expression amongst different actors in the far-right spectrum despite distinct local contexts, and in the case of the UK and Australia these narratives served as a shared vocabulary that facilitated the communication of these ideas transnationally. This influences our current understanding of the nexus between misogyny and violent extremism, in that misogyny creates a linking identity factor and a common line of communication across different geopolitical environments, facilitating both narrative connections and common understanding. Our findings have implications for P/CVE stakeholders and practitioners in risk assessment and management in that it will improve understanding of how misogyny and gender narratives serve as motivators towards violent extremism across three key layers, and the type of discourse used to sustain and legitimise involvement.

A growing amount of literature is being devoted to interrogating gendered dynamics in both violent extremism and terrorism, contributing to the integration of international and feminist security. This includes how such dynamics can shape differences in the motivations and participation of women and men. By critically analysing ideological gender constructs in two women-only extremist forums – the Women’s Forum on Stormfront.org and Women Dawah, a Turkish-language pro-Islamic State group chat on Telegram – and employing feminist methodology, this article demonstrates how gendered online spaces influence women’s ‘everyday practices’ within extremist movements. We argue that women-only online spaces not only facilitate gendered practices by allowing women to share everyday experiences, hold ideological discussions, and engage in debate, but also provide an important means to navigate these issues within the movement itself. In fact, women-only forums are actively used by women within extremist movements to exert greater agency in the face of otherwise constraining gendered ideological constructs. In turn, gendered everyday practices are reinforced by virtual communities that strengthen a sense of meaning – and purpose – in the movement, albeit being ideologically confined to the private sphere in many ways. This study sheds light not only on the differences in participation between women and men, but also on how such virtual communities can serve as spaces to frame and reinforce gendered practices in extremist movements. This has key implications for deradicalisation and disengagement strategies, which are at present overwhelmingly gender neutral. We provide evidence of how women navigate agency in these spaces, while challenging the stereotype that women in extremist movements are typically passive actors confined to traditional roles.

We introduce a generalized form of gelation theory that incorporates individual heterogeneity and show that it can explain the asynchronous, sudden appearance and growth of online extremist groups supporting ISIS (so-called Islamic State) that emerged globally post-2014. The theory predicts how heterogeneity impacts their onset times and growth profiles and suggests that online extremist groups present a broad distribution of heterogeneity-dependent aggregation mechanisms centered around homophily. The good agreement between the theory and empirical data suggests that existing strategies aiming to defeat online extremism under the assumption that it is driven by a few “bad apples” are misguided. More generally, this generalized theory should apply to a range of real-world systems featuring aggregation among heterogeneous objects.

This thesis examines why approximately 700 German foreign fighters traveled to Syria and Iraq between early 2012 and late 2015. It presents the author’s original research on 99 German foreign fighter profiles, examining their preexisting network connections in Germany as well as their biographical availability and integration into German society. The study finds that German foreign fighters are primarily mobilized through traditional social network connections and that the mobilizing network in Germany consists of a nationwide, interconnected, and politically active “Salafist scene.” The project also finds that while Western governments often worry about the looming threat of online radicalization, verifiable examples of purely Internet-based radicalization remain rare.