Online Library

This paper aims to contribute to understanding how the last flagship magazine of the Islamic State – “Rumiyah” – attempted to influence and manipulate Internet users. Its primary objective is to analyze the propaganda methods exploited in all thirteen issues of this magazine. In order to do so this paper utilises content analysis to investigate “propaganda devices”, a concept developed by the American Institute for Propaganda Analysis. It argues that there were four predominant groups of propaganda devices exploited in this magazine. Two of them, i.e. name-calling and glittering generalities, were utilized to create and promote an artificial, black-and-white vision of the world, composed of the “camp of kufr” (camp of disbelief) and the “camp of iman” (camp of faith), embodied by the Islamic State. The third leading propaganda method, transfer, attempted to legitimize the actions and agenda of the “Caliphate” by using the authority of not only Allah, but also the Prophet Muhammad, his companions (Sahabah), as well as selectively chosen Islamic scholars. Finally, the bandwagon served as a means of creating a sense of community between the editors and readers. Other propaganda devices, such as testimonial or plain folks, played strictly secondary roles in the narration of the magazine.

This paper, which takes the form of a case study, aims to contribute to the debate on activities of the Islamic State’s unofficial media bureaus. Based on tools of open source intelligence, as well as a limited content analysis, it maps the online presence and activities of Ahlut-Tawhid Publications (AHP). Its means of distributing pro-Daesh content in the surface web as well as its general impact are discussed. It also deliberates on the interconnectedness of AHP with other online propaganda cells supporting the self-proclaimed “Caliphate.” This paper argues that this group was part of the ongoing online campaign of the Islamic State in the World Wide Web in 2018 and 2019. It maintained quite an impressive and long-lasting online presence, combining the potential of the most popular microblogs, hosting services and social media with the flexibility of standalone websites. In contrast to the most recognized propaganda cells of Daesh, such as al-Hayat Media Centre or Amaq News Agency whose productions have been quickly detected and removed from the mainstream webpages for years, AHP kept a low profile for the most part of 2018. In effect, it benefited from its relative anonymity and for months operated a network of pro-IS distribution channels throughout Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 environments. This ceased to be the case in 2019, when most of them were incapacitated (banned) by law enforcement or abandoned. It is clear that the attention given to proliferating propaganda through the surface web decreased at this time, probably in favor of the Telegram communication software, as the discovered statistics suggest. The only active (still updated) locations—partially related to Ahlut-Tawhid Publications—belonged to the Bengali Ansar network. It has to be stressed, however, that AHP failed to spark increased attention of Internet users.

The primary objective of this paper is to map the online presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) media branch – Ebaa News Agency (ENA) – on the surface web. It also measures three years of propaganda output of the group and its viewership, as well as outlines the thematic landscape of its productions based on the content analysis of a sample. It argues that Ebaa’s messaging pattern constitutes a peculiar mixture of opposing priorities. It paid a great deal of attention to portraying itself as an independent news agency that has nothing to do with violent terrorist organizations (VEOs). In effect, its productions are easily available on the surface web. A closer look, however, proves that since 2017 ENA has been dedicated to supporting HTS’s radical Islamist agenda. This paper provides evidence of this. Moreover, Ebaa adopted a two-vector distribution strategy of its productions, composed of standalone websites and Telegram channels. In this context, the output of this media cell appears to be quite impressive. Between 2017 and 2020, it was capable of releasing more than 13,000 pieces of propaganda on its websites. At the same time, however, their viewership was lower than initially expected.

The focus of this workshop was individuals’ experiences of, and engagement with, extremist ideas and beliefs – both jihadist and far-right – in a variety of different settings. Panellists explored the role of video games, music, humour and the occult in normalising extremism and assessed the extent to which this plays a role in radicalisation trajectories and desensitises individuals to violence. The reverse process – in which extremist actors adopt mainstream culture to expound their message – was also considered.

Panellists:

Dr Suraj Lakhani (University of Sussex)

Dr Weeda Mehran (University of Exeter)

Prof Jonathan Pieslak (The City College of New York, CUNY)

Dr Ashton Kingdon (University of Southampton)

VOX-Pol Lecture Series, Spring 2023

Title: Emerging Methodologies Panel: Researching the Metaverse.

Chair: Dr Suraj Lakhani (University of Sussex)

Speaker 1: Dr Rachel Kowert

Outline: “The Metaverse” is a phrase that is used often despite the fact that there is no clear consensus on how to define this space. In this short talk, we will explore the various interpretations of the metaverse and put forward a new definition of “metaverse-like spaces” and explore how these environments are not something to expect in a dystopian future, but are present here and now. We will also discuss the challenges and practicalities facing researchers who wish to study these environments.

Speaker 2: Dr Elizabeth Pearson

Outline: Online extremism and terrorism research has been going on for at least two decades now: although there was some earlier coverage (Lowe 1985), the academic sub-field had its genesis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini 1999; Conway 2002; Denning 1999). Despite this, understanding its impacts on the people who collect and analyse data on online extremism and terrorism, and who publish their findings, is a relatively new concern. Lizz Pearson discusses the new VOX-Pol report from the REASSURE project, exploring how researchers are harmed, how they prevent harm and what institutions are doing to help. Based on interviews with researchers, we look at how research in the metaverse might change these findings, and how institutions need to adapt to the ever-changing research environment to protect academics.

Anashid – Islamic a cappella songs – figure prominently in the propagandaconsumption habits of the 17 jihadists who have caused casualties in the United States since 2013.