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In the past decade, people associated with what is known as the alt-right have employed a strategy similar to that of progressive, antiracist satirists to advance a decidedly white supremacist, anti-Semitic, misogynist, and deadly serious agenda. As this article documents, the alt-right weaponizes irony to attract and radicalize potential supporters, challenge progressive ideologies and institutions, redpill normies, and create a toxic counterpublic. Discussing examples of satiric irony generated by the extreme right alongside those produced by the (often mainstream) left, this article pairs two satirical memes, two activists’ use of irony, two ambiguously satirical tweets, and two recent controversies pertaining to racism and satire so as to illustrate how people with very different political commitments employ a similar style with potent effects. Of particular significance are reverse racism discourses, including “white genocide,” and the increasingly complicated relationship between intentions, extremism, and satire.

This thesis concerns the possibility of deceiving cyberterrorists using defensive deception methods. As cyberspace today is a battleground for myriad cyber attacks and intrusions, it may only be a matter of time before terrorists choose to advance their deadly cause in cyberspace. We explore some of the questions raised regarding the threat of cyberterrorism by examining different perspectives, motivations, actors, targets, and how they may be confronted. One way is to draw from the lessons of deception and apply them against cyberterrorist attacks. Cyber deception applies in cyberspace just as well as deception in military battles. From the different categories of attackers that could perpetrate cyberterrorism, we examine the ways in which they may be deceived. Many of the methods and tools that cyberterrorists would use are similar to those used by other less malicious hackers, so we can plan specific deceptions to use against them in advance.

The gaming ecosystem is increasingly observed with the concern that it could pose a threat to public safety, and research accumulates evidence for blatant extremism in the surrounding online space of games. Currently, a connection between gaming and extremism can be established through identity related processes, e.g., gaming-related radicalization elements, distal to gaming itself, such as gaming communities and culture. However, this also raises the question of what the precise function of proximal gaming factors, such as gameplay, mechanics, stories, or game-play motivations, is in the relationship between gaming and extremism. This article aims to shed light on the relation of gaming and extremism by identifying individual profiles of videogame playing based on gameplay motivations and linking them to indications of radical attitudes (here: xenophobia and violence acceptance) as well as conspiracy beliefs that can be associated with extremist beliefs. Further, we include marginalization and anomie as mediators to gain comparative and fine-grained information about the sole impact of gaming motives on radical attitudes. Our findings indicate that while few motivational profiles exhibit weak yet direct connections to radical attitudes, others display the opposite pattern, suggesting a more complex relationship. Marginalization and anomie strongly predict most radical outcome variables and mediate the relationship in most cases, however sometimes negatively. We only found one complex motivational profile that substantially leans toward late-stage radical attitudes, while for instance, dominant social motives clearly inhibit radical outcomes. The current study thus deflates any straightforward perspective on the becoming of a ‘radical gamer’.

The gaming ecosystem is increasingly observed with the concern that it could pose a threat to public safety, and research accumulates evidence for blatant extremism in the surrounding online space of games. Currently, a connection between gaming and extremism can be established through identity related processes, e.g., gaming-related radicalization elements, distal to gaming itself, such as gaming communities and culture. However, this also raises the question of what the precise function of proximal gaming factors, such as gameplay, mechanics, stories, or game-play motivations, is in the relationship between gaming and extremism. This article aims to shed light on the relation of gaming and extremism by identifying individual profiles of videogame playing based on gameplay motivations and linking them to indications of radical attitudes (here: xenophobia and violence acceptance) as well as conspiracy beliefs that can be associated with extremist beliefs. Further, we include marginalization and anomie as mediators to gain comparative and fine-grained information about the sole impact of gaming motives on radical attitudes. Our findings indicate that while few motivational profiles exhibit weak yet direct connections to radical attitudes, others display the opposite pattern, suggesting a more complex relationship. Marginalization and anomie strongly predict most radical outcome variables and mediate the relationship in most cases, however sometimes negatively. We only found one complex motivational profile that substantially leans toward late-stage radical attitudes, while for instance, dominant social motives clearly inhibit radical outcomes. The current study thus deflates any straightforward perspective on the becoming of a ‘radical gamer’.

This paper utilizes Social Movement Theory to analyze the online strategies of al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State. Applying Social Movement Theory, this paper argues that the relative online successes
of each group can be explained through this theory of radicalization through social engagement. This paper
looks at the writings of al-Qaeda strategist, Abu Musab al-Suri, who envisioned use of the internet
for social engagement, as it considers the implications of a likely increase in jihadist use of the internet.

A review of relevant empirical literature shows that many features of social media platforms actively promote or encourage hate speech. Key factors include algorithmic recommendations, which frequently promote hateful ideologies; social affordances which let users encourage or disseminate hate speech by others; anonymous, impersonal environments; and the absence of media ‘gatekeepers’. In mandating faster content deletion, NetzDG only addresses the last of these, ignoring other relevant factors. Moreover, reliance on individual user complaints to trigger platforms’ obligations means hate speech will often escape deletion. Interviews with relevant civil society organisations confirm these flaws of the NetzDG model. From their perspectives, NetzDG has had little impact on the prevalence or visibility of online hate speech, and its reporting mechanisms fail to help affected communities.