Online Library

This study analyzes how Inspire and Dabiq seek to appeal to and
radicalize English-speaking Muslims. It examines how each magazine
strategically designs ingroup, Other, crisis, and solution constructs and
interplays these via value-, dichotomy-, and crisis-reinforcing
narratives. This analysis also explores how narrative, imagery, and
counternarrative messaging are used to shape readers’ perceptions
and polarize their support. While both magazines are dominated by
narratives designed to empower readers toward action, Inspire relies
heavily on identity-choice appeals while Dabiq tends to balance
identity- and rational-choice messaging. This study concludes by
identifying key lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications
campaign and message design.

The article describes the research network “Analysis of extremist aspirations in social networks (X-SONAR)” funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). The network investigates extremist interaction and escalation dynamics in social online networks and their relevance for criminally relevant radicalization processes, such as in the planning and execution of extremist acts of violence. Among other things, the aim is to derive a model for risk assessment and prevention and to develop a demonstrator for a software-based tool that can be used by end-users from security agencies and civil society for on-demand monitoring of extremist agitation in virtual contexts.

The threat posed by terrorism today is changing rapidly—as have methods of study of this phenomenon, including analysis of radicalisation and the ‘terrorist cycle’. This chapter takes a qualitative approach to one aspect of contemporary terrorism, self-directed (‘lone wolf’) terrorism by right-wing extremists. Predominately plaguing the USA at first, solo actor terrorism by fascist extremists crossed the Atlantic in 1999 with David Copeland’s attacks in London, and most horrifically with Anders Behring Breivik’s murder of 77 people in Oslo and Utøya in 2011. Like these two terrorist murderers, the two case studies discussed here, Neil Lewington and Ian Davison, were also radicalised online through ‘passive’ and ‘active’ networks of support. Although interdicted before committing acts of terrorism, the different pathways of online radicalisation by Lexington and Davison are the central subject here.

In this study, and with a view to extending upon existing findings on the effects of general violent media on violent cognitions, we experimentally measured the relationship between exposure to extremist propaganda and violent cognitions. Our results countered our hypotheses and the wider findings of violent media and aggression that exposure to violent stimuli increases violent thoughts and that this effect is moderated by trait aggression. Specifically, this study found that participants with low and medium trait aggression became more pro-social after being exposed to extremist propaganda. We discuss these results with reference to theories of terror management and mortality salience, as well as the implications of these results for wider theories of the role of online extremist material in the wider “radicalization” process.

The level of influence and interference by Russian-linked social media trying to engineer social division in the UK, including through Russian Twitter accounts, is considerably more extensive than has been reported to date.

Popular tech companies—Google, Facebook,
Twitter, and others—have strongly protected
free speech online, a policy widely associated
with the legal norms of the United States.
American tech companies, however, operate
globally, and their platforms are subject to regulation
by the European Union, whose member states offer less
protection to expression than does the United States.
European regulators are pressuring tech companies to
control and suppress extreme speech. The regulators’
clear warning is that, if the companies do not comply
“voluntarily,” they will face harsher laws and potential
liability. This regulatory effort runs the risk of censorship
creep, whereby a wide array of protected speech, including
political criticism and newsworthy content, may end up
being removed from online platforms on a global scale.