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This paper presents the first criminological analysis of an online social reaction to a crime event of national significance, in particular the detection and propagation of cyberhate on social media following a terrorist attack. We take the Woolwich, London terrorist attack in 2013 as our event of interest and draw on Cohen’s process of warning, impact, inventory and reaction to delineate a sequence of incidents that come to constitute a series of deviant responses following the attack. This paper adds to contemporary debates in criminology and the study of hate crime in three ways: (1) it provides the first analysis of the escalation, duration, diffusion and de-escalation of cyberhate in social media following a terrorist event; (2) it applies Cohen’s work on action, reaction and amplification and the role of the traditional media to the online context and (3) it introduces and provides a case study in ‘computational criminology’.

The All Wales Hate Crime Project (Williams & Tregidga 2013, 2014)
highlighted the emerging problem of cyberhate and cyber bulling via social media
through interviews with victims. Opportunities for online engagement have
increased exponentially over the past two decades. In 1999 only 10 per cent of UK
households had access to the Internet. The number had grown to 53 percent in
2005 and to 85 per cent in 2015 (ONS 2015). Estimates put global social media
membership at approximately 2.5 billion non-unique users, with Facebook, Google+
and Twitter accounting for over half of these (Sloan et al. 2015, 2015, Williams et al.
2016). Open and widely accessible social media technologies, such as Twitter and
Facebook, are increasingly being used by citizens on a global scale to publish online
content. The diffusion of information in these networks can manifest itself in a
number of ways, ranging from the positive, such as support of social resilience
through calls for assistance and advice (Morell et al. 2011), to the negative, through
the production and contagion of misinformation and antagonistic and prejudiced
commentary (Burnap et al. 2013, 2014, Williams et al. 2013).

Hate Crime and its commission online is now recognised as a priority by the
UK Government. The sending of menacing messages via the Internet is now
punishable by up to 2 years imprisonment (Malicious Communications Act 1998 as
amended by the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill 2015). The Welsh Government
continues to implement ‘Tackling Hate Crimes and Incidents: A Framework for
Action’ and the fast paced evolution of social media is providing significant
challenges for partners and agencies. Despite this recognition, practitioners can
remain in the dark about the nature, prevalence and resources available to tackle
cyberhate and bulling on social media.
This conference aimed to address this knowledge gap via a series of keynote
presentations from high-profile leaders in the field and via hands on workshops.
This report outlines conference attendee experiences in relation to the current barriers and potential solutions in the area of cyberhate and cyber bullying and puts
forward national recommendations.

— The reporting, recording and incidence of online hate speech has increased over the past two years.
— While the number of people personally targeted remains relatively low, large numbers of people are being exposed to online hate speech, potentially causing decreased life satisfaction. In particular, an increasingly large number of UK children (aged 12-15) report that they are exposed to hateful content online.
— Online hate speech tends to spike for 24-48 hours after key national or international events such as a terror attack, and then rapidly fall, although the baseline of online hate can remain elevated for several months. Where it reaches a certain level, online hate speech can translate into offline hate crime on the streets.
— Hate crime, including hate speech, is both hard to define and hard to prosecute. A patchwork of hate crime laws has developed over the last two decades, but there is concern the laws are not as effective as they could be, and may need to be streamlined and/or extended – for example to cover gender and age-related hate crime. The Law Commission is currently reviewing hate crime legislation, and has separately completed a preliminary review of the criminal law in relation to offensive
and abusive online communications, concluding there was “considerable scope for reform”.
— According to a recent survey by Demos, the public appreciates the difficult trade-off between tackling hate crime and protecting freedom of speech, with 32% in favour of a safety first approach, 23% in favour of protecting civil liberties, and 42% not favouring either option.

In this Lowy Institute Analysis, Lauren Williams examines Islamic State’s use of the Western media to disseminate its propaganda. Williams argues mainstream media outlets have a responsibility to treat Islamic State-produced material more critically, expose the weaknesses of its messages, and place greater effort into counter-messaging.

KEY FINDINGS
Islamic State’s media arm has a clearly defined strategy to manipulate the mainstream media to serve its propaganda objectives.
A more critical view of Islamic State’s claims and propaganda is needed to limit the effectiveness of the group’s messages.
The role of the media, as well as the stories of returnees and defectors, as a platform for counter-messaging has been underutilised.

The global war on terror (“GWOT”) is being fought on many levels. In addition to traditional terror and counterterror activity, both sides are engaged in a public relations and propaganda war, employing the media, willingly and unwillingly, to support their positions. Hovering over these war campaigns are information technologies, which include the Internet. This article provides an introduction to various online content concealing practices that have been employed by those seeking to conceal or limit access to information on the Internet, including terrorist organizations. Further, there is a discussion on tracking and monitoring of website visitors. After reviewing open source information and websites, this article examines techniques and technologies that are easily available to terrorist organizations — foreign and domestic — whose structure can be obtained through Internet websites. The article then turns to a discussion of the legal issues posed by active and passive website monitoring techniques.

In this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online. The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist “ecosystem,” describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.