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Among the most recent evolutions of jihadi terrorist tactics in the West has been the rise of the virtual entrepreneur. The increased use of social media, often paired with applications that ofer the option of encrypted messaging, has enabled members of groups like the Islamic State to make direct and lasting contact with radicalized Americans. In some cases, these individuals direct terror plots, and in others, they provide encouragement and motivation for attacks. In the United States, there are 14 known cases of terrorist-related activity involving 19 U.S.-based individuals where the involvement of an Islamic State virtual entrepreneur has been documented. This outsourcing of terrorism has been a game changer in Islamic State eforts to attack the West.

Much qualitative research has drawn an association between social media and domestic terrorism, with the studies reaching different conclusions. However, few empirical studies have evaluated whether the surge in social media participation affects domestic terrorist events. Controlling for common explanations in the literature, we conduct a cross-national, time-series analysis of up to 151 countries from 2000 to 2019 to assess the impact of social media penetration on domestic terrorism. We find that greater social media penetration increases the likelihood of domestic terrorism in countries as it supports extremists’ ability to recruit, mobilize, and train terrorists. Using mediation analysis, we also find that greater social media penetration amplifies online and political polarization, increasing the likelihood of domestic terrorism events. Our work indicates the possible mechanisms linking social media and domestic terrorism and the need to develop and apply appropriate counterterrorism strategies to mitigate terrorist operations.

In response to the emergence of new, paradigm-shifting technology that increases capability for the benefit and – as is the focus of this work – harm, we sought to provide contributions across three key areas. First, as a foundation, we provide a definition of the ambiguous and, at times, confusing term ‘metaverse’ and outline its unique characteristics as an emerging ecosystem. Second, we synthesise definitional framing with the violent extremist literature to offer guidance on how the metaverse can (and currently is), manifest in terrorist and extremist activities, such as recruitment, planning, finance, and malevolent creativity. We offer that while the use of the internet is not a novel application for such activities and groups, the metaverse and related technologies afford new opportunities for how the internet is used to advance violent missions and objectives. Third, we draw on psychology literature to offer potential mechanisms by which the metaverse may emerge as a future threat landscape. Future areas of research are also discussed.

This chapter explores the manner in which extremist groups could use artificial intelligence (AI) in the future to promote their narratives and recruit people to their causes. It looks at four broad use cases, namely generative AI, chat bots, gaming, and predictive analytics, and analyzes how extremists could adapt their propaganda and outreach efforts to incorporate new and innovative AI-powered techniques which would revolutionize their efficacy. The chapter then analyzes the current regulatory environment with regard to online content to assess the extent to which we are prepared for the AI revolution as it pertains to political messaging and the dissemination of information online. The chapter also touches on what all of this means for our civil liberties and what they might look like in a digital era that is also experiencing decentralization and a decline in Big Tech’s monopoly. It concludes with some thoughts on what we can expect to see in the coming years and suggestions for further research.

This report hopes to contribute to developing research in the ever-evolving arena of radicalisation with a particular focus on the role of the Internet. Our aim is to provide a resource for both policy makers and practitioners that offers an in-depth insight into the means by which extremists use online tools to propagandise and recruit. While previous research has focussed on specific aspects of this phenomenon, this report aims to provide a comprehensive analysis encompassing both qualitative and quantitative methods. It is also unique in that it offers a detailed and practical guide on how to turn the tide against extremists online and reclaim the Internet. Our research would not have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of colleagues, experts, mentors and focus group participants. In particular, we would like to thank our research assistants Ariana Skipp and Aimee Gentry who diligently collected data transcribed interviews and proofread drafts. We would also like to thank Jonathan Russell, Usama Hasan, Faisal Ghazi, Verity Harding, Florian Maganza and Benoit Tabaka for their support, assistance and guidance.