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This qualitative study provides a semiotic perspective on cyberterrorism and its opportunity to cause maximal damage while using terrorist propaganda. The very definition of cyberterrorism refers to Internet use, technology, and computer-based networks against critical infrastructures. The application of Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder– morphological, empirical, syntactical, semantic, pragmatic and social world –to the various methods of propaganda utilized by cyberterrorists will uncover aspects on the transition from traditional to modern methods of attack, cyberterrorist communication, and the recruitment of new members to their cause. Additionally, this research focused on the role of the media in the equation of planning by propaganda to the fruition of an attack. Interviews were collected from ten participants during 30-60 minute segments. Based on the data, five themes emerged: (1) Acknowledgement of the Existence of Cyberterrorism, (2) Postmodern Propaganda and Publicity, (3) Detrimental Effects on Targets, (4) Media Implications, and (5) Communicative Messages. This provides readers with an organized order to the data and provides a way to progressively detail cyberterrorism, with a specific focus on the actual effects of their semiotic intents on targets, on the public, and on the world at large or what is being conveyed. Ultimately, the themes that emerged follow Stamper’s Semiotic Ladder, starting with surface level understanding of cyberterrorism and work up to the global impact of cyberterrorism on various aspects of culture, beliefs, and expectations.

As the Internet is progressively integrated into industrial and defense-related networks around the globe, it is becoming increasing important to understand how state and sub-state groups can use Internet vulnerabilities as a conduit of attack. The current social science literature on cyber threats is largely dominated by descriptive, U.S.-centric research. While this scholarship is important, the findings are not generalizable and fail to address the global aspects of network vulnerabilities. As a result, this dissertation employs a unique dataset of cyber threats from around the world, spanning from 1990 to 2011. This dataset allows for three diverse empirical studies to be conducted. The first study investigates the political, social, and economic characteristics that increase the likelihood of a state being targeted for cyber threats. The results show that different state characteristics are likely to influence the forms of digital attack targeting. For example, states that experience increases in GDP per capita and military size are more likely to be targeted for cyber attacks. Inversely, states that experience increases in GDP per capita and those that are more democratic are less likely to be targeted for cyber terrorism. The second study investigates the role that international rivalries play in cyber threat targeting. The results suggest that states in rivalries may have more reason to strengthen their digital security, and rival actors may be cautious about employing serious, threatening forms of cyber activity against foes because of concerns about escalation. The final study, based upon the crisis bargaining theory, seeks to determine if cyber threat targeting decreases private information asymmetry and therefore decreases conflict participation. Empirical results show that the loss of digital information via cyber means may thus illicit a low intensity threat or militarized action by a target state, but it also simultaneously increases the likelihood that a bargain may be researched, preventing full scale war by reducing the amount of private information held between parties.

In this case study, I analyze the 2014 North Korean computer database hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), a serious national security crisis of cyberterrorism. I utilize Normal Accidents theory as a lens, to help explain how the accident within one system (SPE) and later crisis lead to the interaction with a second system (U.S. Federal Government), the development of a new crisis, and the need for a crisis response from system two. The evolution of a single organization’s accident into a national security crisis does not occur without specific complex interactions that take place to connect the two systems together. To explain this interconnectedness between systems, I introduce two new constructs: 1) common denominator and 2) common goal, which expand Normal Accidents theory allowing it to account for the coupling between the two independent systems (SPE & United States Government) through non-linear interactions. Overall, this case study provides important insight for future crisis communication planning, response, and development regarding between-organization interaction during a crisis.

Since emerging in academic literature in the 1990s, definitions of ‘cyber war’ and cyber warfare’ have been notably inconsistent. There has been no research that examines these inconsistencies and whether they can be resolved. Using the methodology of discourse analysis, this thesis addresses this research need. Analysis has identified that the study of cyber war and cyber warfare is inherently interdisciplinary. The most prominent academic disciplines contributing definitions are Strategic Studies, Security Studies, Information and Communications Technology, Law, and Military Studies. Despite the apparent definitional uncertainty, most researchers do not offer formal definitions of cyber war or cyber warfare. Moreover, there is little evidentiary basis in literature to distinguish between cyber war and cyber warfare. Proximate analysis of definitions of cyber war and cyber warfare suggests a high level of inconsistency between dozens of definitions. However, through deeper analysis of both the relationships between definitions and their underlying structure, this thesis demonstrates that (a) the relationships between definitions can be represented hierarchically, through a discourse hierarchy of definitions; and (b) all definitions share a common underlying structure, accessible through the application of a structural definition model. Crucially, analysis of definitions via these constructs allows a foundational definition of cyber war and cyber warfare to be identified. Concomitantly, use of the model identifies the areas of greatest interdefinitional inconsistency and the implications thereof and contributes to the construction of a taxonomy of definitions of cyber war and cyber warfare. Considered holistically, these research outputs allow for significant resolution of the inconsistency between definitions. Moreover, these outputs provide a basis for the emergence of dominant functional definitions that may aid in the development of policy, strategy, and doctrine.

In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism emerged as a legitimate threat not just to society, but to corporations as well. This new threat has challenged old business rules and prompted companies to rethink their supply chain operations. However, the events of September 11th were not the first or the only disruptions that the business world had experienced. This thesis reviews past historical events that simulate the effects of a terrorist attack and extracts lessons that can be applied by today’s corporations to prepare for future attacks or disruptions. The types of events studied include Biological, Chemical, Radiological and Cyber disruptions. Through the analysis and synthesis of each event’s impact, the following generalized recommendations emerged: Prior warnings and events should be acknowledged, studied and utilized. Government intervention may strain operations under disruptive stress. Alternate sourcing should be considered to ease supply issues. Disruptions should be approached in a comprehensive and forthright manner. A security and safety culture should be fostered to prevent disruptions and control their spread. Systems should be prepared to quickly operate in isolation during a disruption. Finally, impact is frequently less severe then initially predicted. Through the events described and these recommendations, this thesis aims to provide lessons for firms to manage their supply chains through future disruptions.

Based on numerous high level concerns that the cyber threat is expected to increase, as well as the already documented uses of cyber warfare, it is necessary to ensure our naval ships are hardened against such attacks. In doing so, an influence net model was designed to discover the likelihood of a successful cyber attack. However, first it was necessary to establish what the best mitigation tools are in defense of cyber attack methods. In order to do so, an expert opinion survey was designed and completed by individuals currently working in the field of network security. In combination with the expert opinion surveys and in looking at research and established security techniques it should become apparent whether or not ships are taking all the required steps to best secure themselves against an attack. Though the initial model was designed around a theoretical Naval Station Everett ship, with modification the model can be utilized for any naval asset throughout the United States and the risk for each particular U.S. asset can be evaluated. Additionally, this tool can also facilitate security funding as well as establishing a means of prioritizing the tools for protection if the network needs to be hastily re-established after an attack. Ultimately, the protection of a ship’s computer networks against cyber terrorist threats is fundamental in ensuring continued effective command and control and ultimately the security of this nation.