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Since the Islamic State proclaimed the Caliphate in 2014, the terrorist organization has been prominent due to the high-quality and efficient distribution of its propaganda, especially in the main online social media platforms. Two of their most popular vehicles for indoctrination and recruitment, the e-magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, perfectly embody the philosophy of an organization constructed upon a multi-semiotic polarized discourse in which the antagonism between enemies and heroes is stated in many different ways. Using multimodal critical discourse analysis and visual framing as our main theoretical frameworks, this chapter analyses the semiotic structure of the images of foes and allies in the aforementioned magazines to show their essential role within the propaganda machine of the Islamic State, designed to achieve two main interconnected goals: the legitimation of their actions and, through this, the adherence of new fighters to their cause.

Since late 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) social networks on Twitter have been
subjected to periodic account suspensions. In a study of metrics for a network of English language
ISIS supporters active from June to October 2015, suspensions held the size and reach
of the overall network flat, while devastating the reach of specific users who have been
repeatedly targeted.
By analyzing a list of English-speaking ISIS adherents, we found:
• The number of readily discoverable English-speaking ISIS supporters on Twitter is
relatively small, usually fewer than 1,000 accounts.
• Extending the discovery process using advanced social network analysis produced a
network of fewer than 3,000 accounts at any given time.
• ISIS English-language social networks are extremely insular, meaning users mostly
follow and interact with each other.
• The number of users in the network who are based in Iraq and Syria appears to have
declined over time, partly because of suspension activity, but also because of operational
security concerns within ISIS and the deaths of some prominent Syria-based network
participants.
• The average number of Twitter followers any given ISIS supporter could expect was 300
to 400. Average follower counts were periodically reduced by aggressive waves of
suspensions. However, under typical conditions the average remained flat, as seen over a
30-day period beginning in late August, during which relatively few suspensions took
place.
• Over time, individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after being suspended
suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts.
• Network and individual declines persisted even when suspension pressure eased,
suggesting that suspensions diminish activity in ways that extend beyond the simple
removal of accounts.
• The amount of pro-ISIS content available on Twitter was also limited by suspensions,
since all of a user’s tweets are typically deleted when his or her account is suspended.
• ISIS supporters have deployed several countermeasures in an effort to offset the negative
effects of suspensions.
• Countermeasures include the use of applications and simple hacking techniques to
quickly create new accounts for users who have been suspended, as well as elaborate
tactics to rebuild follower networks. Some of these approaches are sophisticated, but they
have had only limited benefits.
• ISIS supporters have also explored the use of other social media platforms as a
supplement to Twitter, but they feel that a robust presence on Twitter and Facebook is
integral to their recruitment and propaganda efforts, and continue returning to those
platforms despite challenges.
Our analysis was based on a list of accounts maintained and promoted by ISIS supporters on
Twitter. The list was primarily billed as a resource for finding other ISIS supporters, but it
included some non-porter accounts, and the user who maintained the list did not follow all of
the listed accounts.

Between 2006 and 2012, two men working on opposite
sides of the struggle between global jihadis and the United
States faced of in New York City. One was the founder of
Revolution Muslim, a group which proselytized—online
and on New York streets—on behalf of al-Qa`ida. The
other led eforts to track the terrorist threat facing the
city. Here, they tell the inside story of the rise of Revolution
Muslim and how the NYPD, by using undercover ofcers
and other methods, put the most dangerous homegrown
jihadi support group to emerge on U.S. soil since 9/11
out of business. As the Islamic State adjusts to its loss of
territory, this case study provides lessons for current and
future counterterrorism investigations.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Media foundations connected to jihadi groups and jihad-supporting organizations, which once released their productions – videos, statements, and more – over jihadi forums, have turned to social media websites, mainly Facebook and Twitter, because of these forums’ inability to provide reliable means for communication, interaction, and publication due to constant and often lengthy disruption of their online presence. This report discusses official and unofficial jihadi media foundations’ presence on Facebook and Twitter, and identifies the foundations’ accounts and provide background information regarding their affiliation and activities.

Der Artikel bietet anhand der Rhetorik ausgewählter arabischer Quellen des Dschihad einen Einblick in die Motivation und die Definition sogenannter Glaubensbekenner-Operationen. Wesentlicher Bestandteil ist das Grundverständnis, dass solche Arten von Operationen rechtlich erlaubt sind und keinen Selbstmord darstellen. Diese Operationen werden von Gott im Jenseits belohnt und sind integraler historischer Teil der militärisch- operativen Vorgehensweise früher Muslime im Denken dschihadistischer Gelehrter, die diese Taktiken in die Gegenwart übertragen und entsprechend sanktionieren. Anhand der im Internet auf einschlägigen Foren und Webseiten veröffentlichten Interviews, Videos und Statements nach der Glaubensbekenner-Operation des palästinensisch-stämmigen Abu Dujana gegen eine von der CIA betriebene „Forward Operations Base“ in Khost, Afghanistan, wird der Artikel nach einem theoretischen Teil mit pragmatischen Argumenten durch die Dschihadisten abgeschlossen.