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This paper examines the ranking of critical assets within an electrical grid under threat of cyber attack. Critical to this analysis is the assumption of zero hour exploits namely, the threat of an immediate attack as soon as a vulnerability is discovered. Modeling shows that over time load fluctuations as well as other system variations will change the importance of each asset in the delivery of bulk power. As opposed to classic stability studies where risk can be shown to be greatest during high load periods, the zero hour exploit-cyber-risk assumes that vulnerabilities will be attacked as soon as they are discovered. The probability of attacks is made uniform over time to include any and all possible attacks. Examining the impact of an attack and how the grid reacts immediately following an attack will identify and determine the criticality of each asset. This work endeavors to fulfill the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection Requirements CIP-001-1 through CIP-009-2, cyber security requirements for the reliable supply of bulk power to customers throughout North America.

Previous research has documented that the internet plays an increasingly important role in facilitating involvement in terrorism. However, the level of specificity of this literature is low. Advancing current insights, we examined how three concrete examples of active (i.e., generate/disseminate terrorist propaganda; interact with co-ideologues) and two examples of passive (i.e., learn about terrorist ideologies/actors; learn tactical information) internet use are related to distinct distal and proximal dynamics of radicalisation. Additionally, we assessed associations between the different types of internet use and the likelihood of having planned/committed a terrorist attack. We analysed a unique dataset based on closed-source risk assessment reports of individuals convicted of terrorism(-related) offences in England and Wales (N = 377). Results of this secondary data analysis pointed to three internet use repertoires: (1) learning about tactical information and terrorist ideologies/actors; (2) only learning about terrorist ideologies/actors; (3) active internet use and learning about terrorist ideologies/actors. Learning about tactical information and terrorist ideologies/actors was (compared to the other two repertoires) associated with a higher likelihood of having planned/committed an act of terrorism. Additionally, levels of capability were higher if individuals learnt both tactical and ideological information online compared to using the internet actively and browsing content about terrorist ideologies/actors. Individuals characterised by either internet use repertoire did, however, not vary significantly regarding their levels of engagement with extremist ideas and actors and the degree to which they had developed an extremist mindset. The results can inform terrorist/violent extremist risk assessment.

In an effort to better understand the risk of individuals being radicalised via the internet, this paper re-examines the phenomenon of online radicalisation by focusing on four considerations of interest: individual, online environment, interactions between individual and the online environment, and protective elements. A key premise of the discussion presented is that the different theoretical assumptions and linkages underlying each consideration are not only reconcilable but that together they provide a more comprehensive understanding of assessing risk of radicalisation via the internet than any perspective by itself. Implications for operationalising these four considerations and their associated factors to identify individuals at risk of being radicalised via the internet will also be discussed.

In an effort to better understand the risk of individuals being radicalised via the internet, this paper re-examines the phenomenon of online radicalisation by focusing on four considerations of interest: individual, online environment, interactions between individual and the online environment, and protective elements. A key premise of the discussion presented is that the different theoretical assumptions and linkages underlying each consideration are not only reconcilable but that together they provide a more comprehensive understanding of assessing risk of radicalisation via the internet than any perspective by itself. Implications for operationalising these four considerations and their associated factors to identify individuals at risk of being radicalised via the internet will also be discussed.

Some moderation strategies of online content have targeted the individuals believed to be the most influential in the diffusion of such material, while others have focused on censorship of the content itself. Few approaches consider these two aspects simultaneously. The present study addresses this gap by showing how a socio-semantic network analysis can help identify individuals and subgroups who are strategically positioned in radical networks and whose comments encourage the use of violence. It also made it possible to identify the individuals and subgroups who act as intermediaries and whose statements are often the most violent.

VOX-Pol Blog post.