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The purpose of this article is to inform the debate about strategies and options for countering online radicalization within the U.S. domestic context. Its aim is to provide a better understanding of how the Internet facilitates radicalization; an appreciation of the dilemmas and tradeoffs that are involved in countering online radicalization within the United States; and ideas and best practices for making the emerging approach and strategy richer and more effective. It argues that online radicalization can be dealt with in three ways. Approaches aimed at restricting freedom of speech and removing content from the Internet are not only the least desirable, they are also the least effective. Instead, government should play a more energetic role in reducing the demand for radicalization and violent extremist messages—for example, by encouraging civic challenges to extremist narratives and by promoting awareness and education of young people. In the short term, the most promising way for dealing with the presence of violent extremists and their propaganda on the Internet is to exploit their online communications to gain intelligence and gather evidence in the most comprehensive and systematic fashion possible.

This paper contributes to platform-comparative research through a case study of Twitter/X, Telegram, and Gettr in the context of German far-right social movements. It introduces the conceptual framework of platform opportunity structures to examine how platforms enable or constrain far-right mobilization. Using community analysis of sharing networks among the same pool of far-right social movement actors, the study explores how technological affordances, governance models, ownership and branding, and user bases and cultures shape platform-specific networking patterns. The findings reveal Telegram as a central platform for the most radical and active communities; Twitter as a site where anti-elite journalists and politicians are salient; and Gettr as a platform to connect to the U.S. far right. While anti-elite and COVID-related conspiracist figures exert influence on all platforms-particularly on Telegram, the prevalence of AfD politicians, pseudonymous amplifiers, and transnational ties to the U.S. far right – especially after Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter – are emergent factors. As Twitter shifts toward ‘alternative’ platforms like Telegram and Gettr, offering minimal moderation and security and even ideological branding, this article adds to understanding how dynamic platform opportunity structures shape far-right mobilization online.

The French Digital Council has been given a mandate to examine Article 9 of the bill on scaling up
counter-terrorism provisions. These provisions amend Article 6 of the Act of 21 June 2004 on confidence
in the digital economy (LCEN) by providing for the administration to block websites containing speech
and/or images constituting incitement to terrorism or in defence of terrorism. They also extend the scope
of the notification tools that technical service providers are bound to use.
The French Digital Council has held fifteen interviews with terrorism experts (sociologists, journalists and
association representatives), specialised lawyers and judges, civil society representatives, intelligence
agency members and digital professionals (full list available in the appendix) to be able to deliver as fully
informed an opinion as possible.

The independent Commission for Countering Extremism has published a legal review, to examine whether existing legislation adequately deals with hateful extremism.

ISD has analysed 100 websites linked to the far right and white supremacist communities to establish which tools, services or platforms are most commonly in use. This small sample is intended only as a snapshot of the broader landscape, but nonetheless
reveals some interesting trends which are worthy of discussion.

The undersigned human rights and digital rights organizations call on the participants of the trialogue meeting on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of Council on preventing/addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online to comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and discuss further amendments that fully respect freedom of expression, freedom of information and personal data protection of internet users.