Online Library

The whitepaper has three parts. The first part provides some contextual background, describing the diverse range of online services utilised by terrorists and extremists and the process by which propaganda is disseminated online. The second part details industry responses. As well as referrals from users and law enforcement, it describes the use of AI for proactive detection and collaborative, cross-platform initiatives. The third part describes four issues for discussion: transparency; definitional clarity; the impact on those targeted; and, the use of online data for predictive purposes.

Cooperation between law enforcement and tech companies is widely regarded as necessary to tackle online terrorist content. Both sectors have publicly stated their commitment to working together and there are examples of mutual cooperation. Yet there are also impediments to such collaboration, including different cultures and operating practices, and there have been high-profile instances of non-cooperation. The informality of existing collaborations has also led to concerns about censorship, mission creep and a lack of accountability and oversight.

The focus of this report is on how to resolve the impediments to closer cooperation between law enforcement and the tech sector in order to realise the benefits of mutual collaboration, while simultaneously addressing concerns about due process and accountability. The report utilises an interview-based methodology to examine the experiences and opinions of personnel from both sectors who have first-hand experience of mutual cooperation. It provides empirically grounded insights into this under-researched topic.

It is well established that jihadist groups and their supporters post URLs on online platforms to outlink to items of propaganda stored on other platforms. Industry initiatives – such as Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s inclusion of URLs in its hash-sharing database, and Tech Against Terrorism’s Terrorist Content Analytics Platform – have sought to counter this practice. These measures, together with new regulatory regimes (e.g. the EU’s Terrorist Content Online Regulation) and the growing use of decentralised services, raise the question whether jihadist groups’ propaganda dissemination strategies are perhaps being forced to evolve. This report considers whether there is evidence of such an evolution, by examining the means that three jihadist groups (Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda (AQ) and Al-Shabaab) used to disseminate their propaganda during a two-month period in early 2023.

Images are known to have important effects on human perception and persuasion. Jihadist groups are also known to make strategic use of emotive imagery and symbolism for persuasive ends. Yet until recently studies of the online magazines published by violent jihadist groups largely focused on their textual, not their image, content and, while the image content of these magazines is now the subject of a burgeoning number of studies, few of these compare the images used by different groups. This article accordingly offers a cross-group comparison, examining the image content of a total of thirty-nine issues of five online magazines published by four different jihadist groups. Starting with a content analysis, it shows that the images’ most common focus is non-leader jihadis. Using a news values analysis, it then shows how these images of non-leader jihadis are used to visually construct the identity of a “good Muslim.” This construct is characterized by three traits, each corresponding to a different news value: fulfilled (personalization); active (consonance); and respected (prominence). Moreover, these traits are intertwined: fulfillment comes from responding actively to the call to violent jihad, which in turn promises respect. The article concludes by highlighting some subtle differences between how the news values of personalization, consonance, and prominence are realized in the different magazines, and by discussing the implications of the “good Muslim” construct for efforts to develop countermessages.

To inform the discussion, the paper draws on the debates that have surrounded the U.K. ‘Encouragement of Terrorism’ criminal offence. Created by the Terrorism Act 2006, and recently amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, this offence has proved controversial from its inception for two principal reasons. First, the offence expressly encompasses both direct and indirect encouragement. Critics have argued that the concept of indirect encouragement is too nebulous and gives the offence too wide a scope. Second, the framing of the offence focuses not on the purpose of the speaker, but on whether the potential effect of the statement is to encourage terrorism.

This article presents an ethnographic analysis of the online training practices IS sympathisers adopt to recruit, indoctrinate, train, and vet new affiliates. The study highlights the carefully crafted virtual ecosystem established by IS unofficial media operatives, which seeks to identify and select converts with specialised digital skills and unwavering commitment to the group’s vision of Islam. Prioritising quality over quantity, the selection process subjects new recruits to rigorous pre-and post-selection trials to ensure their authenticity, devotion, and obedience. Oaths of allegiance are central to membership within this virtual ecosystem, engendering a master-apprentice dynamic that may secure new recruits’ adherence to assigned duties within the network. The instructional scaffolding within this ecosystem comprises two main constituents: theological indoctrination and digital training. The former places emphasis on IS’s allegedly authentic religious sources in teaching Islamic jurisprudence, while the latter includes training on online security and media campaigns. As sympathisers progress through the ranks within the virtual ecosystem, they are empowered by their newly achieved “veteran” status to take on leadership roles within the digital sphere or engage in combat operations. The meticulously engineered architecture of social hierarchies within the network is designed to foster loyalty and obedience, perpetuate a hierarchical fraternity, thereby enhancing the organisation’s resilience and longevity.