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Jihadists are very active on Twitter but their accounts frequently get suspended. A substantial debate over the effectiveness of suspension has arisen; an important factor is that Jihadists quickly create new accounts, resurging back like a game of whack-a-mole. This causes biases for terrorism and intelligence analysts. Whilst widely acknowledged, little research addresses the problem. In this study we identify resurging Jihadist accounts with novel methods, and provide detailed analysis going beyond previous case-studies. We show that suspension is less disruptive to terrorists than previously thought, whilst the bias and disruption caused to terrorism research has been underestimated.

From London to Ontario to Northern Virginia and beyond, young men and women have felt compelled to find belonging in a community ideologically grounded in opposition to the modern world—a community that utilizes violence as a solution to its grievances. Whether the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (IS) ultimately proves to be a temporary phenomenon or not, IS’s success in engaging Western audiences with deliberate and dangerous propaganda will, without question, be modeled by future non-state (and state) adversaries.
For the United States and other Western governments, the root of the problem is that the potential for non-state actors to execute propaganda campaigns of this scale and effectiveness is new to geopolitics. The information front against terrorist organizations is now of vital strategic significance, and the U.S. government was initially caught unprepared. Foreign policy leaders will not be effective in the 21st century, however, if they do not understand how the nuanced use of media is fundamental to the formation of our foreign policy, and not just in explicating and justifying policies.
While the United States continues to emphasize state-level diplomacy and messaging to global publics, IS represents a case study in the strategic significance of a targeted, audience-centric, modern communication campaign. IS has succeeded not because their audience is predisposed to join, but rather because of their sophistication in shaping information environments which exploit their audience’s vulnerabilities.
Like all sophisticated modern media operations, IS knows how to use media technologies deftly to produce content that is relevant, localized, and targeted to segmented audiences. They are in tune with audience interests and media consumption patterns, and take an audience-first approach in content creation, distribution, and engagement. This is to say: they understand their audiences and local media environments better than we do, and leverage this as an input in their use of media and technology tools. It all works to create a powerful message that is intoxicating to people who are looking for a difference in their lives.
To adapt to this new environment, the United States must recognize that adversary information campaigns have a significant “first-mover” advantage, connecting with their audience first and, in doing so, delegitimizing the U.S. response before it can even launch. To counteract this, the United States must enhance its communication strategy with an understanding of our audience and how U.S. communication capabilities can engage them, improve their lives, and strengthen local media environments to nullify (in this case) IS’s formidable offensive-advantage in this information competition.
Terrorist organizations existed before digital media and will continue to exist. An effective U.S. communication strategy can, however, ensure that the strategic impact of information competitions favors the United States, not its adversaries.

In this paper we present initial results from an ongoing study of women affiliated with pro-IS networks on Twitter and other social media. Our particular focus is on 20 accounts belonging to individual identified as ‘fan girls.’ Drawing on an analysis of Twitter posts from these 20 accounts, we identify key characteristics of the fan girl in an attempt to bring conceptual clarity to this role and enhance our understanding of who these girls are and their potential for radicalization.

Since 9/11, there has been an increase in domestic terrorism inspired by the Global Salafi Jihad ideology. Some of the individuals who undergo radicalization are U.S. college and university students. Radicalization is promoted on the Internet in ways that appeal to the young and impact those who are searching for their identities, their places in life. Radicalization is complemented by the open environment of higher education, where college- and university-based organizations can become forums for the presentation of radical messages in a way that connects with students. This article describes the four-stage radicalization process, explains why students are particularly vulnerable, and offers suggestions for implementing an effective response.

Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, the leading English-language propagandist for al-Qa`ida, was killed in an American drone strike in 2011. But his influence has lived on into the Islamic State era, enhanced by his status as a martyr for Islam in the eyes of his admirers. His massive internet presence has turned up as a factor in several attacks since his death, including most recently the San Bernardino shootings and the Orlando nightclub attack as well as a significant number of terrorism cases on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite his long association with al-Qa`ida and that network’s rivalry with the upstart Islamic State, al-Awlaki has been embraced by the Islamic State and its followers, and he continues to inspire terrorism from beyond the grave.

Social media has become the milieu of choice to radicalize young impressionable minds by terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State. While a plethora of research exists on the recruitment and propaganda efforts by terrorist organizations there is limited number of quantitative studies that observe the relationship of gender and the involvement in online radical milieus. This current research will build upon prior studies through the comparative analysis of 750 unique Twitter accounts supporting the IS and the affiliates of al-Qaeda that were non-randomly sampled between January and September of 2015. The research aimed to address the questions of: 1) whether women that are involved in pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post substantively different amounts of content than men, 2) whether women that are involved in pro-jihadist communities on Twitter post substantively different content than their male counterparts and, 3) whether the gender disparity in level and type of involvement on Twitter differ amongst the supporters of different jihadist organizations. This study found that, while pro-jihadist communities on Twitter continue to be dominated by male participation, female supporters of the IS are more active and post more violent content than women that support any other organization. The intragroup differences found amongst the female supporters suggests that group ideology, recruitment and
propaganda strategies play a role in the level of involvement of women in radical milieus.