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VOX-Pol Blog post.

VOX-Pol Blog Post.

VOX-Pol Lecture Series, Spring 2023

Title: Emerging Methodologies Panel: Researching the Metaverse.

Chair: Dr Suraj Lakhani (University of Sussex)

Speaker 1: Dr Rachel Kowert

Outline: “The Metaverse” is a phrase that is used often despite the fact that there is no clear consensus on how to define this space. In this short talk, we will explore the various interpretations of the metaverse and put forward a new definition of “metaverse-like spaces” and explore how these environments are not something to expect in a dystopian future, but are present here and now. We will also discuss the challenges and practicalities facing researchers who wish to study these environments.

Speaker 2: Dr Elizabeth Pearson

Outline: Online extremism and terrorism research has been going on for at least two decades now: although there was some earlier coverage (Lowe 1985), the academic sub-field had its genesis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini 1999; Conway 2002; Denning 1999). Despite this, understanding its impacts on the people who collect and analyse data on online extremism and terrorism, and who publish their findings, is a relatively new concern. Lizz Pearson discusses the new VOX-Pol report from the REASSURE project, exploring how researchers are harmed, how they prevent harm and what institutions are doing to help. Based on interviews with researchers, we look at how research in the metaverse might change these findings, and how institutions need to adapt to the ever-changing research environment to protect academics.

The focus of this workshop was individuals’ experiences of, and engagement with, extremist ideas and beliefs – both jihadist and far-right – in a variety of different settings. Panellists explored the role of video games, music, humour and the occult in normalising extremism and assessed the extent to which this plays a role in radicalisation trajectories and desensitises individuals to violence. The reverse process – in which extremist actors adopt mainstream culture to expound their message – was also considered.

Panellists:

Dr Suraj Lakhani (University of Sussex)

Dr Weeda Mehran (University of Exeter)

Prof Jonathan Pieslak (The City College of New York, CUNY)

Dr Ashton Kingdon (University of Southampton)

This paper maps communication channels exploited by the Salafi-jihadist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and their followers between March 2020 and June 2022 on The Onion Router (TOR). It argues that the true scale of digital jihadist presence on TOR has remained insignificant for years. Militant Islamists have mostly used .onion domains as backup propaganda dissemination channels, which enable content takedown policies introduced by countering violent extremism stakeholders to be circumvented. Aside from propaganda distribution, TOR attracts Salafi-jihadist VEOs and their followers for other reasons, as it facilitates anonymous communication, crowdfunding, sharing of terrorist manuals or the organisation of terrorist attacks.

This article, which combines social network analysis and open-source intelligence, discusses the functions, structure, and evolution of al-Qaeda’s (AQ) information ecosystem on the surface web in the second half of 2023. It argues that despite preferring Rocket Chat as a primary communication channel, this terrorist organisation developed an extensive and robust propaganda distribution network detectable from the surface web. The pro-AQ ecosystem on this Internet communication layer relied primarily on standalone websites, message boards, and blogs, interconnected with a broad range of file-sharing services and channels on encrypted communication apps. Aside from them, the group manifested limited activity on mainstream social media. In the second half of 2023, the group demonstrated resilience to content takedowns, as most of its key domains used to disseminate propaganda continued to be active under the same or changed URLs. This study shows that, in contrast to the Islamic State, alQaeda’s information ecosystem was largely decentralised, which was primarily caused by the differentiated approaches of its branches to maintaining their presence in this environment. The lack of centralisation of AQ’s propaganda distribution network may be considered both an advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, it potentially increases its resilience to content takedowns. On the other hand, however, it also demonstrates a lack of coordination between branches, which decreases their media operations’ potential efficiency and reach.