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Radicalization, which is influenced by social, cognitive, and economic variables, is the mental process that justifies violence or violent behavior. Since the invention of the Internet radical organizations have modified their tactics in order to fit the new environment. The Internet has evolved into more than simply a platform for extremist activity; it has also taken the place of the main operating environment and arena where political beliefs are developed, assaults are planned, and exceptional social movements start to take shape. Members of the group meet up online to discuss their religious beliefs and utilize these forums to broaden the scope of action at the individual and organizational levels in order to disseminate their political ideology, hire employees, and organize assaults. The conceptual framework, individual and group dynamic reasons of radicalization, metaphors for describing radicalization, radicalization driven by religion, internet radicalization, and case studies are highlighted in the current study.

Nowadays, Social Networks have become an essential communication tools producing a large amount of information about their users and their interactions, which can be analysed with Data Mining methods. In the last years, Social Networks are being used to radicalise people. In this paper, we study the performance of a set of indicators and their respective metrics, devoted to assess the risk of radicalisation of a precise individual on three different datasets. Keyword-based metrics, even though depending on the written language, performs well when measuring frustration, perception of discrimination as well as declaration of negative and positive ideas about Western society and Jihadism, respectively. However, metrics based on frequent habits such as writing ellipses are not well enough to characterise a user in risk of radicalisation. The paper presents a detailed description of both, the set of indicators used to assess the radicalisation in Social Networks and the set of datasets used to evaluate them. Finally, an experimental study over these datasets are carried out to evaluate the performance of the metrics considered.

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The primary objective of this paper is to map the online presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) media branch – Ebaa News Agency (ENA) – on the surface web. It also measures three years of propaganda output of the group and its viewership, as well as outlines the thematic landscape of its productions based on the content analysis of a sample. It argues that Ebaa’s messaging pattern constitutes a peculiar mixture of opposing priorities. It paid a great deal of attention to portraying itself as an independent news agency that has nothing to do with violent terrorist organizations (VEOs). In effect, its productions are easily available on the surface web. A closer look, however, proves that since 2017 ENA has been dedicated to supporting HTS’s radical Islamist agenda. This paper provides evidence of this. Moreover, Ebaa adopted a two-vector distribution strategy of its productions, composed of standalone websites and Telegram channels. In this context, the output of this media cell appears to be quite impressive. Between 2017 and 2020, it was capable of releasing more than 13,000 pieces of propaganda on its websites. At the same time, however, their viewership was lower than initially expected.

This article discusses the reasons why content moderation and control in cyberspace, being a primary means of online countering violent extremism (CVE), does not work as intended. It makes four main arguments. Firstly, despite years of efforts from CVE stakeholders, the propaganda of militant Islamist VEOs is still easily accessible on the Internet. This study has mapped hundreds of addresses engaged in digital jihadist activities at the turn of 2020–2021. It effectively proves that the current approach to online CVE brought few tangible effects. Secondly, these programs have been unevenly applied to militant Islamist organizations. There have been groups which represent violent extremist ideology but are not actively combated by stakeholders. As a result, these groups have been able to establish a solid foothold on the surface web. Thirdly, the efficiency of CVE strategies based on content takedowns are decreased by the relative ease of terrorists reestablishing banned communication channels, the availability of vast alternatives for online propaganda dissemination, the introduction of impractical legislation by governments, overlapping jurisdictions on the Internet and the “Streisand effect.” Finally, adequate strategies aimed at curbing digital jihad should be primarily based on offline and online activities which fall outside of the remit of CVE.

This study maps the surface web information ecosystem exploited by the Islamic State (IS) and its followers between December 2020 and June 2021. Open-source intelligence investigation allowed a massive online presence of Daesh, manifested by hundreds of communication channels, to be detected. Its propaganda dissemination was founded mainly on one “central” Arabic domain, linked to a constellation of auxiliary standalone websites, blogs, encrypted messaging apps, as well as file-sharing and streaming services. Aside from it, the Islamic State utilised other surface web environments, including numerous Internet Archive profiles and a network of communication channels established by Afaaq Electronic Foundation. This study also shows that URLs banned by law enforcement in 2020 and 2021 were usually quickly restored by the IS’s media offices.