Online Library

The permanent transition to online activity has brought with it a surge in hate speech discourse. This has prompted increased calls for automatic detection methods, most of which currently rely on a dictionary of hate speech words, and supervised classification. This approach often falls short when dealing with newer words and phrases produced by online extremist communities. These code words are used with the aim of evading automatic detection by systems. Code words are frequently used and have benign meanings in regular discourse, for instance, “skypes, googles, bing, yahoos” are all examples of words that have a hidden hate speech meaning. Such overlap presents a challenge to the traditional keyword approach of collecting data that is specific to hate speech. In this work, we first introduced a word embedding model that learns the hidden hate speech meaning of words. With this insight on code words, we developed a classifier that leverages linguistic patterns to reduce the impact of individual words. The proposed method was evaluated across three different datasets to test its generalizability. The empirical results show that the linguistic patterns approach outperforms the baselines and enables further analysis on hate speech expressions.

This paper combines corpus linguistics and critical discourse analysis methodologies in order to investigate the discourses and cyber activism of the British right-wing nationalist party, Britain First. A study of a corpus of texts produced by elite members of the group reveals a racist, xenophobic stance which constructs Islam and Muslims as the radical, dangerous ‘Other’. This creates a discourse of fear that threatens the way of life of the indigenous in-group of the British people. An investigation of the cyber activity of the group demonstrates that Britain First is able to achieve a significant amount of following on social media by publishing populist material that veils their true nature or ideological stance.

While the threat that al-Shabaab poses to the West can easily be overstated, its outreach to Muslims living in Europe and the United States has been successful relative to other al-Qaeda-linked groups and warrants exploration. The organisation has recruited dozens of foreign fighters from the West (see Appendix). It also holds the dubious distinction of being the first jihadist organisation to recruit an American citizen to commit an act of suicide terrorism. Its recruitment strategy is therefore worthy of examination as a case study of how jihadist groups formulate strategies to lure Western Muslims. Through a combination of primary source analysis, background interviews in East Africa and an in-depth quantitative analysis of the group’s Twitter output, this paper aims to go beyond the simple statement of this problem by explaining how al-Shabaab markets itself to Muslims beyond its borders and what methods it employs. It also explores how the group is using social media to engage its followers in ways that other actors in the global jihad movement have not yet mastered.

This paper, part of the Legal Perspectives on Tech Series, was commissioned in conjunction with the Congressional Counterterrorism Caucus.

The present report is the first in a series focusing on the capacity of Member States to respond to the challenges posed by the foreign terrorist fighter threat. Foreign terrorist fighters pose an acute and growing threat. They increase the intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts and may pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are active, such as Jordan, that as a result are affected by serious security burdens and often need to commit massive resources to combat the impact, and which are, therefore, themselves victims of terrorism. The threat of foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and Member States, even those far from conflict zones. International networks have been established by terrorists and terrorist entities among States through which foreign terrorist fighters and the resources to support them have been channelled back and forth. In exploring the major risks posed by the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, the report assumes that the threat of terrorist acts resulting from a range of terrorist organizations, including, but not confined to, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusrah Front, is rapidly changing and will not be fully geographically contained; that there appears to be virtually no short-term possibility of ending certain threats; and that a significant longer-term risk will derive from “alumni” foreign terrorist fighters upon their return to their own countries or upon their arrival in third countries. The report identifies an urgent need to establish effective flows of information at the national and international levels in the implementation of Security Council resolution 2178 (2014), as noted in Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014), and suggests ways in which that can be done. It draws attention to the significant risks faced by small States due to the possible consequences of returning foreign terrorist fighters, and discusses the human rights implications of possible responses. Future reports will discuss ways to address recruitment, the challenges posed by Internet and communications technologies, exit and entry screening, returning foreign terrorist fighters and other issues. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate has identified an initial 67 Member States most affected by the acute and growing threat posed by
foreign terrorist fighters, who are defined in Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) as individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict. In reviewing the implementation of resolution 2178 (2014) by the first group of 21 States, the Executive Directorate has identified the following priority measures to be taken by States to prevent the movement of foreign terrorist fighters.

VOX-Pol Blog post.