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Briefing Note ‘El Rubio’ Lives: The Challenge Of Arabic Language Extremist Content On Social Media Platforms
View Abstract
This briefing outlines research uncovering thousands of users viewing extremist content in Arabic language across mainstream social platforms including Facebook and YouTube. The findings emerged as world leaders, policymakers, and technology companies gathered in Jordan earlier this month to discuss counter-terrorism and extremism as part of the Aqaba Process and the convening of the Global Internet Forum for Countering Terrorism (GIFCT).
Researchers identified:
• More than 77 pieces of Arabic content promoting influential Islamist extremists from al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as well as affiliates for both organizations, and precursors to both groups on both YouTube and Facebook;
• More than 275,000 users have watched the videos on both Facebook and YouTube;
• The research finds evidence of Islamist extremist supporters sharing content between sites, spreading the content further than their primary YouTube Channels and/or Facebook pages and groups. Approximately 138 individual users have shared links from the YouTube to their networks on Facebook.
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2019 |
Ayad, M. |
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Report |
‘The Baghdadi Net’: How A Network of ISIL-Supporting Accounts Spread Across Twitter
View Abstract
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIL) supporters fanned out large amounts of Arabic content across Twitter all through the week in the wake of the news surrounding the death of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Many accounts were exhibiting strong and multiple signals of automated behavior1, spawning every hour, on the hour, and Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) researchers monitored and tracked these accounts, and their tactics for the past week following the news. Twitter, and accounts specifically designed to report ISIL activity, were limiting some of the effects of what researchers were calling the ‘Baghdadi Net.’ However, it was clear the accounts were able to generate again, sometimes seconds within a takedown period, and spread video, and audio, as well as new ISIL-news content. Many accounts used western avatars, linked to real people, as well as hashtags that were trending across the Middle East and North Africa, including those being used in the Iraq and Lebanon protests. Latching on to trending topics is a well-documented tactic by ISIL and other groups to increase impressions and overall reach of content. As of Friday, the accounts were tweeting out audio content produced by al Furqan media heralding the ascension of the new ISIL leader Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurashi.
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2019 |
Ayad, M. |
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Report |
The Cloud Caliphate: Archiving the Islamic State in Real-Time
View Abstract
This joint report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point offers a preliminary survey and analysis of one of the largest known online repositories of Islamic State materials in order to increase understanding of how violent extremist groups and their supporters manage, preserve, and protect information relevant to their cause. Seemingly managed by sympathizers of the Islamic State, the large cache of digital files, here nicknamed the “Cloud Caliphate,” provides researchers, policymakers, and counterterrorism practitioners additional insights into how and why groups and their adherents maintain archives of such material.
The core analysis breaks into seven different parts. After reviewing the likely origins of the repository, the first section describes its composition, and the second discusses evidence concerning cyber support from other online actors. Sections three through six explore specific folders within the archive, which pertain to matters concerning the Islamic State’s organizational predecessors and a range of notable leaders, ideologues, and scholars. Section seven of the report highlights a real-world case involving the use of the “Cloud Caliphate” archive by an Islamic State supporter. The report concludes with a reflective discussion that notes potential policy considerations for those tasked with confronting the Islamic State’s exploitation of information and communications technologies.
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2021 |
Ayad, M., Amarasingam, A. and Alexander, A. |
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Report |
The Terror Times: The Depth and Breadth of the Islamic State Alternative News Outlet Ecosystem Online
View Abstract
This report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.
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2022 |
Ayad, M., Khan, N. and al-Tamimi, A. |
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Journal |
Fishermen or Swarm Dynamics? Should we Understand Jihadist Online-Radicalization as a Top-Down or Bottom-Up Process?
View Abstract
The internet has profoundly changed the way we communicate, including how jihadist
groups seek to reach Western audiences with their propaganda strategies. Cases of believed
online-radicalization call for a re-evaluation of radicalization processes, previously thought
to depend on face-to-face interactions. Based on the Hoffman-Sageman debate on whether
top-down or bottom-up processes drive terrorism, this essay explores both social movement
and organizational approaches to understand online-radicalization. Do jihadist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda and IS act as ‘fishermen’, actively engaging in the
radicalization processes of individual recruits, or is radicalization driven by social group
dynamics with little organizational involvement? Essentially, the larger question is: What
role do organizational structures play for radicalization in times of ‘virtual jihad’? Bottomup
radicalization processes are facilitated online, because the conditions for Sageman’s
‘bunch of guys’ are replicated by the characteristics of virtual communication: an echo
chamber effect causes frame-alignment through repetition and enables ‘digital natives’ to
communicate claims that resonate with other ‘digital natives’. Top-down structures are
influential, because organizations continue to employ sophisticated propaganda
development, preachers and special recruiters or ‘fishermen’. The article finds evidence for
both schools of thought and concludes that the internet facilitates both types of
radicalization mechanisms. Only a holistic strategy will be successful in battling onlineradicalization
and must include both targeting direct channels through which the
organizations execute control over recruits, and breaking the echo chamber created by
social movement dynamics in the virtual world. While countermeasures need to include the
provision of alternative social narratives and the utilization of ‘digital natives’ to make
counter-messages more effective, organizational structures need to be tackled
simultaneously, not only by identifying and arresting preachers and recruiters, but also
through stronger internet governance tools and collaboration with social media companies.
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2017 |
Baaken, T., and Schlegel, L. |
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MA Thesis |
Online Radicalization Of White Women To Organized White Supremacy
View Abstract
Since its early mainstream adoption in the 1990s, the Internet has been leveraged by white supremacist groups to recruit and radicalize individuals. Twenty years later, social media platforms, like YouTube, reddit, and Twitter, continue to further this practice. The attention of researchers has been primarily centered on white supremacist men, and this focus on white men erases white women’s roles as active agents in the spread of white supremacy, skewing our understanding of white supremacy as a whole. This study used digital ethnography and interviews to examine the ways white women are radicalized to organized white supremacy through popular social media platforms YouTube, reddit, and Twitter. The study found white women were radicalized by engaging with posts and joining communities focusing on beauty, anti-feminism or “The Red Pill,” traditionalist gender values or #TradLives, and alt-right politics. White supremacist recruiters leveraged gendered topics and weaponized platform features – likes, sharing, comments, recommendation algorithms, etc. – to cultivate a sense of community. Through involvement with these communities, women were introduced to racialized perspectives on each topic, usually after a catalytic pop culture or newsworthy event, and slowly radicalized to organized white supremacy.
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2019 |
Badalich, S. |
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