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The primary objective of this paper is to map the online presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) media branch – Ebaa News Agency (ENA) – on the surface web. It also measures three years of propaganda output of the group and its viewership, as well as outlines the thematic landscape of its productions based on the content analysis of a sample. It argues that Ebaa’s messaging pattern constitutes a peculiar mixture of opposing priorities. It paid a great deal of attention to portraying itself as an independent news agency that has nothing to do with violent terrorist organizations (VEOs). In effect, its productions are easily available on the surface web. A closer look, however, proves that since 2017 ENA has been dedicated to supporting HTS’s radical Islamist agenda. This paper provides evidence of this. Moreover, Ebaa adopted a two-vector distribution strategy of its productions, composed of standalone websites and Telegram channels. In this context, the output of this media cell appears to be quite impressive. Between 2017 and 2020, it was capable of releasing more than 13,000 pieces of propaganda on its websites. At the same time, however, their viewership was lower than initially expected.

This article discusses the reasons why content moderation and control in cyberspace, being a primary means of online countering violent extremism (CVE), does not work as intended. It makes four main arguments. Firstly, despite years of efforts from CVE stakeholders, the propaganda of militant Islamist VEOs is still easily accessible on the Internet. This study has mapped hundreds of addresses engaged in digital jihadist activities at the turn of 2020–2021. It effectively proves that the current approach to online CVE brought few tangible effects. Secondly, these programs have been unevenly applied to militant Islamist organizations. There have been groups which represent violent extremist ideology but are not actively combated by stakeholders. As a result, these groups have been able to establish a solid foothold on the surface web. Thirdly, the efficiency of CVE strategies based on content takedowns are decreased by the relative ease of terrorists reestablishing banned communication channels, the availability of vast alternatives for online propaganda dissemination, the introduction of impractical legislation by governments, overlapping jurisdictions on the Internet and the “Streisand effect.” Finally, adequate strategies aimed at curbing digital jihad should be primarily based on offline and online activities which fall outside of the remit of CVE.

This study maps the surface web information ecosystem exploited by the Islamic State (IS) and its followers between December 2020 and June 2021. Open-source intelligence investigation allowed a massive online presence of Daesh, manifested by hundreds of communication channels, to be detected. Its propaganda dissemination was founded mainly on one “central” Arabic domain, linked to a constellation of auxiliary standalone websites, blogs, encrypted messaging apps, as well as file-sharing and streaming services. Aside from it, the Islamic State utilised other surface web environments, including numerous Internet Archive profiles and a network of communication channels established by Afaaq Electronic Foundation. This study also shows that URLs banned by law enforcement in 2020 and 2021 were usually quickly restored by the IS’s media offices.

This paper is based on an experiment-based study carried out in the first half of 2023, which aimed to understand how terrorist organizations can potentially exploit artificial intelligence. It discusses the risks of using AI to produce and disseminate propaganda, as well as verifies whether it can be used to facilitate access to terrorist content. It also explores if AI-based platforms can be used to access terrorism-related know-how. This paper also focuses on understanding the specificity of content moderation procedures introduced by these services to mitigate their use by violent extremists and provides recommendations for increasing their efficiency.

This article aims to map the online propaganda presence and activities of the Turkestan Islamic Party’s media arm—Islam Awazi (“Voice of Islam”). It also discusses its capabilities in terms of producing new releases and attracting online audiences. In order to reach these objectives, this study exploited a methodology which is a combination of open source intelligence techniques (OSINT) with limited content analysis. It argues that the Uyghur-oriented Islam Awazi’s (IA) propaganda strategy was primarily based on one standalone website, which constituted a central repository of its new productions. It was supported by several Telegram channels. However, open source intelligence investigation allowed other domains proliferating the IA’s productions, which were still accessible but abandoned at the time when this study was carried out, to be discovered. It also proved that the organization was capable of producing more than 160 propaganda releases between January and September 2020. Their viewership on the surface web was, however, quite limited. Finally, this study also outlines a peculiar connection between Islam Awazi’s websites and two networks of domains exploited by the cyber-criminal underground to distribute pornography and malware. This may be considered as a sign of an existing—and widely discussed by the academia—terror-crime nexus.