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VOX-Pol Blog post.

It is no surprise to come across information or video on social or mainstream media that was posted by a terrorist organisation like Al-Shabaab. In this regard, researchers have attempted to answer the question of what terrorist organisations aim to achieve by gaining a strong foothold in cyberspace. This article explores the evolution of Al-Shabaab in terms of their media usage and presence—from a local insurgency using magazines and radio stations, to what can be described as a media mogul in Africa. The author explores how and why this group chooses to pursue a strong cyber presence, and what, if anything, Africa and the international community can do about it.

Gaming adjacent platforms have created an expanding ecosystem of online gaming, esport, and social media actors sharing online space, content, communication tools, and users. Esport, in particular, has grown beyond all expectations and is now a global leader in sport fandom and spectatorship. At the same time, the online infiltration and influence of far-right extremism have resulted in increased challenges of online radicalization. Gaming and esport form a foundational part of youth digital culture today, and this has provided a fertile ground for far-right extremist groups to communicate and connect with users globally. This paper uses framing theory and qualitative document analysis to examine how media articles frame the relationship between far-right extremism and esport. The findings enhance our understanding of how narratives of far-right extremist influence in esport and gaming are framed in the media and how this coverage shapes contemporary societal discussion. This is important because as far-right extremism continues to be propagated and performed in esport and gaming spaces, how this is framed to public audiences can have a critical influence on esport and gamer identities, victimization or criminalization of online spaces, and future activities or approaches to counter radicalization within the online environment.

Weeks after its capture of Mosul in 2014, the Islamic State set about transforming its strategic trajectory. Through an avalanche of media products, it worked to aggressively insert itself into the global public discourse and, in turn, popularise its brand, polarise adversary populations and drive rivals into the ideological side-lines. This research paper presents new, empirical insight into this troubling phenomenon, which has set a benchmark for insurgent strategic communications the world over. Comprising the translation and analysis of a 55-page document compiled and published by the Islamic State in 2016, it offers a unique window into the mind-set of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s propagandists.

■ Internet subcultures take advantage of the current media ecosystem to manipulate news frames, set agendas, and propagate ideas.

■ Far-right groups have developed techniques of “attention hacking” to increase the visibility of their ideas through the strategic use of social media, memes, and bots—as well as by targeting journalists, bloggers, and influencers to help spread content.

■ The media’s dependence on social media, analytics and metrics, sensationalism, novelty over newsworthiness, and clickbait makes them vulnerable to such media manipulation.

■ While trolls, white nationalists, men’s rights activists, gamergaters, the “altright,” and conspiracy theorists may diverge deeply in their beliefs, they share tactics and converge on common issues.

■ The far-right exploits young men’s rebellion and dislike of “political correctness” to spread white supremacist thought, Islamophobia, and misogyny through irony and knowledge of internet culture.

■ Media manipulation may contribute to decreased trust of mainstream media, increased misinformation, and further radicalization.

Just three years ago, the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province was the poster child for the Islamic State’s efforts to maintain a constant and lingering threat across the globe. That year, the group conducted a series of regional terrorist attacks across Central and East Africa, and expanded inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo. More importantly, it produced a plethora of propaganda releases, making it one of the most active Islamic State’s affiliates on the continent. Today, this has largely changed. While still a serious and deadly threat inside Congo and beyond, its propaganda output is a shell of its former self. This decline is, in part, thanks to the current joint Ugandan-Congolese operations against it.