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Confrontation with radical online content has been empirically linked to the facilitation of radicalization processes. Therefore, building a presence of information about potential prevention of radicalization through an online campaign may be particularly relevant to limit the activities and appeals of radical actors. In this study, we thus examine the effectiveness of campaign material focused on cognitive biases (i.e., when people’s cognitive processes of information are systematically distorted). We test the success of the campaign material with respect to three campaign objectives: Building (1) knowledge about biases, (2) confidence to recognize biases, and (3) awareness and relevance of the issue. We conducted an online-experiment with adolescents (N = 223) comparing a control group (no exposure to the campaign material) to (A) a group that watched the developed campaign videos and (B) a group that watched the videos and took a self-assessment quiz. This comparison aims at testing how different levels of interactivity affect the three campaign objectives. The results suggest that the campaign materials increased knowledge about cognitive biases, but did not affect adolescents’ confidence in recognizing biases and the perceived relevance of learning about biases.

This book deals with the psychological effects of extremist propaganda videos. It particularly asks the question how young adults in Germany respond to right- wing as well as Islamic extremist videos which can be found on the Internet today. This is not a book about terrorism, but about the potential conditions which might facilitate a climate of receptivity for radical messages in a young mass audience with diverging cultural and educational background and different attitudes and values.

The amount of uploaded extremist propaganda on the internet is increasing. In particular, right-wing extremist as well as Islamic extremist groups take advantage of the opportunities presented by the internet to spread their ideas to worldwide masses. Both tackle in-group specific topics and address their audiences in their respective political, national or religious identities. Several factors, such as higher levels of authoritarian value orientations and threatening life situations (such as existential threats or psychological uncertainty) have been found to shape people’s reactions towards radical groups as well as to propaganda. The current study investigated whether the response to extremist propaganda videos (namely, aversion felt for the video and the perceived persuasiveness of the video) is shaped by an individual’s authoritarian attitudes and psychological uncertainty and whether this is a global process or in-group specific. Further, it considered the effects of exposure to extremist propaganda on the identification with one’s in-group. In a laboratory experiment, German students were confronted with a right-wing extremist and an Islamic extremist video after manipulating their level of uncertainty (high vs. low levels of psychological uncertainty).  The results confirmed that the interaction between authoritarianism and psychological uncertainty affected the evaluation of right-wing extremist videos addressing participants’ national in-group. Under conditions of uncertainty, authoritarianism predicted less aversion and a higher persuasiveness of these videos. Further, psychological uncertainty increased the identification with participants’ German nationality, irrespective of authoritarian attitudes. Notably, the effect was in-group bound: The same effect was not found for Islamic extremist propaganda referring to a religious out-group. The results are discussed regarding the potential of propaganda to foster behavioral intentions and engagement in extremist groups in specific threatening situations.

To accentuate which platform characteristics particularly foster radicalization and extremist dynamics, this contribution investigates the affordances of social media as delineated in contemporary literature, conducting a platform comparison encompassing Telegram, WhatsApp, and X (formerly Twitter). Based on a scoping review, 17 affordances identified from studies researching radicalization dynamics on social media were extracted and categorized. The most frequently mentioned affordances—anonymity, visibility, and collectivity—were then further analyzed concerning their contribution to radicalization and the radicalization potential of these specific platforms. The platform-comparative affordance discussion shows that, although, in principle each of the three compared platforms can foster an environment conducive to radicalization depending on user intention and usage context, the specific characteristics of each platform necessitate a nuanced consideration. On one hand, it is imperative to discern affordances differentially along various dimensions when assessing their implications (e.g., internal vs. external visibility). On the other hand, it is beneficial to consider which affordances emerge from the actualization of other affordances. For instance, collectivity can result from the interplay of several affordances, such as interactivity and anonymity, and can be referred to as a meta-affordance. Furthermore, the analysis shows that platform branding and self-presentation not only affect platform architecture and affordances but also shape users’ perceptions of the platform, thereby influencing the actualization of affordances. This was particularly noted in the literature for Telegram and increasingly for X. Specific assertions, nevertheless, are hindered by the conceptual diffusion of the affordance approach and a lack of empirical analyses directly and systematically examining platform affordances in conjunction with radicalization dynamics.

The perceived threat of extremist online propaganda has generated a need for countermeasures applicable to large audiences. The dissemination of videos designed to counter violent extremism (CVE videos) is widely discussed. These videos are often described as “counter-narratives,” implying that narrativity is a crucial factor for their effectiveness. Experimental research testing this assumption is rare and direct comparisons of narrativity effects between propaganda and CVE videos are lacking. To fill this gap, we conducted two experiments (one in a laboratory and one online) in which we confronted German participants with different religious affiliations and from various cultural backgrounds (NStudy 1 = 338 and NStudy 2 = 155) with Islamist extremist or right-wing extremist propaganda videos and with corresponding CVE videos. The results confirmed that narrativity (a) increases persuasive processing of propaganda and CVE videos, (b) fosters amplification intentions regarding these videos, and (c) increases attraction to extremists versus counter-activists. Thus, our studies highlight the crucial role of narrativity in both extremist propaganda and video-based CVE approaches.

VOX-Pol is pleased to share the latest online workshop on “Borderline Online Content” which took place in June 2024. The workshop is hosted by Brigitte Naderer, Senior Researcher at the Medical University of Vienna, Heidi Schulze Research Associate at LMU Munich, and Diana Rieger, Professor at LMU Munich. The presenters will speak on topics around borderline, ‘hard to regulate’, content in the following four talks:

Heidi Schulze & Simon Greipl “A Little Less Hate, But a Lot More Harm – Fear Speech as Strategic Borderline Communication”

Hannah Rose: “Hybridised Online Hate and Extremism in the Israel/Gaza Conflict”

Ursula Schmid “Legitimizing hostility through humor: Perceptions and effects of humorous hate speech on social media”

Broderick McDonald “Lawful but Awful: Borderline Content and Human Rights”