Online Library

We have collected over 30M messages from the publicly available /pol/ message boards on 4chan and 8chan, and compiled them into a model of toxic language use. The trained word embeddings (±0.4GB) are released for free and may be useful for further study on toxic discourse or to boost hate speech detection systems: textgain.com/8chan.

Community Action for Preventing Extremism (CAPE) is Australia’s only not-for-profit counter-extremism project focused specifically on preventing a growth in right-wing extremism. By disseminating counter-narratives to extremism through the exitwhitepower.com website and directly engaging with individuals at-risk via social media, CAPE seeks to sow a seed of doubt that will reduce individual’s vulnerability to involvement in the far-right. This paper will outline CAPE’s practitioner experience in developing online interventions to challenge far-right narratives and the advantages of using this method of engagement. The paper will also outline distinctions between traditional white supremacist far-right groups and the increasingly active anti-Muslim groups, which create challenges for CAPE’s work in countering far-right online activity.

This study explores how the internet is used by individuals in the process of their radicalisation. It is based on primary data drawn from a variety of sources: evidence presented at trial, computer registries of convicted terrorists, interviews with convicted terrorists and extremists, as well as police senior investigative officers responsible for terrorist investigations.

This paper provides a broad summary of our current understanding of the role of the Internet in relation to extremist and terrorist networks. It covers the role of the Internet in radicalisation; the use of new technologies by extremists looking to organize and/or use violence, whether in a group or alone (including how this is changing the presence of women online); the ways in which the internet has been used as an operation tool by terrorists (to recruit, train, coordinate and communicate); and the range of policy responses, including the emerging priority area of counter-narratives to take on the dominant messages of extremists and challenge their legitimacy.

Online radical Islam is a topic widely studied by scholars and notoriously discussed among non- experts as well (; ; ). Because of its intrinsic characteristics (i.e. accessibility, anonymity, or users’ identity dissimulation), the internet has always been a useful tool for propagandists of Islamic fundamentalism (; ; ). However, in the last decade, studies have questioned the real importance and magnitude of Islamic radicalization online (). In fact, while scholars were focused on observing digital Islamic radicalization, a galaxy of new forms of extremism was growing online (; ) that no longer made Islam an exceptional case study. Today, Muslim people are one of the groups most aggressively targeted by extremist, intolerant, violent, and radical discourses (; Amnesty International, ). Anti-Muslim hate speech has spread online throughout Europe and the United States, reinforced by the propaganda and political discourse of populist right-wing parties (; ). This paper introduces some large-scale action-research projects developed in Europe and Italy in the last three years (2016–2019) and aims to reconstruct the most updated Islamophobia state of the art in terms of numbers, characteristics, and phenomenology from the offline to the online context.

ƒWhile not as large as in many other Western
countries, ISIS-related mobilization in the United States
has been unprecedented.

As of the fall of 2015, U.S.
authorities speak of some 250 Americans who have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria/Iraq to join the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 900 active investigations
against ISIS sympathizers in all 50 states.

ƒ Seventy-one individuals have been charged with
ISIS-related activities since March 2014. Fifty-six have
been arrested in 2015 alone, a record number of
terrorism-related arrests for any year since 9/11. Of
those charged:
‚ The average age is 26.
‚ 86% are male.
‚ Their activities were located in 21 states.
‚ 51% traveled or attempted to travel abroad.
‚ 27% were involved in plots to carry out attacks on
U.S. soil.
‚ 55% were arrested in an operation involving an
informant and/or an undercover agent.

ƒ A small number of Americans have been killed in
ISIS-related activities: three inside the U.S., at least a
dozen abroad.

ƒ The profiles of individuals involved in ISIS-related activities
in the U.S. differ widely in race, age, social class,
education, and family background. Their motivations
are equally diverse and defy easy analysis.
ƒ Social media plays a crucial role in the radicalization
and, at times, mobilization of U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers.
The Program on Extremism has identified some
300 American and/or U.S.-based ISIS sympathizers active
on social media, spreading propaganda, and interacting
with like-minded individuals. Some members
of this online echo chamber eventually make the leap
from keyboard warriors to actual militancy.

ƒ American ISIS sympathizers are particularly active on
Twitter, where they spasmodically create accounts that
often get suspended in a never-ending cat-and-mouse
game. Some accounts (the “nodes”) are the generators
of primary content, some (the “amplifiers”) just retweet
material, others (the “shout-outs”) promote newly created
accounts of suspended users.

ƒ ISIS-related radicalization is by no means limited to
social media. While instances of purely web-driven,
individual radicalization are numerous, in several cases
U.S.-based individuals initially cultivated and later
strengthened their interest in ISIS’s narrative through
face-to-face relationships. In most cases online and
offline dynamics complement one another.

ƒ The spectrum of U.S.-based sympathizers’ actual involvement
with ISIS varies significantly, ranging from
those who are merely inspired by its message to those
few who reached mid-level leadership positions within
the group.