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Hiding true personality behind a facade is one of the basic
tricks adopted by humans who live double lives for illegal purposes. In
particular terrorists have historically adopted the protocol of a facade
behaviour coupled with a second life consisting mainly in illegal activities
and their planning.
Nowadays a few cases of behaviours that hide a dangerous activity, possibly
illegal, behind an apparently neutral and mean public person, can
be replicated, and sometimes just provided, by a social network pro-
file. Recognizing that a social network profile is fake, in some extreme
cases, a bot, and determining the contour relationships that limit such a
condition is one of the most important weapons for terrorism fight.
In this paper we show that what we name the Spider-man protocol, a
set of behaviour rules that bring to hiding a personality behind a facade,
has several weaknesses, and it is prone to a set of attacks that permit to
detect these behaviours. We provide the description of an experimental
architecture that is used for determining violations of the protocol, and
therefore breaches in the secrecy of the individual protection settled by
the terrorists.

Bereits seit den 1990er Jahren gebrauchen TerroristInnen das Internet für ihre Zwecke, das ihnen ganz neue Möglichkeiten für Propaganda, Rekrutierung, Radikalisierung, Finanzierung und Planung eröffnet hat. Statt auf eigene Webseiten setzen TerroristInnen heute zunehmend und gezielt auf die Neuen Medien. Diese bieten eine hervorragende kostenlose Infrastruktur und erlauben es, ein globales Publikum zu erreichen. Dieser Beitrag beschreibt die terroristische Nutzung der drei größten Social Media-Dienste – Facebook, Twitter und YouTube – und das dahinterstehende Kalkül. Besondere Beachtung finden dabei Inhalte mit Bezug zu Deutschland.

Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to ‘online radicalisation’. Second, we conducted a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not.

The current flow of foreigners to Syria and Iraq is remarkable not only for its scale, but also for its inclusion of many women. Much has been written about the male fighters who migrate to engage in the conflict there; these fighters are prolific on social media and share details of their day-to-day experiences with supporters and opponents alike. Less, however, is known about the women who travel to join ISIS and support its state-building efforts. The flow of both men and women is a concern for Western governments, who fear that these individuals could pose a threat on return home. The number of Western migrants overall is estimated at 3,000, with as many as 550 of these
being women. This report aims to provide insight into the female migrants, examining the reasons they migrate, the reality of their lives in ISIS-controlled territory, and the potential risk they pose. While there is a large online ecosystem of female ISIS supporters, this study will focus specifically on Western women who are believed to be currently residing in ISIS-controlled territory.

The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalisation.

This article aims to demonstrate that a greater understanding of communication in the 21st century is essential to more effective counterterrorism. In fact, while “strategic communication” and “narratives” are advocated by many analysts as essential weapons in countering extremism, few seem to truly understand the reality of the digital-age information environment where such tools need to be deployed. To contribute to bridging this gap, the article outlines some problematic misunderstandings of the contemporary information environment, provides an alternative communication-based framework to explain radicalization, and draws some counterintuitive lessons for tackling terrorism.