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Digital platforms were slow to build robust teams to counter threat actors, but today, many of those corporate teams have robust processes, specialized tools, and innovative approaches to countering highly adaptive adversaries. They operate in a tremendously dynamic environment where their adversaries can innovate at low cost, primarily because of the nature of the digital “terrain” where the conflict occurs. And while the actions these teams take are not kinetic, as those sometimes utilized in geopolitical conflict, the cat-and-mouse game between Trust & Safety teams and threat actors online suggests lessons that are increasingly relevant to the national security community. This article explores five factors that were key to facilitating innovation in Facebook’s approach to countering the Islamic State—and that I argue are more generalizable. They are: people, organization, legitimacy, tools, and collaboration. It also identifies lessons that can be learned from that experience. For example, we did not prioritize using a particular technology or focus experimentation in some bespoke “innovation center.” Rather, we succeeded because we were made responsible for a critical mission, were unencumbered by past process, and had the right team structured to reduce external dependencies for innovation. Basic technological innovation can occur in an ivory tower, but applied innovation requires proximity to real-world missions. You cannot expect dramatic innovation without failure and iteration in an environment of real responsibility. Fundamentally, that means that innovation requires accepting risk. The structures and incentives of Silicon Valley cannot and should not simply be grafted on to our national security infrastructure. The rewards and costs of failure are different. But military organizations should shoulder the risks associated with innovation and study the lessons of corollary efforts in Silicon Valley and the private sector more broadly.

This background note pertains to how far right extremist groups have coopted methods from the ‘cyber caliphate’ and jihadist Internet use to develop their own support networks. Specifically, the material deals with the varying levels of online presence, comparing jihadist and far right strategies to disseminate propaganda. By adhering to this layered network, the source reveals how extremist groups of all varieties are able to protect themselves while simultaneously projecting their message. The source also briefly touches on the few, but crucial divergences between the jihadist and far right methods.

OSCE’s background note on jihadist internet usage provides valuable context and a succinct survey of how the extensive research already done on jihadist internet presence also applies to the far right. Researchers looking to study the correlations between the two should begin here.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Universities play a vital role in carrying out research on issues where security-sensitive material is relevant. This guidance document concerns the storage and circulation of security- sensitive research material. If circulated carelessly, such material is sometimes open to misinterpretation by the authorities, and can put authors in danger of arrest and prosecution under, for example, counter-terrorism legislation. Certain procedures for independently registering and storing this material – through research ethics processes – are recommended in this guidance.

The successful recruitment strategies of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Daesh) has become a serious challenge for the international community. Daesh employs a multifaceted online media strategy to recruit targeted demographics. The Carter Center (TCC) is working to counter Daesh’s recruitment propaganda efforts by undertaking in-depth analysis of this group’s print and social media publications. This will be followed by a series of workshops in partnership with religious and local community leaders. TCC has developed a detailed coding methodology allowing for structured study of each individual issue of Daesh s online magazine, Dabiq. Currently, Issues 1 – 12 have been examined, categorizing 31 separate variables broken down by text, context, imagery, and magazine evolution. This qualitative and quantitative methodological analysis enables the study of shifting themes, trends, and recruitment strategies. This report will discuss the significance of Dabiq as a compliment to Daesh’s social media campaign, Daesh’s re-appropriation of international media, and its repurposing of this material to enhance its own recruitment strategies.

Al Qaeda is today a fragmented organization, and its strategic communication efforts now focus largely on recruiting individuals in the West to carry out “individual jihad” in their home countries. One Al Qaeda–affiliated publication, Inspire, represents an unusual use of the digital magazine format and content for recruitment. This study examines the content and design of Inspire to determine how the magazine may advance the self-radicalization that it seeks to induce in its readers. This analysis finds that the magazine weaves together jihadist ideology, a narrow interpretation of Islam, and appropriations of Western popular culture to maximize the publication’s potential for motivating readers toward violence.