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The article examines online radicalization of youth on social networks. Based on a review of the existing literature on radicalization, I first defined its understanding. Having examined the existing approaches, I joined the opinion that radicalism leads to violence only in some cases. I distinguish between “cognitive” radicalization, or the formation of extreme beliefs, and “behavioral” radicalization, which leads to extremist behavior. Thus, radicalization is the process of accepting certain ideas that can lead to possible violent actions. Online radicalization is a reality that has emerged in the last 10-15 years due to the rapid development of online social networks. I understand it as the formation of radical views, yet mainly through interaction with various types of Internet content and not direct personal communication or written study of propaganda materials. Further, also based on monitoring of relevant sources, I developed a model of risk factors that can trigger the radicalization process. Of the many possible factors, I chose, in my opinion, the most significant ones. Firstly, these are social macro-level risk factors that violate norms and homeostasis, creating internal tensions, namely: the ongoing conflict with the West and existential threats of its escalation, the prevalence of ideologies that justify violence, the formation of a new information and semantic environment of fakes and simulacra, socio-economic problems, dangers of social disintegration. Secondly, these are age-psychological risk factors for changes in the consciousness and behavior of young people in a harmful direction, namely: the search for a new belonging, provocative behavior and nonconformism. I believe that the onset of radicalization among young people is initiated by the inability of some of them to satisfactorily solve their age-related developmental tasks in the context of increasing problematization of the social environment. Finally, I presented a model of the mechanisms of online radicalization as the realization of offline potential. These are interconnected mechanisms, namely: compensation for vulnerability, consolidation of isolation through online immersion, facilitation, echo chambers, acceleration of radicalization, launching actions offline.

Using a combination of traditional websites, mainstream social media platforms, YouTube, and other online services, extremists broadcast their views, provoke negative sentiment toward enemies, incite people to violence, glorify martyrs, create virtual communities with like-minded individuals, provide religious or legal justifications for violent actions, and communicate individually with new recruits to groom them for violent activities. This paper proposes the implementation of community policing principles in the development of strategies for countering online extremist propaganda. One of the key components of community policing is citizen engagement. This involves identifying ways the community can become involved in addressing various types of crime and disorder, including online appeals by violent extremists. Community members surf the Internet and participate on social media, where they may encounter extremist messages, appeals, and strategies. They can become sources of information about what is occurring on the Internet regarding how violent extremists are using the Internet. Police agencies should make an effort, through agency websites and social media, to encourage citizens to report extremist activity on the Internet.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

Psychological theories of mobilization tend to focus on explaining people’s motivations for action, rather than mobilization (“activation”) processes. To investigate the online behaviors associated with mobilization, we compared the online communications data of 26 people who subsequently mobilized to right-wing extremist action and 48 people who held similar extremist views but did not mobilize (N = 119,473 social media posts). In a three-part analysis, involving content analysis (Part 1), topic modeling (Part 2), and machine learning (Part 3), we showed that communicating ideological or hateful content was not related to mobilization, but rather mobilization was positively related to talking about violent action, operational planning, and logistics. Our findings imply that to explain mobilization to extremist action, rather than the motivations for action, theories of collective action should extend beyond how individuals express grievances and anger, to how they equip themselves with the “know-how” and capability to act.

The Syria conflict has been described as the most socially mediated in history, with online social media playing a particularly important role. At the same time, the everchanging landscape of the conflict leads to difficulties in applying analytical approaches taken by other studies of online political activism. Therefore, in this paper, we use an approach that does not require strong prior assumptions or the proposal of an advance hypothesis to analyze Twitter and YouTube activity of a range of protagonists to the conflict, in an attempt to reveal additional insights into the relationships between them. By means of a network representation that combines multiple data views, we uncover communities of accounts falling into four categories that broadly reflect the situation on the ground in Syria. A detailed analysis of selected communities within the antiregime categories is provided, focusing on their central actors, preferred online platforms, and activity surrounding “real world” events. Our findings indicate that social media activity in Syria is considerably more convoluted than reported in many other studies of online political activism, suggesting that alternative analytical approaches can play an important role in this type of scenario.