Online Library

Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, the leading English-language propagandist for al-Qa`ida, was killed in an American drone strike in 2011. But his influence has lived on into the Islamic State era, enhanced by his status as a martyr for Islam in the eyes of his admirers. His massive internet presence has turned up as a factor in several attacks since his death, including most recently the San Bernardino shootings and the Orlando nightclub attack as well as a significant number of terrorism cases on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite his long association with al-Qa`ida and that network’s rivalry with the upstart Islamic State, al-Awlaki has been embraced by the Islamic State and its followers, and he continues to inspire terrorism from beyond the grave.

A counter-intuitive finding emerges from an analysis of Arabic Twitter posts from 2014 to 2015: Twitter participants who are negative toward the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) are also more likely to hold negative views of the United States. This surprising correlation is due to the interpretations of two sets of users. One set of users views the United States and ISIS negatively as independent interventionist powers in the region. The other set of users negatively links the United States with ISIS, often asserting a secretive conspiracy between the two. The intense negativity toward the United States in the Middle East seems conducive to views that, in one way or another, cause citizens to link the United States and ISIS in a conspiratorial manner.

A counter-intuitive finding emerges from an analysis of Arabic Twitter posts from 2014 to 2015: Twitter participants who are negative toward the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) are also more likely to hold negative views of the United States. This surprising correlation is due to the interpretations of two sets of users. One set of users views the United States and ISIS negatively as independent interventionist powers in the region. The other set of users negatively links the United States with ISIS, often asserting a secretive conspiracy between the two. The intense negativity toward the United States in the Middle East seems conducive to views that, in one way or another, cause citizens to link the United States and ISIS in a conspiratorial manner.

A partir de un análisis de publicaciones en árabe en Twitter correspondientes al período 2014–2015, surge una conclusión contraria a la intuición: Quienes participan en Twitter y tienen una actitud negativa con respecto al Estado Islámico de Irak y el Levante (EIIL) también tienen más probabilidades de ostentar una opinión negativa con respecto a los Estados Unidos (EE. UU.). Esta sorprendente correlación se debe a las interpretaciones de dos grupos de usuarios. Uno de dichos grupos tiene una visión negativa de los EE. UU. y del EIIL, ya que los considera poderes intervencionistas independientes en la región. El otro grupo de usuarios establece una vinculación negativa entre los EE. UU. y el EIIL, y suele afirmar que existe una conspiración secreta entre los dos. La intensa negatividad con respecto a los Estados Unidos en el Oriente Medio parece propiciar opiniones que, de una u otra manera, hacen que los ciudadanos establezcan una vinculación conspirativa entre los EE. UU. y el EIIL.

Une conclusion contre-intuitive ressort d’une analyse des publications Twitter en arabe de 2014–2015: les participants à Twitter qui ont une opinion négative de l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant sont également plus susceptibles d’avoir une opinion négative des États-Unis. Cette corrélation surprenante est due aux interprétations de deux ensembles d’utilisateurs. Un ensemble d’utilisateurs voit négativement les États-Unis et l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant puisqu’il les considère comme des puissances interventionnistes indépendantes dans la région. L’autre ensemble d’utilisateurs les associe négativement en affirmant souvent qu’il existe une conspiration secrète entre eux deux. L’intense négativité à l’égard des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient semble propice à des points de vue qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, amènent les citoyens à établir un lien conspirationniste entre les États-Unis et l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant.

In 2020, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP) Berlin carried out a sample analysis to test the extent to which YouTube, Facebook and Instagram block “manifestly illegal” terrorist content upon notification. Our findings raise doubts that the currently applied compliance systems of these companies achieve the objectives of making their services safe for users. As a result, CEP proposed requirements for effective and transparent compliance regimes with a focus on automated decision-making tools and lessons learned from the regulation of the financial industry. This Policy Paper combines all the relevant lessons learned and gives concrete recommendations on how to make the DSA also an effective regulation against terrorist content online.

This article explores the results of a study on media participation on Twitter in 2018/2019 perceived as contributing to far right and Islamist radical ideologies, in 7 European countries. By combining online ethnography and big data approaches, we see that online far right extremism in Europe is active and ranks are growing, while Islamist extremism has been incapacitated in sharing controversial forms of expression. We describe how the far right uses Twitter as a means for political activism, while Islamist extremists offer lifestyle information, related to local branches of faith, using Twitter as a storefront that re-routes users to other platforms. We consider resources for action, notably on the far right. World leaders influence followers online and support a global conversation between users that paves the way to a far right European milieu thriving on Twitter. To conclude, we delve into the notions of radicalisation and political participation to emphasise the asymmetry between the two forms of media participation in respect to academic discourses and big tech and States’ practises.

The apocalyptic narrative of the Syrian civil war promoted by the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in 2014 had galvanised around a hundred radicals in Malaysia who subsequently migrated to Iraq and Syria. At least forty-five of them propagated their jihadist cause online resulting in the mushrooming of online extremism in the country. The growth spans over five years (2013-2017) in two phases, one led by Muhammad Lotfi Arifin’s network of online followers and the other by Muhammad Wanndy Muhammad Jedi’s online supporters and sympathizers. Lotfi and his network popularised the concept of ‘jihad’ from the perspective of militant groups, while Wanndy lured vulnerable online followers deeper into the later stages of violent radicalisation. The trajectory of Malaysia’s online violent radicalism from Lotfi to Wanndy was coincidental rather than deliberate, signifying the ‘funnel’ process of radicalisation. This process is synced with the terrorists’ switch from online public platforms to encrypted and private ones.