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Von Christchurch bis Halle: Wie sich der Rechtsterrorismus neu erfindet
Radikale und extreme Rechte vernetzen sich längst nicht mehr nur durch geheime Treffen. Sie sind ganz offen im Internet unterwegs, über alle nationalen Grenzen hinweg. Ihr Umgang mit der digitalen Infrastruktur ist versiert. Ihre Mittel: Strategiepapiere, Guerilla-Marketing und organisierte Hasskampagnen. An die Stelle straff organisierter Gruppen treten immer öfter lose Netzwerke. Viele radikalisieren sich, ein Teil von ihnen greift zur Gewalt, einige von ihnen töten. Karolin Schwarz, Journalistin und Expertin für rechte Propaganda im Internet, zeigt, wie sich Rechtsextremismus organisiert und eine neue Form des globalen Terrorismus entsteht, dessen Gewalt zum Ausbruch kommt. Parallel tragen rechtspopulistische Regierungen und totalitäre Regime Lüge und Hetze über das Netz nach Europa – eine unheilvolle Allianz. Schwarz macht deutlich: Gesellschaft, Justiz und Politik sind keineswegs wehrlos. Dafür müssen sie rechte Strategien und Technologien aber kennen und verstehen.

The report notes that in 2018, the Israeli government continued to systematically target Palestinians and the right to freedom of expression via the Internet. In the year 2018, Israeli authorities arrested around 350 Palestinians in the West Bank on charges of “incitement” because of their publications on social media. 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media launched its annual report on Palestinian digital rights for the year 2018. The report details violations by governments, authorities, international technology companies and Palestinian society.

(Hard)Wired for Terror is divided into two parts. In the first part, (the ‘Roots’ ) we provide a historical, semantic analysis of the concepts of radicalism, extremism and terrorism, and how they are interconnected. Furthermore, a comprehensive overview is presented of the state of the art in which the current radicalization and terrorism research is rooted. We challenge insights from individual-psychological and collective-sociological research and bind them together on a social-communicative dimension. By means of a theoretical blend of Social Movement Theory, Mediatization, and Socio-Epidemiology, we propose a new cyclic model of mediatized terrorism and radicalization. In the second part (the ‘Routes’ ), we present the results of five original empirical studies. Both message-centered and audience-centered analyses were conducted. On the basis of a detailed content analysis, we uncover the moral psychological and theological underpinnings of the ISIS’s worldview. Additionally, survey data of Belgian young adults reveal the ‘effects’ of different forms of Salafi-Jihadist communication artefacts (from beheading videos to terrorist attacks). Ultimately, the dissertation suggests a few policy recommendations with the aim to prevent radicalization and terrorism.

In recent years, terrorism and radicalization have been a consistent issue that many countries have faced. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been the most recent in a long trail of organizations that have sought to strike terror against the western world. However, ISIS is distinguished from other groups, like Al-Qaeda, in that ISIS supports a complex propaganda machine. Although ISIS is not the first organization to use the social media platform, they are the first to use it with such diversity. The two main channels that ISIS uses to spread their propaganda messages are through social media sites such as Twitter and through online journals such as the Dabiq. Recent research has attempted to determine how recruitment messages are being received and which messages trigger recruitment. It is the goal of this paper to determine which messages are salient, and the psychological constructs that support them. By coding messages for appeals to identity, need for cognitive closure, time pressure, and appeals to ideology, the researchers expect that the two main channels of ISIS propaganda differ in their messages. We hypothesize that Twitter messages will be targeted towards novice ISIS sympathizers, whereas the Dabiq will be focused on already-radicalized individuals who have moved past the introduction of the radical ideology.

The Handbook is divided into seven self-contained chapters, which build on each other but also allow the reader to jump in at any point, depending on their interests. Specific content may also be found using the keyword index. The seven chapters are distributed between the Handbook’s two main parts, each of which has a specific focus. A third, supplementary section consists of a selection of additional articles on relevant topics. Part 1, consisting of Chapters 1 to 4, deals with the theoretical foundations of violent extremism prevention under the key topics of ‘theoretical references’, ‘phenomenology’, ‘radicalisation processes’ and ‘evaluation’. Part 2 comprises Chapters 5 to 7 and places the focus on violent extremism prevention practice in Germany. This section deals with the approaches practised here, existing prevention programmes and the current prevention landscape. Chapters 1 to 7, which cover what we could call the main body of violent extremism prevention, are supplemented by a third section comprising excurses into complementary questions and areas of society which, although not explicitly considered part of the field of violent extremism prevention itself, nevertheless influence the occurrence of radicalisation and the diverse manifestations of politically and/or religiously motivated extremisms. The topics touched upon there include conflict transformation, the media, criminal law, mobile counselling, civic education, football culture, Islamic associations, victim counselling and ethics.

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