Online Library

This report treats developments in the violent extremist and terrorist online scene(s) and responses to them in the 13-month period from 1 December 2018 to 31 December 2019. It is divided into two parts: Part I focuses on the online activities of the extreme right, with a particular emphasis on the Christchurch attacks, and Part II on violent online jihadism, particularly the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (hereafter IS). The Conclusion provides a summing-up and identifies issues in this realm that bear watching in 2020. Those familiar with our previous reports will know that the structuring of these was slightly different, with analysis of violent jihadi activity preceding discussion of extreme right online activity in all instances. The March 2019 Christchurch attacks and a series of subsequent attacks in the United States and Germany put extreme right online activity firmly centre stage however, which is reflected in the structuring of the present report.

This Element presents original research into how young people interact with violent extremist material, including terrorist propaganda, when online. It explores a series of emotional and behavioural responses that challenge assumptions that terror or trauma are the primary emotional responses to these online environments. It situates young people’s emotional responses within a social framework, revealing them to have a relatively sophisticated relationship with violent extremism on social media that challenges simplistic concerns about processes of radicalisation. The Element draws on four years of research, including quantitative surveys and qualitative focus groups with young people, and presents a unique perspective drawn from young people’s experiences.

This article examines the fascists imaginaries that are produced and circulated at 4chan /pol/. Based on analysis of memes and posts collected during a 6-month period in 2019, it explores the diagnoses given by anonymous users to the imagining of the ultra-nation and dehumanized others, and the prescriptions for the remedies needed to bring about its saving. It argues that the cultural practices of /pol/ where fascist fantasies of white supremacy are spread fast and anonymously in a transnational milieu through transgressive play frames are particularly powerful for the amplification of the logic of an endangered ultra-nation that needs urgent violent defence to obtain racial palingenesis. As such cyberfascism co-produced in a leaderless network among users scattered across continents lends itself to calls for violent action against minority communities, including terrorism.

In the West, the concern surrounding the rise of online harassment, trolling and other malicious and antisocial behaviors tend to be hyper focused on websites like 4chan, 8chan and reddit. However, the rise of online hate culture that laid the groundwork for movements like Gamergate and the alt right has a precedent in Japan – specifically, the culture that was borne out of the 2channel text board, which was the inspiration for the American 4chan. As society decayed around many Japanese in the 1990s (an economic recession, terrorist attacks, earthquakes, to name a few events), the Internet came to prominence in the form of Bulletin Board Systems. Despite its lasting impact and influence on digital culture more globally, it is understudied and ignored in larger discussions around trolling, harassment, and online hate. Using a case study of the anti-Korean manga Kenkanryu and through the lens of Cynical Romanticism, this essay examines the ways that 2channel and the netto uyoku (the Japanese extreme far right) created a digital subculture that has had a lasting impact on global online hate. Though the netto uyoku never achieved significant successes in terms of actual societal and political change, what they did leave behind is a blueprint for online reactionaries.

Recognizing that militant, non-state groups utilize social media and online platforms to reach members, sympathizers, and potential recruits, state agencies and social media corporations now increasingly regulate access to accounts affiliated with such groups. Scholars examining deplatforming efforts have, to date, focused on the extent of audience loss after account restrictions and the identification of strategies for regrouping online followers on the same or different platforms over time. Left unexplored is if and how militant non-state groups adapt their official messaging strategies in response to platform restrictions despite continuing online access to them. To begin to fill that gap, this study compares ISIS’s 550 images displayed in the group’s official newsletter al-Naba 6 months before and after Europol’s November 2019 take-down of terrorist affiliated accounts, groups, channels, and bots on Telegram. It conducts a content analysis of images related to militaries and their outcomes, non-military activities and their outcomes, and presentational forms. The findings demonstrate that ISIS visually emphasizes its standard priming approach but shifts its agenda-setting strategy. While retaining some of its standard visual framing practices, the group also alters frames, particularly those related to images showing opposing militaries and military outcome.