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The Syria conflict has been described as the most socially mediated in history, with online social media playing a particularly important role. At the same time, the everchanging landscape of the conflict leads to difficulties in applying analytical approaches taken by other studies of online political activism. Therefore, in this paper, we use an approach that does not require strong prior assumptions or the proposal of an advance hypothesis to analyze Twitter and YouTube activity of a range of protagonists to the conflict, in an attempt to reveal additional insights into the relationships between them. By means of a network representation that combines multiple data views, we uncover communities of accounts falling into four categories that broadly reflect the situation on the ground in Syria. A detailed analysis of selected communities within the antiregime categories is provided, focusing on their central actors, preferred online platforms, and activity surrounding “real world” events. Our findings indicate that social media activity in Syria is considerably more convoluted than reported in many other studies of online political activism, suggesting that alternative analytical approaches can play an important role in this type of scenario.

The advancement in technology has brought a new era in terrorism where Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a major platform of communication with wide range of usage from message channeling to propaganda and recruitment of new followers in terrorist groups. Meanwhile, during the terrorist attacks people use OSNs for information exchange, mobilizing and uniting and raising money for the victims. This paper critically analyses the specific usage of OSNs in the times of terrorisms attacks in developing countries. We crawled and used Twitter’s data during Westgate shopping mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya. We then analysed the number of tweets, geo-location of tweets, demographics of the users and whether users in developing countries tend to tweet, retweet or reply during the event of a terrorist attack. We define new metrics (reach and impression of the tweet) and present the models for calculating them. The study findings show that, users from developing countries tend to tweet more at the first and critical times of the terrorist occurrence. Moreover, large number of tweets originated from the attacked country (Kenya) with 73% from men and 23% from women where original posts had a most number of tweets followed by replies and retweets.

This doctoral thesis takes the reader into elements of the strategy of using modern
communication as well the advocated monopoly of truth by jihadist groups world
wide.

An introduction to Jihadism online

The Internet’s unprecedented global reach and scope combined with the difficulty in monitoring and tracing communications make the Internet a prime tool for extremists and terrorists. The Simon Wiesenthal Center has been monitoring these developments for nearly two decades through our Digital Terrorism and Hate Project. Our findings reveal that as the Internet has grown, the escalation of extremist sites has kept pace in number and in technological sophistication.

Terrorist and extremist movements have long exploited mass communications technology in pursuit of their political ends. The advent of the internet offers new opportunities. In response, state counter-measures seek to stem the impact of extreme ideologies by a number of tactics. “Positive” measures refer to those online initiatives that seek to make an impact through digital engagement and education and the provision of counter-narratives. “Negative” measures describe those approaches that advocate for, or result in, the deletion or restriction of violent extremist online content and/or the legal sanctioning of its online purveyors or users. More sanctions-based outcomes arise through discretionary state activity such as warnings and counselling of vulnerable individuals, or through disruptive counter-measures such as bans on the giving of lectures or prohibitions on the entry into the country of speakers or the taking down of extremist internet sites. Other measures step over into criminal justice, as when individuals are prosecuted for collecting materials or information (including typically information downloaded from the internet) or for issuing messages which can be construed as direct or indirect incitements to terrorism. This paper will analyse the responses to extremist uses of the internet, with an emphasis upon legal responses – “online laws”.