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The study aims to capture links between the use of encrypted communication channel -Telegram and lone wolf attacks occurred in Europe between 2015-2016. To understand threads of ISIS communication on Telegram we used digital ethnography approach which consists of the self-observation of information flows on four of ISIS’s most celebrated telegram Channels. We draw on public sphere theory and coined the term terror socio-sphere 3.0 as the theoretical background of this study. The collected data is presented as screenshots to capture a visual evidence of ISIS communication threads. This study shows that ISIS Telegram channels play critical role in personal communication between potential recruits and dissemination of propaganda that encourage ‘lone wolves’ to carry attacks in the world at large. This study was limited to the number of the channels that have been widely celebrated.

This article investigates the social media content of women who are affiliated with the Islamic State. Throughout one year, ninety-three Twitter accounts were tracked to explore the patterns of engagement by pro–Islamic State women online and examine how these patterns illuminate the roles that pro–Islamic State women occupy on social media networks. The study reveals that women who associate with the Islamic State mostly preserve the traditional gendered role of support in the online realm. However, support is not their exclusive role and some women are active in the organization, using Twitter to recruit, promote, and even commit terrorist violence.

The public outcry attending President Trump’s attempted travel ban from seven radical Muslim states, designed to prevent foreign terrorists from entering the country, has diverted attention from the longstanding danger of homegrown jihadists. As early as 2007, the New York Police Department (NYPD) released a 92-page report documenting the extent of al-Qaeda-linked homegrown jihad in Europe and the United States.[1] The Obama administration, however, went out of its way to ignore, deny, and whitewash any homegrown terror that smacked of Islamist violence. But a decade later, al-Qaeda has been all but eclipsed by the Islamic State (ISIS), which has skillfully used social media to become the foremost purveyor of jihadist indoctrination in the West, creating a “virtual caliphate,” extremely dangerous and easily accessible to vulnerable men and women from a variety of backgrounds in a manner al-Qaeda was never able to achieve. Even were all territory now under ISIS control to be retaken, this virtual caliphate could continue to pose a major threat.

This report maps the ecosystem of the burgeoning
‘new’ extreme right across Europe and the US, which is
characterised by its international outlook, technological
sophistication, and overtures to groups outside of the
traditional recruitment pool for the extreme-right. This
movement is marked by its opportunistic pragmatism,
seeing movements which hold seemingly contradictory
ideologies share a bed for the sake of achieving
common goals. It examines points of connectivity
and collaboration between disparate groups and
assesses the interplay between different extreme-right
movements, key influencers and subcultures both
online and offline.

Policy Exchange’s new report provides a comprehensive analysis of the
struggle against online jihadist extremism – what we call “the new
Netwar”. This issue is vital to UK national security and there is a
danger that the blood and treasure we are investing in defeating ISIS in
Iraq and Syria will produce little more than a pyrrhic victory unless we
act to defeat the virtual threat. At present, we are certainly not winning
the war online. The spate of terrorist attacks the UK suffered in the first
half of 2017 confirmed that online extremism is a real and present
danger. In each case, online radicalisation played some part in driving
the perpetrators to violence. As a society, we are struggling to grasp the
extent of the challenge and also appropriate ways of responding. It is
clear that the status quo is not working. It is time for a new approach.
Policy Exchange has worked with a team of experts to provide fresh
insight into the debate around online extremism. The report that
follows is divided into three sections:

Branding strategies are becoming increasingly important for terrorist organisations who need
to take a more purposeful approach at imbuing aspirational associations to their organisations
in order secure recruits and funds in an increasingly competitive environment. The creation
and implication of these individual brands are further amplified through the sophisticated
harnessing of ICT and digital media, where the harnessing of novel tactics and digital trends
feed into the increasing use of branding. It is a strategy being employed by numerous terrorist
groups, and a burgeoning research field is rapidly evolving to represent this development.
This study seeks to explore how al-Shabab constructs their brand in their digital magazine
Gaidi Mtaani, using Aristotle’s rhetorical triad of ethos, pathos and logos. This study has the
hopes of contributing to comparison studies between Dabiq and Inspire and wider terrorist
branding, terrorism, ICT and communication studies. Understanding the differences between
how some of the most notorious terrorist organizations distinguish themselves will help
counter the rhetoric and brand associations projected through their publications. In order to
answer this research question, this study will consist of a two-part theoretical framework
situated in the concept of branding and rhetoric theory. Rhetoric theory will help this study
understand how al-Shabab communicate and constructs their brand. It will allow for the
analysis of any persuasive communications that express al-Shabab’s brand associations and
help analyse al-Shabab’s divisive use of language in order to ultimately promote their brand
and ideas. The empirical data will be analysed through the use of qualitative content analysis.