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Background
Despite the prominent role that digital media play in the lives and mental health of young people as well as in violent radicalization (VR) processes, empirical research aimed to investigate the association between Internet use, depressive symptoms and support for VR among young people is scant. We adopt a person-centered approach to investigate patterns of digital media use and their association with depressive symptoms and support for VR.

Methods
A sample of 2,324 Canadian young people (Mage = 30.10; SDage = 5.44 ; 59% women) responded to an online questionnaire. We used latent profile analysis to identify patterns of digital media use and linear regression to estimate the associations between class membership, depressive symptoms and support for VR.

Results
We identified four classes of individuals with regards to digital media use, named Average Internet Use/Institutional trust, Average internet use/Undifferentiated Trust, Limited Internet Use/Low Trust and Online Relational and Political Engagement/Social Media Trust. Linear regression indicated that individuals in the Online Relational and Political Engagement/Social Media Trust and Average Internet Use/Institutional trust profiles reported the highest and lowest scores of both depression and support for VR, respectively.

Conclusions
It is essential to tailor prevention and intervention efforts to mitigate risks of VR to the specific needs and experiences of different groups in society, within a socio-ecological perspective. Prevention should consider both strengths and risks of digital media use and simulteaneously target both online and offline experiences and networks, with a focus on the sociopolitical and relational/emotional components of Internet use.

Profiling has its traditions in criminal investigations where it is used to assist in apprehending an offender by examining and attempting to understand his or her psychological motivations and personality. Terrorist specialists and theorists have applied traditional profiling techniques in hopes of distinguishing nonterrorists from terrorists and in an endeavor to understand the motivators for radicalization. However, these attempts have created a divide between the theorists resulting in contradictory data and debate. With the rise of social media, the methods of terrorism have changed. The Islamic State (IS) in particular has tapped into using media, not only to recruit, but as a form of technological combat, which in turn has added to their success and strength. This dissertation introduces the theory of Combat Branding. The findings of this dissertation suggest that it is possible to create a deductive profile of Western IS recruits by beginning with the examination of IS’s Combat Brand. This is a qualitative visual narrative study of official IS media consisting of video and still images. It is my hypothesis that starting with an analysis of the Combat Brand is a missing link to approaching a deductive profile of the intended target audience.

This report represents a first contribution by the Samir Kassir Foundation (SKF) to the ongoing and growing debate on the role of communication in the radicalisation process and the mechanisms to prevent or counter violent extremism (CVE). The primary focus of this research is communication by and about the Islamic State and did not include communication by and about militant Islamist organisations from other ideological and sectarian backgrounds. It is based on qualitative opinion and media consumption research conducted in February and March 2016 with Lebanese audiences in Tripoli, North Lebanon, West Bekaa and among Syrian refugees with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands under contract No. 28141. The project was implemented by a steering committee led by academic and policy consultant Drew Mikhael and comprised of SKF Executive Director Ayman Mhanna, SKF Programs Coordinator Nassim AbiGhanem, academic and senior researcher Nidal Ayoub and social media communication specialist Marie-Thérèse Corbani. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the Samir Kassir Foundation and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The CTC is committed to continuing to search out unique sources of data to provide insight into the
workings of terrorist organizations and, when possible, making them available to the broader research
community, which will undoubtedly add its own insights and continue to enhance our collective understanding.
To further this end, all of the documents (both the original Arabic as well as English
translations) referred to in this report are being released on the CTC’s website at ctc.usma.edu.5 These
13 documents provide interesting and important insights on four main topics regarding the Islamic
State’s media organization.
The first insight is that these documents offer, for the first time, a conclusive link between the Islamic
State’s central media bureau and Amaq News Agency. More specifically, these documents show that
the central media bureau considered Amaq to be on par with other previously recognized central media
entities such as Al-Naba and Al-Bayan. Furthermore, the Islamic State’s Diwan of Central Media
encouraged local media bureaus to send content to Amaq, going so far as to make cooperation with
Amaq a part of each local media bureau’s monthly evaluation.
The second is that these documents show the emphasis the organization placed on producing diferent
types of products in order to convey a broader narrative about the caliphate. Although examining
the group’s propaganda products after they have been released demonstrates this as well, the level of
detail and effort put in by the group to this end, as highlighted by these documents, is more expansive
than previously acknowledged.
Third, these documents show very clearly how the Diwan of Central Media created rules, evaluations,
and internal memos that were designed to strengthen the centralization of the group’s media bureaucracy,
solidifying the central media organization’s control over what and how the local media bureaus
carried on their propaganda work. This finding runs counter to some discussion on decentralization
as one of the main reasons for the success of the group’s media operations.6
There certainly is an element
of decentralization to the group’s online activities, but these documents show there is a limit
to the group’s willingness to decentralize in the media realm. Indeed, in a document titled “General
Guidance and Instructions,” we find the following counsel:
“We also advise the brothers to avoid innovation because it is mostly the main cause of mistakes.”7

Finally, the documents show that the Islamic State’s media organization exercises self-awareness in
terms of its potential vulnerability. Indeed, the documents provide several insights into how the media
side of the organization recognized that its role in promoting the group meant that the media components
of the group would be in possession of information that could result in harm if it were known or otherwise obtained by the enemy. This led the group to focus on the importance of information
security among media operatives.
The Islamic State’s efforts in each of these four areas provide a more detailed understanding not only
of how the group organized and implemented its media strategy, but also how a militant organization
was able to capture the world’s attention using the art of propaganda. This report proceeds by examining
each of these four areas in turn.

As the physical territory held by the group known as the Islamic State diminished in 2016-2017, concern
about of the status of the group’s “virtual” caliphate increased. This report focuses on one aspect
of that virtual caliphate: the production of visual propaganda by the group’s ofcial media bureaus.
Using a dataset of more than 13,000 pieces of ofcial visual propaganda distributed from January 2015
to June 2018, this report examines how the production of such pieces has changed over this timeframe
in terms of the number of pieces distributed, the geographic dynamics associated with the production
of propaganda, and the content featured in these products. Through the course of this examination,
several key findings emerge:
Ofcial visual propaganda production has decreased significantly: According to the CTC’s collection
criteria, August 2015 represented the high-water mark for the production of ofcial visual propaganda,
with 754 releases. The low-point occurred in June 2018, with 44 releases. This represents
a 94-percent decrease in visual propaganda production. It is important to note that this decrease
does not account for non-visual production such as text-only tweets.
Despite the decrease, fluctuation in visual propaganda production is likely to continue: At the
macro level, production rebounded slightly in January 2018 before falling of again. This follows a
more sustained rebound in production that occurred in late 2016. At the local media bureau level,
increases and decreases have occurred quite frequently.
Since July 2015, 100 Islamic State media operatives have been announced as being martyred:
Among many reasons for the decrease in propaganda production, one revealed by this report is
the number of media personnel who have been killed. In the first quarter of 2016 alone, 20 such
personnel were eulogized in the group’s propaganda.
Islamic State videos (excluding Amaq and Furat Media Establishment) have been increasing in
length since January 2015: In the first five months of 2015, the average length of an Islamic State
video was a little over six minutes. In the first five months of 2018, this number had increased to
approximately 16 minutes 30 seconds. This may suggest a decreased ability to create narrowly
tailored and targeted videos.
The Islamic State’s media bureaus inside of Iraq and Syria present a worrying sign for the future:
During 2016 and after the liberation of parts of Iraq from formal Islamic State control in December
2017, production of ofcial visual products from Iraqi media bureaus declined. Since that point,
however, production coming specifically from Iraq has rebounded slightly, highlighting the group’s
resilience and potential future threat in the region.
The Islamic State’s media bureaus outside of Iraq and Syria are producing more propaganda as
a proportion of the group’s overall ofcial visual output than ever before: Due to both an overall
decline in production of ofcial visual releases inside Iraq and Syria and a small increase among
some bureaus outside of Iraq and Syria, most notably the Khurasan bureau, the Islamic State’s
media bureaus outside of Iraq and Syria have surpassed 20 percent of overall ofcial visual output
in six of the last nine months. This level of non-Iraq and Syria production had not occurred once
in the preceding 32 months.
The theme of Islamic State ofcial visual releases is overwhelmingly military as opposed to non-military:
In the first quarter of 2015, 53 percent of the group’s ofcial visual releases were non-military
in theme. In this first quarter of 2018, this number had fallen to 15 percent.