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This article offers a descriptive analysis of intelligence operations carried out by the United States and its allies against the presence of jihadist groups on the Internet during the period 2001–2020. In contrast to actions aimed at eliminating the virtual spaces in which terrorists operate, the intelligence operations analysed here are designed to erode terrorists’ trust in such spaces without compromising intelligence sources. The article argues that the combination of cyberattacks and psychological operations in the form of honeypots and sabotage have achieved considerable success in terms of reducing terrorist activities on the Internet and undermining the effectiveness of propaganda initiatives undertaken by terrorist groups.

This article contributes to the growing field of social media and internet research, focusing on questions of securitization and examining the internet politics of Central Asia with a specific focus on Turkmenistan. The article extends the brief analysis introduced by Tucker and Turaeva (2016) concerning Turkmen nationals joining IS (Islamic State). Here, I have contextualized those reported discussions into a wider geopolitical and sociological positioning of the participants (both individual and states) with the aim of uncovering the methods and principles that state and non-state actors use to construct discourses of threat and danger on social media and elsewhere on the internet. I argue that social media and the internet have moved beyond being a means for open communication and exchange; they have also come to be used by authoritarian states to suppress, control, and manipulate certain discourses. In the case of Turkmenistan, social media helps to control security discourse about the ISIS threat and the presence of Turkmenistani nationals in the group, even as it grants open access to information.

Over time cyberspace has become an increasingly relevant environment for Islamic terrorism. The advent of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in 2014 showed capability in exploiting jihadist propaganda and terror communication to radicalize and mobilize sympathizers globally. The digital arena has assumed a central role in the online jihadist movement. This centrality manifested itself in establishing an increasingly active Digital Caliphate declined in a community shape. The community’s members migrated on different digital platforms, consolidating mainly on Telegram between 2017 and the end of 2019 when the extremist digital community was hardly hit by a counterterrorism operation led by Europol. However, how was the Digital Caliphate organized on Telegram? Was there any leadership within this community? Who were the main actors’ part of it? How did the trust-building process work amongst strangers but close to the same extremist ideology? Furthermore, what were the expressive, communicative and symbolic features of the online jihadist culture? By applying digital ethnography through the covert participant observation lasting about two years within the pro-IS digital community on Telegram, this study seeks to provide an insight into the social, cultural and organizational anatomy of the Digital Caliphate and its members by identifying a possible organizational model. Extensive reflection was also dedicated to the ethical dimension; thus, the potentiality emerged from applying the ethnographic approach when considered a counterterrorism tool called “Digital Humint”. The “Think Terrorist” approach, a process that immerses the researcher within the extremist perspective, is not limited to being an academic exercise but becomes an analysis tool that helps identify future threats. Interpreting the jihadist ecosystems and the role of technology increases our understanding and provides new insights for future prevention strategies. That is the challenge that poses academics and law enforcement agencies as increasingly converging actors in fighting against terrorism.

This study analysed three social media movements linked with extreme right‑wing activities online. Such activities were carried out by right‑wing extremists and those who support their philosophy of nationalism and religious conservatism, whether actively or passively. This study also investigated how themes and narratives from across the globe, such as US political discourse, Russian disinformation and conspiracy theories, are combined with real‑life local grievances in order to appeal to similarly aligned followers to help to disseminate and legitimise reactionary speech.

Without measures of the lethality of terrorist networks, it is very difficult to assess if capturing or killing a terrorist is effective. We present the predictive lethality analysis of terrorist organization () algorithm, which merges machine learning with techniques from graph theory and social network analysis to predict the number of attacks that a terrorist network will carry out based on a network structure alone. We show that is highly accurate on two novel datasets, which cover Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (ISIS). Using both machine learning and statistical methods, we show that the most significant macrofeatures for predicting AQ’s lethality are related to their public communications (PCs) and logistical subnetworks, while the leadership and operational subnetworks are most impactful for predicting ISISs lethality. Across both groups, the average degree and the diameters of the strongly connected components (SCCs) within these networks are strongly linked with lethality.

This report provides an overview of two seemingly new formations of online networks of accelerationist and neo-fascist entities that emerged in early 2021 and are self-described Atomwaffen Division spinoffs. It also provides an understanding of how they behave online and speaks to the threats of offline violence they pose.