Online Library

Do social media and search companies exacerbate antisemitism and hate through their own design and system functions? In this joint study by the ADL Center for Technology and Society (CTS) and Tech Transparency Project (TTP), we investigated search functions on both social media platforms and Google. Our results show how these companies’ own tools–such as autocomplete and auto-generation of content–made finding and engaging with antisemitism easier and faster.1 In some cases, the companies even helped create the content themselves.

Our researchers compiled a list of 130 hate groups and movements from ADL’s Glossary of Extremism, picking terms that were tagged in the glossary with all three of the following categories: “groups/movements,” “white supremacist,” and “antisemitism.”2 The researchers then typed each term into the respective search bars of Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, and recorded the results.

Do social media companies exacerbate antisemitism and hate through their own recommendation and amplification tools? We investigated how four of the biggest social media platforms treated users who searched for or engaged with content related to anti-Jewish tropes, conspiracy theories, and other topics. Three of them–Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter1 (now known as X after a rebranding by owner Elon Musk)–filled their feeds with far more antisemitic content and conspiratorial accounts and recommended the most hateful influencers and pages to follow. One platform, YouTube, did not.

In this joint study by the ADL Center for Technology and Society (CTS) and Tech Transparency Project (TTP), researchers created six test personas of different ages and genders and set up accounts for them on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube. Researchers had them search each platform for a basket of terms related to conspiracy theories as well as popular internet personalities, commentators, and video games. The study then examined the content that the platforms’ algorithms recommended to these hypothetical users.

At Manchester Crown Court on 18 October 2024, Robert Taylor was sentenced to four years in prison with a one year extended license period for nine offences relating to racial hatred, two terror offences, two offences related to hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation and one case of support for a proscribed organisation.

This Research Briefing is the second in CST’s ‘Pathway to Terror’ series that outlines CST’s specific work in tracking, monitoring and reporting individuals’ online extremism. It has two sections: the first section reveals the full extent of Taylor’s anti-Jewish activity, the ideological extremism that lay behind his offending, and CST’s investigation that led to his arrest and conviction. The second part of this report looks at the GDL network more widely, its links to the UK, its growing presence on X alongside its use of alternative tech platforms, and its role in attempting to radicalise online users globally

Radical milieus have been described as specific social environ¬ments whose culture, narratives, and symbols shape both individuals and groups, and the social networks and relationships out of which those individuals and groups develop and emerge. Researcher Peter Waldmann and his co-authors attribute distinct and independent qualities to these environments, portraying them as social entities in their own right, that is, a collective of people sharing certain perspectives and a unitary identity: a “subculture” or a “community.” This does not mean that conflict is absent between any given radical milieu and the violent extremist or terrorist group(s) that emerges from within it. Milieus have their own interests that lead them not just to interact with, but oftentimes to criticise and sometimes even confront their violent offshoots. Perhaps most importantly, Waldmann’s conception of radical milieus appears not merely to have social relationships as a core characteristic, but necessitates, implicitly or explicitly, face-to-face interaction amongst the members of any given milieu.

This paper combines qualitative and quantitative content analysis to map and analyze the “Incel” worldview shared by members of a misogynistic online community ideologically linked to several recent acts of politically motivated violence, including Alek Minassian’s van attack in Toronto (2018) and Elliot Rodger’s school shooting in Isla Vista (2014). Specifically, the paper analyses how support and motivation for violence results from the particular structure this worldview presents in terms of social categories and causal narratives.

An analysis of Harakat al-Shabab’s multimedia releases and the rapid evolution in their production quality and design over a period of two to three years. Sound quality, animation, syncing sound with visuals, and narrative structures have all improved from the group’s multimedia releases from 2007 and 2008 when its videos were relatively simple, often just individuals sitting in front of a video camera, possibly just a camcorder, and grainy battle footage depicting fierce firefights between Harakat al-Shabab and the interim Somali government and its chief military backers, the African Union expeditionary force stationed inside the country.