Online Library

The problem of terrorism is both an immediate threat and a long-term issue of safety
and social cohesion, locally and globally. An immediate threat requires relatively
straightforward interventions. Our public debates seem to be focusing too much on “fire-
fighting” crisis management, and congratulating ourselves on instant emotional displays
of solidarity, without paying enough attention to the substantial challenges of developing
a broader social consensus, and a culture of mutual respect. More specifically, we need to
find new ways to understand how local and global issues intersect, and why the global
hegemony of one or two superpowers no longer seems to deliver stability and security
(even for themselves). This is particularly true in a world where national borders have
less and less relevance for the homogeneity of populations, cultures or values, and where
whole communities, for instance, continue practices with impunity which are completely
unacceptable to others – as well as being illegal, e.g. female genital mutilation. This
paper explores some key theoretical issues which might help us to understand some of the
underlying longer-term issues: the articulation of identity, culture, and power, and impact
of micro-practices on global cohesion and security. The new globally connected social
media have a central role to play in this analysis.

Mubin Shaikh, Police Project Consultant with the Romeo Dallaire Initiative, discusses the evolution of radical propaganda online, social media and foreign fighters and the need for a robust counter narrative. Mr. Shaikh brings his real world knowledge of these issues as a former CSIS and RCMP operative, discussing them from the perspective of a real world and online counter-terrorism practitioner.

This interview is part of The SecDev Foundation’s Prevent Violent Extremism: A Social Media Research Portal – https://preventviolentextremism.info/

It has been established by leaders of the Australian national security community, such as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, that young people are being increasingly recruited into extremism. To date, few Australian studies have examined this issue using primary source data. This article seeks to understand the conditions which may make vulnerable young Australians more susceptible to recruitment, recruitment pathways, and forms of recruitment. To address this, primary sources were consulted, and frontline countering violent extremism (CVE) practitioners were interviewed. It was found that there is no typical pathway for young Australians to be recruited to extremism and that recruitment can be both foreign (informed by transnational networks and organisations) and/or familiar (within the immediate domestic environment of the young person). We identified the continued significance of online vectors, but further established the ongoing relevance and power of offline engagement for the recruitment of young people. Finally, we suggest that multiple intersecting vulnerabilities render young people more susceptible to recruitment, with data that suggests they may be naïve to their being recruited in the first place.

This paper will examine how extremist organizations manage to present themselves as credible actors in the eyes of potential supporters on social media. This paper will address this question by exploring the role of authenticity in strategic narratives, which is believed to help these groups achieve this purpose. Apart from introducing this new theoretical concept, the paper will also apply it to a new case study of the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) – the first far-right organization to be designated as terrorist by the U.S. and Canada. By conducting discourse analysis of the group’s social media propaganda on the Russian network VKontakte, the paper will show how the RIM makes its strategic narratives authentic and, as a consequence, creates an image of a credible and trustworthy actor and thus manages to reach out to its target audience.

The latest Digital Citizens Alliance investigation exposes the fallacy that
much, if anything, has changed. Partnering with the Global Intellectual Property
Enforcement Center (GIPEC), Digital Citizens has reviewed dozens of examples
of how terrorist organizations continue to rely on digital platforms such as
Google, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram to promote hate speech and recruit.
What it underscores is that the problem is not a surface issue that can be
solved simply through greater vigilance or the hiring of more content monitors.
The true cause of these troubling issues is the business model of these
platforms. When Cambridge Analytica inappropriately received the personal
information of at least 87 million Americans harvested by Facebook there was
no breach—Facebook turned that information over to the company because its
business model is to monetize users’ personal information with advertisers and
third parties.

The focus of this paper is on the extremist group Britain First. As such, it does not explore online terrorist activity but rather examines how a group regarded as extremist is subject to online sanctions. The removal of the extremist group Britain First from Facebook in March 2018 successfully disrupted the group’s online activity, leading them to have to start anew on Gab, a different and considerably smaller social media platform. The removal also resulted in the group having to seek new online followers from a much smaller, less diverse recruitment pool. This paper demonstrates the further impact of the group’s platform migration on their online strategy – particularly on their choice of images and the engagement levels generated through them. The paper puts forward a number of key recommendations, most importantly that social-media companies should continue to censor and remove hateful content.