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VOX-Pol Blog post.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

This background note pertains to how far right extremist groups have coopted methods from the ‘cyber caliphate’ and jihadist Internet use to develop their own support networks. Specifically, the material deals with the varying levels of online presence, comparing jihadist and far right strategies to disseminate propaganda. By adhering to this layered network, the source reveals how extremist groups of all varieties are able to protect themselves while simultaneously projecting their message. The source also briefly touches on the few, but crucial divergences between the jihadist and far right methods.

OSCE’s background note on jihadist internet usage provides valuable context and a succinct survey of how the extensive research already done on jihadist internet presence also applies to the far right. Researchers looking to study the correlations between the two should begin here.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The article analyzes the online humorous practices and discursive conventions of a far-right Russian Telegram community during a sociopolitical crisis. A sample of 130 disparagement jokes is examined to find out how existential uncertainty, created by the outbreak of a full-scale war, affects the far-right humorous othering. The jokes were published in a Local Crew channel a month before and a month after two moments of the most acute sociopolitical upheaval, namely, the declaration of mobilization and the attempted coup by the Wagner Group. The findings demonstrate that, after the war started, the community opted for demonizing the single outgroup while attempting to preserve the coherent ingroup by means of building ingroup appreciation within a pro-military nationalist niche. Additional upheavals were framed as irrelevant, compared to the major identity markers and the general crisis of the war, and did not affect either the community’s rhetoric or the othering patterns.

This chapter analyses the Norwegian authorities’ presence on Twitter during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks. Twitter activity by two official institutions is analysed in particular, namely, the blood bank at Oslo University Hospital and the Norwegian Police Security Services (PST). Our findings show that the Norwegian authorities were almost completely absent on Twitter during the critical hours of the terrorist attack, and that there was no coordination and synchronisation of communication from the authorities. This official silence allowed the diffusion of speculation and misinformation to take place; these were neither corrected nor addressed, as the analysed PST case shows. In contrast, the blood bank used Twitter to mobilise blood donors to address an acute problem: a shortage of blood to treat casualties. The chapter concludes by offering recommendations to the authorities for future major incidents. Book edited by Harald Hornmoen and Klas Backholm.