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The right-wing Swedish Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) is increasingly active on social media. Using discursive psychology, this text explores the rhetorical organization of text and rhetorical resources used on the Swedish online forum Flashback. The aim is to reveal and problematize truth claims about NRM made by antagonists and protagonists. Questions are (1) how and what do NRM antagonists and protagonists convey in Flashback posts about NRM, and its ideology and members? (2) how do NRM antagonists and protagonists make truth claims about NRM in Flashback posts? The empirical material consisting of 1546 Flashback posts analyzed to identify typical discussions on “NMR’s true nature”; accomplished social actions stemming from the posts. Findings show that the Flashback thread can be understood as being a rhetorical battle that concerns the “truth” about NRM, where a variety of rhetorical resources are used to render statements credibility and those involved legitimacy.

The internet has profoundly changed the way we communicate, including how jihadist
groups seek to reach Western audiences with their propaganda strategies. Cases of believed
online-radicalization call for a re-evaluation of radicalization processes, previously thought
to depend on face-to-face interactions. Based on the Hoffman-Sageman debate on whether
top-down or bottom-up processes drive terrorism, this essay explores both social movement
and organizational approaches to understand online-radicalization. Do jihadist
organizations such as Al-Qaeda and IS act as ‘fishermen’, actively engaging in the
radicalization processes of individual recruits, or is radicalization driven by social group
dynamics with little organizational involvement? Essentially, the larger question is: What
role do organizational structures play for radicalization in times of ‘virtual jihad’? Bottomup
radicalization processes are facilitated online, because the conditions for Sageman’s
‘bunch of guys’ are replicated by the characteristics of virtual communication: an echo
chamber effect causes frame-alignment through repetition and enables ‘digital natives’ to
communicate claims that resonate with other ‘digital natives’. Top-down structures are
influential, because organizations continue to employ sophisticated propaganda
development, preachers and special recruiters or ‘fishermen’. The article finds evidence for
both schools of thought and concludes that the internet facilitates both types of
radicalization mechanisms. Only a holistic strategy will be successful in battling onlineradicalization
and must include both targeting direct channels through which the
organizations execute control over recruits, and breaking the echo chamber created by
social movement dynamics in the virtual world. While countermeasures need to include the
provision of alternative social narratives and the utilization of ‘digital natives’ to make
counter-messages more effective, organizational structures need to be tackled
simultaneously, not only by identifying and arresting preachers and recruiters, but also
through stronger internet governance tools and collaboration with social media companies.

White supremacists and the Far Right political movement in the UK have, had considerable success in spreading their messages through Web sites. Some of these Web sites clearly contribute to an enabling environment for racially motivated violence in our towns and cities and possibly help to underpin also the rise of, and support for, the Far Right in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. From a position that acknowledges the enduring issue of white hegemony in Western societies, this paper provides a number of research-based recommendations for further research and future policy and practice in tackling white supremacist racial hatred on the Net.

Online extremists’ use of social media poses a new form of threat to the general public. These extremists range from cyberbullies to terrorist organizations. Social media providers often suspend the extremists’ accounts in response to user complaints. However, extremist users can simply create new accounts and continue their activities. In this work we present a new set of operational capabilities to address the threat posed by online extremists in social networks. We use thousands of Twitter accounts related to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to develop behavioral models for these users—in particular, what their accounts look like and with whom they connect. We use these models to track existing extremist users by identifying pairs of accounts belonging to the same user. We then present a model for efficiently searching the social network to find suspended users’ new accounts based on a variant of the classic Pólya’s urn setup. We find a simple characterization of the optimal search policy for this model under fairly general conditions. Our urn model and main theoretical results generalize easily to search problems in other fields.

This workbook teaches researchers, analysts and practitioners how different sorts of terrorist and violent extremist actors utilise financial technologies and cryptocurrencies to finance their operations. The process of terrorist adoption of financial technologies is spelled out for various organisations and can assist analysts to estimate whether and when a group or terrorist actor would embrace a financial technology or cryptocurrency. The workbook also includes terms that may be used to search information holdings for terrorist adoption of cryptocurrencies or financial technologies, offering early warning of terrorist adoption.