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VOX-Pol Blog post.

The present paper contributes to the research on the activities of far-right actors on social media by examining the interconnections between far-right actors and groups on Telegram platform using network analysis. The far-right network observed on Telegram is highly decentralized, similarly to the far-right networks found on other social media platforms. The network is divided mostly along the ideological and national lines, with the communities related to 4chan imageboard and Donald Trump’s supporters being the most influential. The analysis of the network evolution shows that the start of its explosive growth coincides in time with the mass bans of the far-right actors on mainstream social media platforms. The observed patterns of network evolution suggest that the simultaneous migration of these actors to Telegram has allowed them to swiftly recreate their connections and gain prominence in the network thus casting doubt on the effectiveness of deplatforming for curbing the influence of far-right and other extremist actors.

Popular tech companies—Google, Facebook,
Twitter, and others—have strongly protected
free speech online, a policy widely associated
with the legal norms of the United States.
American tech companies, however, operate
globally, and their platforms are subject to regulation
by the European Union, whose member states offer less
protection to expression than does the United States.
European regulators are pressuring tech companies to
control and suppress extreme speech. The regulators’
clear warning is that, if the companies do not comply
“voluntarily,” they will face harsher laws and potential
liability. This regulatory effort runs the risk of censorship
creep, whereby a wide array of protected speech, including
political criticism and newsworthy content, may end up
being removed from online platforms on a global scale.

The purpose of this article is to compare and contrast the US press coverage accorded to female terrorist plotter, Colleen LaRose, with that of two male terrorist plotters in order to test whether assertions in the academic literature regarding media treatment of women terrorists stand up to empirical scrutiny. The authors employed TextSTAT software to generate frequency counts of all words contained in 150 newspaper reports on their three subjects and then slotted relevant terms into categories fitting the commonest female terrorist frames, as identified by Nacos’s article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2005). The authors’ findings confirm that women involved in terrorism receive significantly more press coverage and are framed vastly differently in the US press than their male counterparts.

This paper presents a review of recent academic scholarship and debates on cyber terrorism, and more broadly of what is known about terrorist’s direct use of the Internet as weapon and, less directly, as a communication device. It presents an overview of a field of discourse that has, since its inception, provided a number of foreboding and even doomsday warnings about the future of cyber terrorism, which in the main have failed to come to realization. First, it surveys why these gloomy warnings regarding future proliferation of cyber terrorism have not been born out in practice, and explains that rather than looking for instances of the Internet being used directly as a weapon by terrorists, current debates in academic and policy circles have shifted to trying to measure and ascertain the role that the Internet plays in spreading and supporting extremist discourse to ever wider audiences. It continues by posing a series of questions regarding online audiences that are in need of future research if we are to better understand the role of the Internet in spreading and supporting violent extremist discourse and cultivating terrorism, most importantly the role of audiences as autonomous agents in navigating, reacting and responding to online violent extremist materials.

This article presents the results of a case study of the online community Russian Nationalism, one of the most popular Russian nationalists’ online communities on VKontakte in 2012–2016. The article aims to find out where network leaders and common members of nationalist online groups closed on the Russian Internet go and in which thematic communities they continue their activity. Russian Nationalism members’ personal profiles and friendly links on VKontakte were used as data sources. The metrics of social network analysis were used to study Russian Nationalism’s network structure. The study showed that the ban of a massive extreme right nationalist online group leads to an increase in the number of smaller shelter groups that retain their ideological basis, but abandon the clearly expressed hate speech; members of a banned nationalist group flow to groups whose content is both close (militaristic, cultural, and historical) and far (everyday) to the extreme right. The content of the latter can transform in line with the nationalist ideology. The case study of Russian Nationalism shows a high potential for diffusion of extreme right nationalist ideas in the Russian network space, which manifests in their ability to penetrate other thematic and ideological areas of public discourse.