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Radicalization research is dedicated to analyzing factors related to radicalization processes, which in turn can lead to extremism. One factor is frequently discussed: the role of the Internet. This paper examines the relationship between active and passive online activities, including consumption, networking, and posting, and extremist attitudes in the field of Islamism and right-wing extremism among adolescents. Data from a school survey (N = 6,715) show that right-wing attitudes are particularly correlated with consumption of political websites, though this effect is weaker among females. However, posting shows only a small effect and networking shows no effect at all. Islamist attitudes, on the other hand, are related to the extent to which one consumes violent Islamist videos, meets other Muslims online, and posts Islamic content.

Die Radikalisierungsforschung untersucht Faktoren und Bedingungen von Prozessen, die hin zu Extremismus führen können. Ein häufig genannter Faktor ist das Internet. Diese Arbeit untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen verschiedenen passiven und aktiven Internetaktivitäten, wie das Konsumieren, Vernetzen und Posten mit extremistischen Einstellungen im Bereich Islamismus und Rechtsextremismus bei Jugendlichen. Daten einer Schüler*innenbefragung (N = 6,715) zeigen, dass rechtsextreme Einstellungen insbesondere bei Jungen mit dem Konsum politischer Websites einhergehen, während Posting nur geringe und das Netzwerken keine Zusammenhänge mit rechtsextremen Einstellungen zeigen. Bei islamistischen Einstellungen zeigen sich dagegen Zusammenhänge mit dem Konsum von islamistischen Gewaltvideos, dem Vernetzen mit anderen Muslim*innen und dem Posten islamischer Inhalte.

This study maps the surface web information ecosystem exploited by the Islamic State (IS) and its followers between December 2020 and June 2021. Open-source intelligence investigation allowed a massive online presence of Daesh, manifested by hundreds of communication channels, to be detected. Its propaganda dissemination was founded mainly on one “central” Arabic domain, linked to a constellation of auxiliary standalone websites, blogs, encrypted messaging apps, as well as file-sharing and streaming services. Aside from it, the Islamic State utilised other surface web environments, including numerous Internet Archive profiles and a network of communication channels established by Afaaq Electronic Foundation. This study also shows that URLs banned by law enforcement in 2020 and 2021 were usually quickly restored by the IS’s media offices.

Researchers and pundits alike regularly describe terrorism as being a theatrical performance that depends on publicity to build recognition, garner attention and command legitimation. Clearly, the mechanical contours of the information environment matter when it comes to determining the opportunities and challenges for both terrorist and counterterrorist success. This article addresses arguably the most singularly significant intermediary for information access in modern society: web search engines. These information gatekeepers play a crucial role in guiding both government and non-state approaches to terror. That said, these tools are associated with bias and malperformance on a number of fronts. This study examines the degree to which different search engine usage might present a differential view of terrorism to different users. I turn to agent-based digital infrastructure as a basis for studying divergent information experiences with a major terrorist incident, specifically the suicide bombing and subsequent small arms attacks on the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan on August 26, 2021. The results are striking, confirming that there is substantial and clear variation in the outputs based around a host of factors—variable queries and query styles, information orientations and subsequent personalization, geographic location and, of course, search engine choice.

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