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This dissertation explores the impact of new technologies on state repression, political violence, and contentious politics via three interrelated studies. The first chapter presents a novel theory that describes the technology policies the Chinese government uses to oppress Uyghurs and turn them into obedient citizens. The chapter analyzes artificial intelligence tools, incarceration testimonies, official documents, police data, satellite evidence, and reports by nongovernmental organizations and scholars. Its findings shed light on the pervasive and increasingly dangerous nature of state repression in the digital age. The second chapter investigates the relationship between digital repression and the nature of conflicts using a global event dataset that documents conflicts with at least 1,000 participants. Considering the results of a rare events logistic regression analysis, the chapter asserts that digital repression alone is not a strong enough determinant of the occurrence of violent incidents. This chapter contributes to explanations of the complex dynamics between state repression and collective behavior by taking a critical stance toward technological determinism. The last chapter examines the relationship between technological repression and the likelihood of success for social movements through a competing risk analysis. It shows that social movements are less likely to succeed in countries that employ repression technology more
frequently compared to their less repressive counterparts. This finding illuminates the longstanding debate on the repression–resistance nexus by demonstrating the negative impact of technological repression on civil resistance. In sum, this dissertation documents the risks and opportunities associated with new technologies while also delineating their limitations.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

The author seeks to highlight just how central this unofficial Islamic State ecosystem is to audiences inspired by the group and how the interplay between this ecosystem and youth requires reframing the challenge rather than doubling down on the same playbooks. This article will first present the connection between these young peoples’ use of social media and their attacks. The author will then seek to create the tie-in between the real-world threats posed by these youth-led plots and the unofficial digital ecosystem of the Islamic State, going beyond and expanding the author’s previous work into the ecosystem. 16 This tie-in will be followed by an analysis of the unofficial Islamic State ecosystem, expanding on what the author has already published about it, and will do so by diving into the outlets and tactics central to the ecosystem, and will conclude with recommendations for digital counterterrorism practitioners and researchers. The article will build on a broader report by the author on the Islamic State’s online activities that was published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) on February 12, 2025.

The ISD Germany study on the extreme right-wing use of Telegram serves as a complementary text to the “Escape routes” report. In it, the research team examined links to other platforms, which were shared on the controversial messenger service and were disseminated in the channels of right-wing extremists, right-wing radicals and conspiracy ideologues in the German-speaking world. The main scope of this research was on smaller platforms that do not fall under the deletion obligation of the NetzDG. Links to larger platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were also analysed, given that the collected data set contained almost twice as many links to these platforms than to those not fully covered by the NetzDG.

For this report, the ISD research team collected 659,110 messages from 238 public channels from the extreme right, radical right, Reichsbürger:innen and conspiracy ideology spectrum between 1 January and 12 September 2021. From these messages, 371,988 links were extracted, leading to 8,252 domains. The ISD Germany researchers examined domains that were shared more than 15 times and identified social networks and platforms.

VOX-Pol Blog post.

VOX-Pol Blog post.